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ABSTRACT  
 
The concepts of deliberation and deliberative democracy have attracted much attention 
in political theory over the past twenty years.  At first seen as both highly idealised and 
unreflective of reality, they have now shed this accusation of impracticality, as 
practitioners and policy makers alike have attempted to institute deliberative principles 
on a national and international scale.  Running alongside this has been the desire to both 
understand political deliberation and its effects more fully, and to then apply this new 
information back to deliberative democratic theory.  This thesis sits in the latter 
tradition, presenting an empirical investigation of political deliberation and then 
discussing how it relates back to deliberative models of democracy.  Where it departs 
from all of the contemporary experimental work, however, is the methodology and 
conceptual model it is founded upon.  Embracing the decision and game theoretic 
approaches, I develop a three-fold framework to study the effects of deliberation on 
individual decision-making.  After outlining two levels of ‘preference’ and ‘issue’, I 
focus on the third, which I term agency.  I then compare a particular case of agency 
revision, which moves people from individualistic to team reasoning, before developing 
and putting into action an experimental test of the phenomenon. Finally, I then combine 
these results with the most recent drive in deliberative democracy towards a systemic 
approach, and derive an alternative, more positive argument for this recasting. 
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V. INTRODUCTION 
 
In a 1998 survey article, James Bohman famously lamented the lack of any 
comprehensive empirical research programme undertaken in the field of deliberative 
democracy.  In particular, he threw the spotlight onto the crucial link between empirical 
evidence and institutional design, and argued this relationship was vital if deliberative 
democratic theory was to make the difficult transition from political theory to political 
reality: 
 
For all the sophistication of these discussions of justification, institutional design 
and feasibility, there is still a surprising lack of empirical case studies of 
democratic deliberation at the appropriate level and scale.  
(Bohman 1998; p. 419) 
 
This relationship between theory and practice, he went on to argue, was critical because 
it helped political scientists gain further insight into the approach from both 
perspectives.  Studying how deliberation happened in the real world and what it actually 
achieved was crucial for both putting it into practice, as well as then re evaluating the 
model upon which it was based.  In short, whilst as an area in idealised political theory 
it had indeed ‘come of age’; this had yet to be matched with any equivalent progress in 
political science.  Driven by this assertion that ‘the deliberative model of democracy 
[had begun to exemplify the] widening gap between normative and empirical 
approaches to politics’ (Habermas 2006), a significant amount of research has begun to 
take place on exactly this front (Thompson 2008).  In fact, this agenda has developed so 
much over the past five to ten years, that Dryzek (2008) recently claimed we had 
witnessed the ‘empirical turn in deliberative democracy’.   
 
With this context in mind, this thesis is a conceptual and empirical investigation of 
deliberation and through that, deliberative democratic theory.  But as I will show in 
chapter two, the current work taking place in one particular subfield has failed to really 
grasp the full story behind a fundamental claim made by all deliberative democrats: that 
the process causes individuals to ‘change’ over the course of the deliberation.  The 
argument structure of this thesis can therefore be summarised as follows: 
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Chapter  Main Concern 
One To provide a literature review of deliberation and deliberative democracy, 
and show how both have already been through recasting on the basis of 
empirical evidence and analysis. 
Two To focus specifically on deliberation, and outline an analytical model to 
investigate the central claim of deliberative revision. 
Three To further theoretically investigate one particular claim regarding 
deliberative revision: that it causes individuals to change the way they 
reason (to team-reasoning) during decision-making. 
Four To outline an experimental methodology used to test empirically for the 
process of agency revision to team reasoning during political deliberation.  
Five To outline the case study of the mini public used for the experimental 
investigation of deliberation. 
Six To describe the results from the deliberative revision experiment, and to 
analyse the various relationships found within the data. 
Seven To then re apply the results and conceptual lessons back to deliberation, 
and thus deliberative models of democracy. 
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  CHAPTER 1   
DELIBERATION AND THE DELIBERATIVE TURN IN 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
As I stated in the introduction, this thesis is a conceptual and empirical investigation of 
deliberation, and through this, deliberative democracy.  As such, my first task is to 
provide a discussion of the concepts and debates that have characterised the subject 
area.  This first chapter, then, has three objectives: 
 
i.       To provide a clear, and much needed distinction between the concepts of 
‘deliberation’ and ‘deliberative democracy’.1   
ii. To provide an overview of deliberative democratic theory, exploring the 
various challenges to it, and the way the theory has already been recast a 
number of times due to critical analysis and evidence.  
iii. To explore exactly what is meant by the concept of ‘deliberation’ and to 
identify the main principles that have been associated with its use in 
deliberative democratic theory. As I will argue a little later, this is essential 
for a study with any conceptual or empirical element in its investigation.   
 
In accomplishing these goals, I will demonstrate the degree to which deliberation and 
deliberative democratic theory have already been through significant reformulation on 
the basis of critical analysis and evidence.  This final point sets the precedent for the 
conceptual examination in chapters two and three, the resulting empirical investigation 
based on these lessons during chapters four, five, and six, and the argument for further 
recasting of deliberation and deliberative democracy that I make in chapter seven. 
 
1.2 DEFINING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRATIC THEORY  
 
                                                 
1 This point is both crucial for the thesis, as well as the literature at large.  A number of recent important 
review articles of these issues, including Bächtiger et al (2010) and Mansbridge et al (2010), seem to 
switch too readily between the two concepts.  My objective is to clearly distinguish between them during 
this chapter. 
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Over the past fifteen years, the debate within the discipline of democratic theory has 
been dominated by two distinct approaches.  Firstly, there is the aggregative approach, 
which considers raw preferences as the primary material for decision-making, and 
conceptualises democracy as an economic market where bargaining and self interest 
reign supreme. Stemming from a highly liberal position, it stipulates that personal 
preferences need no public or private justification, and aside from their roles in 
prediction or correction, it regards reasons as insignificant and inconsequential to the 
process.  Collective political decisions are then made according to a specific, although 
not universal, aggregation method.  If a particular threshold is met, usually some form 
of majoritarian result, then the outcome is binding and deemed legitimate for all 
citizens.  
 
This model dominated the theoretical literature up until the late 1980s, and arguably still 
occupies centre stage in the more applied field of democratisation.  Its pedigree can be 
seen in the sheer volume of literature premised on its fundamental principles. Wollheim 
(1962; p.76), for example, envisaged the democratic process as a type of machine, into 
which are 'fed, at fixed intervals, the choices of individual citizens'; Riker (1961) sees it 
as the mere 'summing of preferences', whilst Sen (1970; pp.35-36) describes it as a 
'collective choice rule' used to transpose individual preferences into a unique social 
ordering of alternatives.  Mansbridge on the other hand, offers the following 
comprehensive definition: 
 
Voters pursue their individual interests by making demands on the political 
system in proportion to the intensity of their feelings.  Politicians, also pursuing 
their own interests, adopt policies that buy them votes, thus ensuring 
accountability.  In order to stay in office, politicians act like entrepreneurs and 
brokers, looking for formulations that satisfy as many, and alienate as few, 
interests as possible.  From the interchange between self-interested voters and 
self-interested brokers emerge decisions that come as close as possible to a 
balanced aggregation of individual interests.   
(Mansbridge 1980; p. 17) 
 
The key point to take is that this model of democracy sees only the decision rule as the 
source of authority, settling what collective decision should be taken, and therefore 
making the minority of citizens who might disagree, obey it.  Since the late 1980s, 
however, democratic theory has experienced what Dryzek (2000, p. v) famously calls 
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the 'deliberative turn’2, where the focus of democracy has shifted to what Parkinson 
(2006a; p.1) claims can roughly be described as 'a way of thinking about politics which 
emphasises the give and take of public reasoning between citizens, rather than counting 
the votes or authority of representatives'.  Moreover, the deliberative conception of 
democracy stresses the importance of the process itself, whereby 'individuals are 
amenable to changing their judgements, preferences and views during the course of 
their interactions, which involve persuasion rather than coercion, manipulation or 
deception' (Dryzek 2000; p.1).  Put more precisely, the focus of democratic theory has 
shifted starkly from the 'what' question of decision making, to the 'why'.      
 
1.2.1 CLASSIFYING MODELS OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
 
Deliberative democratic theory then, formulated largely as a response to the rather more 
minimal account of democracy espoused above, has a rich theoretical history.  This 
section will draw on a useful distinction made in a number of places including Elstub 
(2010), Bächtiger et al (2010) and Mansbridge et al (2010), whereby three distinct 
‘generations’ of deliberative democracy can be identified.  The first generation3 of 
deliberative democrats, including Habermas (1987, 1990, 1994, 1996a, 1996b, 1997), 
Rawls (1993, 1997a, 1997b), and Cohen (1997), although differing in terms of their 
focus, all envisaged the process of deliberation as a highly idealised method that 
resulted a ‘superior’ collective decision (often resulting in consensus).  Second-
generation4 deliberative democrats on the other hand, including Dryzek (1990, 2000), 
Young (1996, 1999) Goodin  (2003), and Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 2004), have 
attempted to adapt deliberative models to take into account the effects of deep 
disagreement, other forms of communication and private preferences – therefore 
rejecting the strict outcome requirement of consensus.  Each model has taken a slightly 
different focus, and thus they are in fact more a collection of interdependent departures 
from the idealised accounts of their predecessors, than a unified set of approaches.  
Finally, third generation deliberative democrats5 are categorised by their desire to 
explore the ways in which these second generation models might be institutionalised in 
large modern societies, and can broadly be split into two tracts.  One, which has 
                                                 
2 The phrase 'deliberative democracy' was coined originally by Bessette (1980) to describe the discussions 
between members of the US House of Congress. 
3 Bächtiger et al (2010) label this ‘type I’, whilst Mansbridge et al (2010) use the term ‘classic 
deliberation’ to represent the same concept. 
4 Bächtiger et al (2010) term this ‘type II’, whilst Mansbridge et al (2010; p. 67) describe it as an 
‘expansion of the classic ideal’. 
5 Only Elstub (2010) makes this important distinction clear, although it is certainly implicit in Bächtiger 
et al (2010).   
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attempted to show how various micro models might be adapted to mass publics 
(Ackerman and Fishkin 2002, 2005; Fishkin 1995), and another that has sought to recast 
deliberative principles in terms of a macro scale ‘system’ (Hendriks 2006; Mansbridge 
1999; Dryzek 2009; Goodin 2005; Parkinson 2006a, 2008a).   A discussion of these 
third generation models is taken up in the concluding chapter of this thesis, which takes 
into account the conceptual and empirical lessons that I draw from the analysis of 
second-generation deliberation in the following investigative chapters. 
 
Before I look at the movement from first to second-generation incarnations then, I want 
to briefly address a popular oversimplification/misinterpretation of the way these 
models can be classified.  A number of authors have sought to delineate between 
theories of deliberative democracy on the grounds of ‘preference formation’ and 
‘decision rule’ alone (Fishkin 2005; Shapiro 2003):  
 
Mode of Preference 
Formation 
Decision Rule is Consensus Decision Rule is Aggregative 
None N/A6 
 
Purely Aggregative 
Deliberation First Generation/ 
Ideal Deliberative 
Second Generation/ 
Deliberative Aggregation 
 
Figure 1.1: A Taxonomy of Democratic Theories 
 
But critically, this fails to fully comprehend the degree to which second generation 
models differ from their first generation predecessors, and further still, the degree to 
which second generation models differ from each other.   Moreover, it also places far 
too much emphasis on applying aggregative principles to deliberative models. There is 
much more that separates these two types of approaches than simply the collective 
decision of the deliberating individuals – a nuance that will become clear in section 
1.2.3.  In the next two sections of this chapter then, by outlining first and second-
generation accounts of deliberative democracy, the objective is to show how the 
approach has already been through significant recasting on the basis of contestation and 
evidence.   
 
                                                 
6 It is questionable over whether a) this box exists (how do we know we are in consensus if no 
deliberation or aggregation can take place), or indeed b) whether it can be construed in democratic terms 
(it might be seen as representing a totalitarian regime of government). 
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1.2.2 FIRST GENERATION MODELS 
 
Historically of course, the idea that democracy must include deliberation is nothing 
new, dating back to amongst others, the work of Aristotle (1998; 1287a34) who 
famously proclaimed the law ‘reason unaffected by desire’.  In terms of outlining a 
cohesive theory that models the principles, methods and outcomes of a deliberative 
democracy however, two authors more than any other are central.  One is John Rawls 
(1993, 1997a, 1997b), most effectively applied in Cohen (1997), who is famous for 
framing deliberative democracy in terms of a 'moral requirement' (Freeman 2000; 
p.379).  The other is Jurgen Habermas, who proceeds on the basis of discourse ethics 
and rationality. Both types of account discuss how collective decisions are conceived 
and endorse consensus as a possible (Cohen) or even required (Rawls/Habermas) ideal.  
For example Cohen (1997; p.75) states 'ideal deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally 
motivated consensus', whilst Habermas (1996; p.110) asserts 'the democratic principle 
states that only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent of all 
citizens'. Further still, there is also broad agreement between the two perspectives on the 
nature of the collective outcomes that deliberative democracy will yield.  Cohen (1997; 
p.67) claims that public deliberation 'shapes the identity and interests of citizens in ways 
that contribute to the formation of a public conception of common good', with 
Habermas, albeit placing more emphasis on the required procedural conditions, offering 
a similar statement:  
 
Under the pragmatic presuppositions of an inclusive and non-coercive rational 
discourse among free and equal participants, everyone is required to take the 
perspective of everyone else, and thus project herself into the understandings of 
self and world of all others; from this interlocking of perspectives there emerges 
an ideally extended we-perspective from which all can test in common whether 
they wish to make a controversial norm the basis of their shared practice […] 
(Habermas 1995; pp.117-118)  
 
Where they differ, is in the mechanism they argue makes this possible, and the scope to 
which these principles should be applied.  Rawls and Cohen appeal to a strictly defined 
concept of public reason, applicable only in the public political forum to questions of 
'constitutional essentials' (Rawls 2001; p. 41), and which, in a democratic citizenry, is 
described as the 'reason of its citizens, of those sharing the status of equal citizenship', 
with its content centred on 'the good of the public' (Rawls 1993; p.213).  Consequently 
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this notion then extends to an interpretation of consensus as that of an 'overlapping 
consensus', whereby substantive goals are agreed to by people from all moral doctrines 
from their respectively different personal grounds.   
 
Habermas, on the other hand, relies on both a different interpretation of what 
deliberation entails (i.e. issues of public reason), as well as the domain in which it is 
applicable.  For him, the process of deliberation should not be restricted in either of the 
manners characterised by Rawls: it should include appeals to individual moral 
considerations, and be associated with unofficial networks of private people beyond that 
of the official political domain (indeed Habermas sees these unofficial domains as the 
true source of legitimacy for a government).  His approach is further grounded on the 
presence of a number of conditions required for an ideal speech situation, requiring 
individuals to deliberate with reference to an 'ideal audience or an ideally inclusive 
community' (Habermas 1996; p. 322), and to ascertain the position that such as 
community would agree to, under hypothetical conditions of perfectly democratic 
discourse.  This mechanism, referred to as a process of communicative rationality, is 
indeed often compared to Rawls, but the key point of departure is that Habermas claims 
without actual deliberation amongst equals, in a situation that approximates his given 
conditions, then no consensus can be attained.7   
 
Each of these two perspectives, then, relies on different primary arguments to defend 
their respective accounts of deliberative democracy.  Rawls and Cohen appeal explicitly 
to the idea that decisions made will reflect justice and fairness, whilst Habermas makes 
legitimacy and rationality his core concerns.   Each claims that the true site of 
deliberation in a democracy is different.  Rawls and Cohen favour formal political 
institutions, whilst Habermas puts much more emphasis on the informal public sphere.  
But where they find common ground, and why they are considered under the same 
banner, is the rather idealised way in which they model the deliberation in deliberative 
democracy.  Whether made in terms of ‘public reason’, or ‘communicative rationality’, 
both perspectives present a highly normative framework that offers a very strict 
normative picture of what deliberation should involve.  It is principally this feature, not 
                                                 
7 Indeed this very reason is often given for an argument that Rawls' original work does not class him as a 
deliberative democrat (Saward 2002), in contrast to Habermas whose emphasis on the essentiality of a 
dialogical process clearly lends itself to the notion of deliberation.  This point will become even more 
relevant in section three of this chapter. 
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only the fact that they aim for consensus8, which ties these approaches together.  It is 
also this feature that I’ll return to in section three of this chapter. 
 
1.2.3 SECOND GENERATION MODELS 
 
Second-generation models, I want to emphasise once again, are different from their 
predecessors on a number of different dimensions.  In this section, I discuss a selection 
of these theories by way of their main departing points from first generation ideals.  But 
crucially, I am going to partition off any discussions of how these adaptations might 
impact on how we define deliberation (rather than deliberative democracy). I do this for 
reasons of clarity of argument and simplicity.  This project is foremost an empirical 
investigation of deliberation, with the results then re applied to deliberative democratic 
theory.  As such, keeping the two (related) concepts distinct is imperative. 
 
Exclusivity Challenges to Deliberative Democracy 
Splitting these second generation models up into different families, I want to consider 
particular types of objections to (and thus reformulations of) deliberative democratic 
theory in turn.  The first are a collection that might be labelled as inclusivity challenges 
(Young 1999), i.e. what is included in a deliberative model of democracy.  I now 
consider a number of these in turn. 
 
i. What kinds of participation are included in a deliberative democracy? 
 
Within this sub-categorisation, the first departure stems from an argument that Young 
(2001) labels ‘the activist challenge’.  She begins the article by pointing out that 
contemporary democratic theory does little to value, or even include, the role that 
demonstration or direct action plays in a well functioning democracy.  This, it is argued, 
is problematic, as a number of rights that are considered beneficial to individuals have 
been secured in exactly this manner.  Her examples cite ‘the eight hour day’, ‘votes for 
women’ and ‘the right to sit at any lunch counter’ – but it is easily conceivable to think 
of numerous other instances throughout history that would fall into this category. The 
peaceful protests and civil disobedience pioneered by Ghandi during India’s fight for 
independence, the famous refusal of individuals to pay Thatcher’s Poll Tax, or the well-
publicised music concerts and rallies that were organised to put pressure on the G8 
                                                 
8 See Manin (1987) for a discussion of how first generation models of deliberative democracy do not 
necessarily lead to consensus.   
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nations to write off third world debt.  All show that direct political action, namely in the 
shape of activism, can have a significant positive impact on democracy (Platt 2008).   
 
Young then goes on to offer two types of argument as to why deliberative democratic 
principles offer negative judgements on behaviour that is arguably essential for society.  
Both rely on an apparent contradiction between activist behaviour and the norms of 
deliberative democracy articulated in first generation models.  Activist behaviour is 
categorised as (i) ‘interest based’, and (ii) unreasonable in nature.  The former refers to 
the point that activists are defined by the very fact that they have taken a particular 
stance on a particular issue.  Emmeline Pankhurst, for example, did not enter the 
political stage as an individual uncommitted on the issue – she was firmly on the side of 
women’s suffrage from the off.  The latter point of unreasonableness, on the other hand, 
relates to the unwillingness of activists to consider other points of view during the 
political process. As Young (2001; p. 674) puts it herself: ‘[activists] simply aim to win 
the most for their group and engage in power politics to do so’. These characteristics 
appear quite antithetical to the maxims of public reason and communicative rationality.  
As the argument logically proceeds then, activists should therefore be excluded from the 
deliberative decision-making process.   
 
So how does Young propose this problem is resolved?  One way is by demonstrating 
that activist behaviour is actually compatible with the first generation normative ideals.  
Being ‘interest based’ is not the same as being ‘self-interest based’, as it is directed 
towards an objective that is both principled and communicative in nature.  It is also 
relevant, Young claims, that most activists are often much more likely to have ‘good 
reasons for what they do’. This is indeed a reformulative approach then, but not in the 
sense of reformulating deliberative democratic theory.  Rather, the approach runs in the 
other direction as it attempts to recast activism in terms of deliberative principles.  An 
alternative way, and one that Young concludes with, is to adapt the deliberative model 
of democracy to deal with this challenge:   
 
We can conceive the exchange of ideas and processes of communication taking 
place in a vibrant democracy as far more rowdy, disorderly, and decentred […] in 
this alternative conceptualisation, processes of engaged and responsible 
democratic communication include street demonstrations and sit ins, musical 
works and cartoons... 
(Young 2001; p.688)  
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By allowing activist forms of participation such as protests into the process, Young 
effectively shuts down this objection to/critical observation of, deliberative models of 
democracy.  Whilst any model must include reasoned political discussion, there is 
nothing to stop it from including other forms of participation as well.  In doing so, the 
‘activist challenge’ no longer applies. 
 
ii. Who participates in a deliberative democracy? 
 
A second important point can be made about participation here.  First generation 
theorists view the deliberative process very much through the lens of an extremely large 
discursive forum.  All individuals who are affected by the collective decision are 
expected to participate, and moreover, if the ‘ideal’ is to be realised, then this must all 
happen simultaneously.  However, as Dahl’s ‘back of the envelope’ calculation 
demonstrates, there is a significant problem of scale that deliberative democracy needs 
to confront:  
 
If an association were to make one decision a day, allow ten hours a day for 
discussion, and permit each member just ten minutes – rather extreme 
assumptions […] – then the association could not have more than sixty members. 
(Dahl 1970; pp. 67-68) 
 
A number of non-mutually exclusive ways have popularly been used to reformulate 
deliberative democracy in light of this objection on grounds of legitimacy (Dryzek 
2001, Parkinson 2006a).  The first suggests that deliberative models of democracy are 
only applied to a very small set of possible collective decisions that need to be made – 
mirroring Rawls’ argument over constitutional essentials.  But it should be obvious that 
this does not really address the problem of scale, as even a single constitutional problem 
would still take years to decide in a polity of thousands, let alone millions.  The second 
solution, based on Goodin (2000, 2003) and Goodin and Niemeyer (2003), offers an 
argument for the prioritisation of ‘internal reflection’ over deliberation, meaning 
individuals are no longer required to physically interact with each other.  This is 
something that I will cover specifically in section three of this chapter when I consider 
whether deliberation must be a form of external communication.   
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Dealing with a third possible solution then. Both Rawlsian and Habermassian models of 
deliberative democracy are highly participatory in nature.  But we need look no further 
than wholly aggregative accounts, which only require individuals to tick boxes on ballot 
papers, to find that some element of representation is necessary for it to work on a large 
scale.  As a consequence, Bessette (1994) Gastil (2000) amongst others, explicitly 
envisage a deliberative democracy as one where deliberation plays a role in the election 
of representatives, although as Dryzek (2001) points out, it is not exactly clear how the 
problem of scale does not then simply apply to the election campaign itself.  Parkinson 
(2003, 2006b, 2007) on the other hand, offers a solution that approaches the problem 
from the other perspective.  Implicit in his defence of the British House of Lords (which 
are appointed, not elected), is the idea that an elected representative chamber itself 
might be conceptualised as the site of deliberative democracy.  In this approach which 
Goodin (2000) labels ‘ersatz deliberation’, individuals only need to elect a limited 
selection of paid representatives, who then clearly have the both the time and resources 
to commit themselves fully to the process.  However, this in turn brings up a whole set 
of different legitimacy problems.  Should individuals elect representatives that most 
strongly represent their initial preferences?  Or should they elect people who most 
strongly represent their values, in an attempt to ‘second guess’ their deliberative 
judgements? (Saward 2006). These questions are crucial for deliberative democrats who 
wish to reformulate deliberative democracy on these grounds9, and indeed, are some of 
the key reasons behind Dryzek’s (2001, with Niemeyer 2008) recasting in terms of 
‘discursive’ rather than deliberative representation.10 
 
The problem of scale, clearly, is extremely difficult to overcome.  Indeed neither of 
these possible solutions seem to provide a reformulation that clearly addresses all the 
specific issues that large-scale deliberative democracy produces.  An alternative, 
however, is suggested by third-generation deliberative democrats, who following 
Habermas’ (1996) ‘two track model’, have suggested deliberative democracy needs to 
be recast in more ‘macro’ terms.  This represents the most recent shift in the theory, and 
is something I will consider in depth, along side my experimental results, during the 
concluding seventh chapter of the thesis. 
 
                                                 
9 Parkinson (2003) brings in Catt’s (1999) distinction between the ‘delegate’ and ‘trustee’ model of 
representation to make this point even clearer. 
10 Discursive, rather than deliberative, representation attempts to separate legitimate decision-making 
from head counts.  In this sense, the democratic system is modelled as the confrontation of ‘discourses’ 
rather than individuals.  Parkinson (2003; p.186) offers a nice critique of this reformulation.  
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iii. What types of preference are valid in a deliberative democracy? 
 
When first generation deliberative and aggregative models of democracy are juxtaposed 
to each other, one of the clearest points of departure is the nature of the preferences that 
each articulation uses for collective decision-making.  Aggregative models deal with 
preferences based on raw self-interest, deliberative models on preferences that are 
considered and reflect the public good. But if other forms of communication are 
allowed into the model, which explicitly draw upon personal history and experiences, it 
begs the question of whether self-regarding preferences and opinions should also be 
included.  The challenge is therefore whether deliberative models of democracy should 
in fact relax the requirement that collective decisions should be made on arguments (and 
votes) that reflect the common good, and instead incorporate other types of preferences 
as legitimate inputs.   
 
It is almost ubiquitous for second-generation deliberative democrats then, to relax the 
requirement and discuss preferences as ‘taking into account the perspective of others 
during the process of judgement’ (Niemeyer 2004; p. 352), or put more explicitly, in 
terms of a ‘public spirited attitude’ (Chambers 2003; p. 318).11  But some go even 
further still.  Mansbridge et al (2010) for example, argues for the principle of self-
interest as both a necessary and even desirable feature of deliberative democracy. On 
the grounds of necessity, they follow Cohen and Rogers (2003) in arguing that even in 
an idealised first generation articulation, expressions of self-interest are required so that 
participants can gain a sense of the ‘common good’.  Every individual involved in the 
process needs to know how a particular policy might affect every other individual in 
order to establish what is best for everyone. Without such an exploration, the challenge 
of Sanders (1997) becomes relevant, as ‘the understandings of the common good of the 
more powerful in the polity will dominate’ (Mansbridge et al 2010; p. 74).  They also, 
more controversially, argue for the role that self-interested preferences play in the 
construction of an aggregate conception of the common good. This last point runs 
nicely into the second set of challenges that second-generation deliberative democrats 
have grappled with.   
 
Difference Challenges to Deliberative Democracy 
                                                 
11 The various ways this is expressed in second-generation models suggests a number of different 
interpretations as to exactly what these ‘public spirited’ preferences are.  Although I do not want to get 
into the debate here, this forms one of the central discussion points in next chapter of the thesis.  
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The next challenge and set of adaptations that I want to consider draws on this idea that 
self-interest might have a legitimate place in deliberative democracy.  I want to look at 
how concerns over the inevitable effect of deep disagreement have impacted on the 
movement from first to second-generation models.  Both Habermas and Rawls point 
towards the power of reasoned discussion to achieve consensus – either via public 
reason, or through communicative rationality.  But a number of different deliberative 
democrats (Bohman 1995,1996; Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 2004; Manin 1987) 
have identified examples where even under these principles, agreement is impossible.12  
Moreover some have even gone further, suggesting that complete consensus (where all 
individuals agree to the same outcome for the same reasons) is ‘unnecessary, and 
undesirable’ (Dryzek 2000; p. 170). 
 
More specifically, they point to cases of value pluralism, where ‘reasonable’ 
preferences are completely contradictory to each other, and no common ground or ‘best 
for everyone’ decision is possible.  Rawls' (1993; p.243) example of abortion, for 
instance, can be used for an effective illumination of this issue.  Appealing to 'three 
important political values: the due respect for human life, the ordered reproduction of 
political society over time… and finally the equality of women as equal citizens', he 
claims that at the start of pregnancy the political value of female equality will have 
primacy, and therefore supports the right to abortion.  But what if people think, also on 
reasonable grounds, that due respect for human life is more important?  This position 
can also be defended on reasonable grounds. Herein lies the problem. Value pluralism 
dictates that two polar positions can both seem reasonable from different perspectives 
(Dryzek and Niemeyer 2006). 
 
Once again, partitioning off the discussion of how this deep disagreement (a fact 
highlighted in second-generation accounts) might consequentially affect the nature and 
definition of deliberation, two resultant challenges need to be considered. 
 
iv. What outcome does deliberative democracy yield? 
 
Accounts of deliberative democracy that accept (and even embrace) value pluralism 
must therefore rely on outcomes other than a strict consensus.  Mansbridge et al (2010) 
outline three different types of agreement that might be reached in a deliberative 
                                                 
12 These approaches are often referred to under the heading of ‘difference democrats’. 
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democracy other than convergence (which they define as strict consensus).  The first 
draws on the work of Sunstein (1996, 1997), who in studying decisions made by the US 
Supreme Court (often held up as an exemplar of deliberative decision-making), 
identified forms of workable agreements that continually came up.  Termed 
‘incompletely theorised agreements’, these outcomes reflect a group of individuals who 
all support the same substantive policy decision, but each for completely different 
reasons.  Inserting this objective as a legitimate outcome for a deliberative democracy is 
easy, Dryzek (2000; p.48) argues, so long as the relative reasons that are used to sustain 
the agreement withstand appropriate scrutiny.  The second possibility Mansbridge et al 
(2010) identify, they term ‘integrative negotiation’, and is defined as an agreement 
where individuals are able to exploit the incommensurate nature of the reasons they 
disagree over a particular decision.  Whilst the third, cooperative negotiation, is based 
on the idea of compromise – where each individual ‘gives up’ some part of his or her 
preferred outcome in order to reach an agreement.   
 
Other second-generation theorists have also explored some other types of possible 
outcome as the objective for deliberative democracy.  Dryzek and Niemeyer (2006; p. 
638), for example, identify three different levels at which ‘consensus’ might work: 
 
 Value Belief Expressed Preference 
Type of consensus Normative consensus  Epistemic consensus  Preference consensus  
Meta-counterpart Recognition of types 
of value that are 
legitimate 
Acceptance of 
credibility of disputed 
beliefs 
Agreement on the 
nature of the disputed 
choices 
 
Figure 1.2: Elements of Preference Construction 
 
Very briefly, normative consensus concerns reaching an agreement over the ranking of 
values that are legitimately held by individuals.  Epistemic consensus on the other hand, 
refers to an outcome where individuals agree on exactly how the disputed choices will 
impact upon the individuals.  Preference consensus, of course, is strict agreement over 
the policy choice (which includes both strict consensus as well as an incompletely 
theorized agreement).  They then extend this directly to the question of deliberative 
democracy, and argue particularly for a reformulation of the theory to focus on the ideal 
outcome as one of meta-consensus.  Agreement over the set, rather than ranking, of 
values that are deemed legitimate, or the set of credible beliefs over the impact of the 
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policy alternatives are two possibilities, as is an agreement over the set of possible 
policy choices put before the demos.  This third level in particular, has proved popular 
with social choice theorists who have explored the likelihood of preference structuration 
(Dryzek and List 2003; Miller 1992)  - and is something I will explore in depth during 
chapter two when I consider the rational choice approach to deliberative democracy.  
Finally, Niemeyer and Dryzek (2007) also explore an idea they call ‘intersubjective 
rationality’, which argues for a strengthening of the link between values/beliefs and 
expressed preferences as the ideal outcome (in apparent contradiction to Sunstein’s 
incompletely theorised agreements). 
 
v. How are the outcomes in a deliberative democracy identified? 
 
Deliberative models of democracy, even if they include other forms of participation as 
acceptable in their framework, are still clearly ‘talk centric’.  Amongst relatively small 
deliberating groups of individuals, it is perhaps possible to imagine that towards the end 
of the discussion, members will begin to get a sense of the likely outcome.   For 
example, if each individual makes exactly the same reasoned argument towards the 
same policy proposal, it would be quite clear from the discussion alone that a complete 
consensus had arisen.  Indeed if you consider small committee meetings, it is often the 
chairperson’s responsibility to identify the point at which this happens. It is this 
sentiment, then, that seems to be the impetus behind statements like ‘decision making 
by discussion’ (Elster 1998c; p.1). 
 
However, a number of political theorists and deliberative democrats alike have 
identified problems with this idea, and can be split broadly into one of three 
subcategories. Firstly then, Manin (1987) and Cohen (1997) are typical of first 
generation deliberative democrats in identifying consensus as an ideal, but both admit 
the possibility that when it is not forthcoming, ‘deliberation concludes with voting, 
subject to some form of majority rule’ (p. 75).  This is very much an argument of 
second best.  Voting is only required when consensus is not forthcoming.  Other 
democratic theorists, particularly Saward (1998), have taken a different approach and 
argued for aggregation on the grounds of inevitability.  Even under full agreement, they 
argue, some form of voting is required to fully clarify/identify the decision that has been 
made: 
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No matter how much deliberation takes place, heads have to be counted – 
aggregated – at some point if a democratic decision is to be reached.  No 
adequate model of democracy can fail to be “aggregative”. 
(Saward 1998; p.64) 
 
The third subcategory involves a more positive approach to the challenge, and includes 
arguments that make the case directly for the benefits that aggregation – voting in 
particular – brings to a deliberative democracy.  Prezeworski (1998) for example, claims 
that aggregation is the true site of legitimate authority, and that without it deliberative 
models of democracy are less complete.  Goodin (2008b) on the other hand, takes a 
slightly different tack.  He argues that deliberation is a highly path dependent process.  
Because of its serial nature, and accepting some level of epistemic virtue in the model, 
he asserts that aggregation’s simultaneous structure is a much better ‘decision-making’ 
process. In effect, it prevents the possibility that a ‘good’ choice is impacted by ‘bad’ 
choice made before it. Deliberation is essential for democracy, but it must end in voting. 
 
My recommendation is therefore, ‘first talk, then vote’.  That is to say, build 
discursive and deliberative elements centrally into the political process, but make 
the ultimate decisions through more purely aggregative procedures. 
(Goodin 2008b; p.124) 
 
Let me summarise some of the key points from these discussions then.  Second-
generation models of deliberative democracy have attempted to respond to a number of 
challenges to the original articulation in the work of Habermas, Rawls and Cohen.  
These challenges, roughly split into ‘exclusivity’ and ‘difference’ problems, have in 
turn led to theories of deliberative democracy that include of other forms of 
participation, communication and preferences, and have recast the objective outcome 
into one of a number of different possibilities, all identified by an aggregation phase.  
But what I have continually left to be discussed, of course, is how the concept of 
‘deliberation’ has been reformulated to accommodate these challenges.  This is the 
debate I now take up. 
 
1.3 DEFINING DELIBERATION   
 
1.3.1 FIRST GENERATION DELIBERATION 
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Deliberation and deliberative democracy are not the same thing.  Nor are they bound 
together in perpetuity. It is possible to have democratic decision-making without any 
deliberative element, and similarly, it is quite plausible to have deliberation outside of a 
democracy.  I make this point again because it will prove crucial for the concluding 
chapters of the thesis.  As I have shown then, second-generation models of deliberative 
democracy depart from their first generation predecessors on a host of different 
dimensions.  The final aspect I want to consider is without doubt the most important of 
these many departures.  As Rawls (1997b; p.772) once stated, ‘the definitive idea for 
deliberative democracy is deliberation itself’.  As a concept in its own right, deliberation 
is credited in delivering numerous benefits other than increased legitimacy in 
democratic outcomes. Mill, for example, famously argued for its epistemic and 
developmental qualities when he claimed: 
 
No wise man ever acquired his wisdom in any mode but it [deliberation]; nor is it 
in the nature of human intellect to become wise in any other manner. The steady 
habit of correcting and completing his own opinion by collating it with those of 
others, so far from causing doubt and hesitation in carrying it into practice, is the 
only stable foundation for a just reliance on it […]. 
(Mill 1972; p.88) 
 
Other than accepting the key assumption that deliberation causes individuals to change 
through the process, I want set aside the discussion of exactly how, until the following 
chapter.  Presently, my objective is simply to arrive at an adequate definition of what is 
meant when the concept of deliberation is utilised in deliberative models of democracy.  
There are then, two ways of describing this concept.  One is by looking at the various 
tasks that deliberation is required to perform, which I will term the ‘structural account’.  
The other involves looking at the actions of the individuals involved in the process (or 
features of the communication) – which I will term the ‘behavioural account’. Political 
theory has remained fixed almost entirely on the latter, and it is this approach that I 
discuss first.  To do this, I want to draw upon a three-fold framework outlined in 
Thompson (2008; p. 501): 
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Conceptual Criteria Evaluative Criteria Empirical Criteria 
Clarifies the limit and scope 
of the concept. 
Defines what deliberation is 
applied to. 
Clarifies exactly what is 
meant by the concept. 
Defines the criteria by which 
to judge it. 
Clarifies the concept in terms 
of operational features. 
Required for real-world 
applications 
 
Figure 1.3: Three Levels of Deliberative Criteria 
 
First generation approaches to deliberation offered a highly normative and idealised 
account of exactly what it meant. Recall once more Rawls’ reliance on the ‘give and 
take of public reason’, or Habermas’ appeal to ‘fully rational discussion that requires 
individuals to deliberate with reference to an ideally inclusive community’.  The 
objective of both these accounts, I would suggest, was to bridge the gap between 
conceptual and evaluative criteria.    On the Rawlsian side, this is most clearly 
articulated in Cohen’s (1997; pp.73-75) principles of ideal deliberation: 
 
        Ideal deliberation is free in that individuals consider themselves bound only 
by the results of the deliberation, and are free to act on the decision. 
        Ideal deliberation requires individuals to offer reasons for their proposals, 
on the requirement that the reason alone is sufficient to persuade others of 
its merit. 
        Ideal deliberation requires that all individuals involved in the process are 
formally and substantively equal. 
        Ideal deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus.   
 
Whilst for Habermas, these might be expressed as the following (cited and adapted from 
Bächtiger et al 2010; p. 36): 
 
       No one with competency to speak and act may be excluded from discourse. 
       All have the same chances to question and/or introduce any assertion 
whatever as well as express their attitudes, desires and needs. 
        No one may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising 
these rights. 
        All have the right to question the assigned topics of conversation. 
        All have the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the very rules of the 
discourse procedure and the way in which they are applied or carried out. 
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        The discourse must be public and rational, with participants adopting 
arguments that are orientated towards a truthful common understanding. 
 
The critique these criteria have faced, as with first generation models of deliberative 
democracy, are challenges on a number of different fronts.  As well as the problems that 
might be subsumed under the headings of exclusivity and difference challenges, there 
are also clear cognitive and motivational issues to consider. Do individuals really have 
the ability or even desire to participate in deliberation defined by these principles? 
Because of this, second-generation deliberative democrats have sought to redefine the 
notion of what is meant by deliberation.  However, most have done so in a way that sits 
firmly in Thompson’s (2008) first box.  They have established conceptual criteria for a 
reformulated definition, but have then failed to translate this to an evaluative approach.  
In other words, most second-generation versions of deliberation offer quite vague and 
non-specified accounts of exactly what they mean.   For example, Chambers (2003; p. 
309) defines it as ‘debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well informed 
opinions in which participants are willing to revise their preferences in light of 
discussions, new information, and claims made by fellow participants’. Dryzek (2000; 
p.2) adopts a more liberal position in claiming ‘the only condition for authentic 
deliberation is then the requirement that communication induce reflection upon 
preferences in a non-coercive fashion’.  Whilst Gutmann and Thompson (2004) fail to 
provide an overt single definition of what is meant by ‘deliberation’ – focussing purely 
on debates in deliberative democracy. 
 
This is clearly a significant problem.  If the effects of deliberation are to be studied in 
the real world, in order to provide insight and analysis as to how it is then integrated 
with normative democratic theory, then a clear definition is vital.  How can something 
be investigated if it cannot be identified in the first place?  This is a sentiment echoed by 
Steiner’s (2008) warning regarding the apparent prevalence of ‘concept stretching’ in 
the discipline.  If deliberation includes everything, then by definition, it refers to 
nothing.  It is then impossible to tell whether an empirical study is examining the effects 
of deliberation, or another related form of communication such as cooperative 
argumentation (Makau and Marty 2001), dialogue (Pearce and Littlejohn 1997) or 
debate (Tannen 1998). 
 
1.3.2 DEFINING ‘SECOND-GENERATION’ DELIBERATION 
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In this section I want to construct a model of deliberation that draws on a mixture of the 
principles identified by first generation theories, but makes explicit the possibility of 
relaxation on the basis of the various challenges made to them.  In many respects then, 
this is a similar approach to that taken by proponents of the Discourse Quality Index 
(Sporndli 2003, Steenbergen et al 2003)13, and indeed I will draw quite heavily on their 
categories in my discussion of the principles of deliberative behaviour.  But where my 
approach differs, is that I also want to provide a discussion of deliberation in terms of 
how it proceeds.  By looking at both ways to define deliberation, my objective is to 
create a more comprehensive set of evaluative criteria that can be used to both judge its 
quality, and particularly, to justify empirical/operational features of the deliberative 
mini public that I outline in chapter five.  
 
But before I do this, I need to make a fundamental point very clear.  It is possible to 
define concepts in absolute terms.  For example in chemistry, an element is either 
hydrogen, or it is not.  It cannot be ‘hydrogen-ish’.  Following Sporndli (2003) and 
Steenbergen et al (2003), I argue that deliberation is not one of these notions.  It exists 
on a scale.  At one end sits something that satisfies the principles of deliberation 
perfectly, and at the other end, something that fulfils none of these criteria.   Of course, 
this does not mean that points on the scale of deliberation (or its constitutive principles) 
cannot be identified and labelled as a particular form.  When we deal with percentages 
in mathematics, for example, we continually rely on terms that pertain to specific points 
on this scale – 50% is often described as ‘half way’.  Neblo (2007) makes a useful 
related point when he discusses the same premise, but rather concerns himself with the 
point at which discussion scores so low on the scale that it does not warrant the label 
deliberation at all:14 
 
                                                 
13 The ‘Discourse Quality Index’ (DQI) (Sporndli 2003, Steenbergen et al 2003; pp. 27-30) draws on five 
‘coding categories’ in order to assess the extent to which real world deliberation satisfies the 
Habermassian inspired ideal.  The first is participation, which includes the extent to which individuals can 
participate freely in the deliberative process. The second is the level of justification, which concerns the 
extent to which participants offer reasons for their positions.  Related to this is the third criterion, which 
looks at the way these reasons are justified, from self-interest to the common good. The fourth is respect, 
which measures the degree to which individuals treat each other in terms of counterarguments, and the 
final aspect is constructivism, which analyses whether the deliberation is directed towards the pursuit of 
an outcome amenable to all involved.   
14 Neblo (2007) begins with a very useful articulation of these issues, on the promise that in the latter 
section of the paper he will explore the principles/criteria he believes are useful in order to define and 
judge deliberation.  I find his exposition extremely unstructured, and because of this, I’m not really sure 
he achieves his objective.  
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Deliberation is thus akin to a concept like ‘courage’, that describes a range of 
phenomena, but does so in a way that is intrinsically approbative. There may be 
degrees of courage, but we need a different phrase, ‘utter cowardice’, to describe 
a complete lack of courage.   Similarly, putative deliberation that falls below a 
certain threshold is no longer deliberation.   
(Neblo 2007; p. 529)    
 
I now want to outline the six principles that I believe constitute the main normative 
features of deliberation from the behavioural approach.  In doing so, I also want to 
explore the way some of these criteria have been relaxed, and how this relates to the 
‘quality’ of deliberation.  These six criteria are: 
 
i.       Interactive Communicative Process 
ii. Equality 
iii. Mutual Respect and Reciprocity 
iv. Reason-based Discussion  
v. The Public Principle 
vi. Decision-focussed 
 
Figure 1.4: The Behavioural Account of Deliberation 
 
Interactive Communicative Process 
Deliberation, ideally, is an interactive communicative process between two or more 
individuals (Minozzi et al 2010).  This point is made quite explicit by Habermas, when 
he claims 'moral justifications are dependent on argumentation actually being carried 
out, not for pragmatic reasons of an equalisation of power, but for internal reasons, 
namely that real argument makes moral insights possible' (Habermas 1990; p. 57).  It 
might seem to sit in apparent contradiction to some interpretations of the Rawlsian 
approach, which places more emphasis on internal reflection.  Those who subscribe 
fully to this account, thus, might define deliberation as something that ‘occurs anytime a 
citizen either actively justifies her views (even to herself) or defends them against a 
challenge (even from herself)’ (Gunderson 1995; p. 199).  In other words, it is possible 
to take part in deliberation purely with oneself.  There are others, however, who whilst 
recognising the positive deliberative impact that such a cognitive process yields, 
recognise that it cannot entirely replace the ‘external-collective’ dimension (Goodin 
2000).  Challenges especially relevant to deliberation articulated in this way, including 
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the ability to make others present without having met them, or the ability to then 
understand their arguments without having heard them, all clearly suggest that some 
element of actual communicative interaction is required.15  As Shapiro (2002; p. 197) 
pointed out: ‘we can be individually reflective, but not individually deliberative’. 
 
A second way that the maxim of interactive communication might be challenged and 
relaxed surrounds the physical nature of the contact. In particular, the possibility that 
information technology might ease the burden of face-to-face deliberation has been 
explored by a number of second-generation theorists (Coleman and Gotze 2001, 
Dahlberg 2001, Smith et al 2009).   Wright and Street (2007), in a discussion of the 
institutional factors that play a role in determining quality of deliberation online, 
identify a particular benefit other than addressing the scale problem that it might 
provide.  They distinguish between synchronous and asynchronous forms of 
communication, where in the latter participants have an opportunity to go away and 
think about their response before making it, compared to the former where it must be 
instantaneous.  Clearly, individuals who take more time in considering their response 
are behaving more deliberatively.  But this isn’t precluded, per se, in synchronous 
behaviour.  Wright and Street’s (2007) argument is indeed interesting and important, 
but their assertion that it does not occur in facet-to-face deliberation is erroneous.  Gastil 
(2000), on the other hand, considers this question directly, and asks what virtues face-
to-face interaction delivers that is not provided via web-based activity.  Although he 
openly admits the case isn’t quite settled, he cites the importance of socialisation and 
group cohesiveness in making decisions over controversial political decisions  - 
something facilitated by face-to-face discussion.16  In short then, whilst deliberation is 
indeed possible online, and even within a single individual, face-to-face interactive 
communication remains the ideal. 
 
Equality  
The principle of equality is a feature common to almost every comprehensive definition 
of deliberation, and appears particularly when discussed with reference to deliberative 
democracy. Cohen (1998), for example, identified two levels at which it is relevant, the 
procedural and substantive: 
 
                                                 
15 Goodin (2003; p. 108-109) also identifies the issue of legitimacy as a reason to defend the need for 
physical communication between individuals. 
16 This is an area that I will discuss in much more depth during chapter three. 
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They are formally equal in that rules regulating the ideal procedure do not single 
out individuals for special advantage or disadvantage.  Instead, everyone with 
deliberative capacities – which is to say more or less all human beings – has and 
is recognised as having equal standing at each stage of the deliberative process. 
[…] The participants are substantively equal in that the existing distribution of 
power and resources does not shape their chances to contribute to deliberation, 
nor does that distribution play an authoritative role in their deliberation. 
(Cohen 1998; p. 194) 
 
First generation accounts of deliberation have therefore defined it as discussion that 
takes place between individuals who are both substantively and procedurally equal.  
However, second generation accounts have had to respond to significant criticisms on 
the first level.  Sanders’ (1997) argument regarding power structures has raised the 
possibility that a completely equal deliberation is impossible, and that individuals with 
greater deliberative capacity will dominate the discussion.  Moreover, the desirability of 
such a concept in particular debates is also questionable.  For example during 
deliberation on complex ethical questions in the scientific realm (i.e. genetically 
modified foods), a persuasive argument that ‘experts’ might indeed warrant unequal 
status can be made.  The relaxation of the equality maxim in deliberation has therefore 
mirrored Sen’s (1992) famous reformulation of the economic approach to poverty and 
inequality, moving to a capability-based approach.  In this sense, deliberative equality 
has come to rest simply on a procedural basis (Christiano 2008).  Deliberation 
represents a process that values higher levels of equality in participation (the more equal 
the better the deliberation), but can only provide the institutional rules to guarantee 
equality of opportunity.17 
 
Mutual Respect and Reciprocity 
Linked to the concept of equality are the maxims of mutual respect and reciprocity 
(Gutmann and Thompson 1996).  Deliberation is a dynamic process, which requires 
individuals to interact with one another during the discussion.  This means, of course, 
that they are therefore continually put in the position where they must respond to 
statements and claims made by other members of the deliberation.  Mutual 
                                                 
17 A point that has yet to be even acknowledged by deliberative democrats working on the topic of 
equality concerns the fact that ‘whoever speaks first’ automatically has disproportionate power compared 
to the other individuals involved.  This is because they have the opportunity to set the agenda of the 
discussion.  Because of the dynamic nature of deliberation, this contradiction seems endemic, although 
my discussion of the external account of deliberation might suggest one way in which it might be 
mitigated. 
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respect/reciprocity, then, are defined by Gutmann and Thompson (2004) in two parts.  
The first concerns ‘a favourable attitude towards, and constructive interaction with, the 
persons with whom one disagrees’ (2004; p. 79). This links nicely with the maxim of 
equality, and indeed Sanders (1997) continually merges these points during her critique.  
Individuals deliberating with each other must respect one another to the extent that they 
respond directly to the arguments and claims that are made during the discussion.  
Talking at cross-purposes, where a given participant pays no attention to what others are 
saying, occurs when this is violated and is clearly non-deliberative in nature. 
 
The second part of the definition of this maxim is slightly more complex.  Reciprocity 
concerns not jut the requirement that individuals respond to the claims made by others, 
but also that they give them equal standing to their own.  By this, it refers to what 
Habermas first alluded to when he used the now famous phrase ‘the forceless force of 
the better argument’ (Habermas 1999; p. 332).  Gutmann and Thompson have then 
placed further emphasis on it, and described it as ‘the character of individuals who are 
morally committed, self-reflective about their commitments, discerning of the 
difference between respectable and merely tolerable differences of opinion, and open to 
the possibility of changing their minds or modifying their positions at some time in the 
future’ (2004; p. 79).  Reciprocity, then, is required for deliberation because it explicitly 
includes the assumption that the process has an effect on the individuals involved.  
Without this foundation, there is no reason for deliberation in the first place 
(Mansbridge et al 2010; p.78).  Better quality deliberation therefore involves individuals 
who are better able to meet this requirement. 
 
Reason-based Discussion 
The requirement that deliberation proceeds on the basis of reason-based discussion is a 
feature of all first generation accounts.  Habermas focused on the contestation between 
rational discourses, whilst Rawls continuously referred to ‘public reason’.  Reason-
based discussion, understood here as linguistic/communicative device that simply draws 
a link between justification and an action, has a number of normatively attractive 
features that make its prioritisation in deliberation quite logical.  Most importantly, the 
claims made on the basis of reason-based argument are much more likely to stand up to 
deliberative contestation, as well as persuade others of the merits of the argument.   
They are also, by definition, more universal in the sense that individuals with a requisite 
cognitive ability, irrespective of personal experience, are more likely to be able to 
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understand them.  Finally, reason-based discussion also has the benefit that it invites 
commensurable replies from other participants, in that a proposition put forward by any 
individual can be countered by any other without having to establish a shared personal 
perspective/history18.  As Manin (1987) put it then: 
 
Between the rational object of universal agreement and the arbitrary lies the 
domain of the reasonable and the justifiable, that is, the domain of propositions 
that are likely to convince, by means of arguments, whose inclusion is not 
contestable, the greater part of an audience.   
(Manin 1987; p. 363) 
 
Because of these features, first generation models of deliberation took great pains to 
exclude other forms of communication in their definition.  But many second-generation 
accounts have taken a more liberal position.19  Fearon (1998), for instance, argues for 
the broadest conceptualisation of what should be included, and suggests deliberation 
should be defined merely as ‘discussion’. Dryzek (2000), on the other hand, takes a 
position somewhat in between these two perspectives, and claims there are some 
particular forms of discussion that should, and some that should not, form part of a 
comprehensive definition of deliberation.  In Dryzek’s own words, he states ‘we must 
determine the degree to which [it] must stress rational argument, and the extent to which 
it can and should admit other forms of communication’ (2000; p. 67).20 
 
The premise then, is the cognitive challenge made by Sanders (1997; p. 348) that ‘some 
citizens are better than others at articulating their arguments in rational, reasonable 
terms’, and that this power discrepancy means the deliberative process is likely to 
favour a particular type of individual.  Sanders draws heavily on the work of 
Schumpeter, and in particular, his assertion that the masses ‘are not capable of rational 
argument’ (p. 354), and whilst her line of reasoning explicitly concerns the dominance 
of white middle class men during American jury deliberation (pp. 362-369), the point is 
certainly generalisable.  Two possible avenues exist in order to confront this challenge 
                                                 
18 Bohman and Richardson (2009; p.254) contest this slightly, and suggest that individuals have different 
conceptions of what counts as a reason.  However, their argument appears to be made on the basis of the 
content of these reasons, rather than the linguistic/communicative structure of what a reason contains.  
This is addressed in the following criterion. 
19 A good discussion of how a related discipline, communication studies, has responded to these 
challenges is found in Escobar (2009) – on the topic of ‘dialogue’ rather than ‘deliberation’. 
20 Because Dryzek is typical of most second-generation accounts and fails to continually distinguish 
between the two concepts, he is actually referring to ‘deliberative democracy’ in this quote.  The point is, 
though, must more applicable to the concept of ‘deliberation’. 
 35 
to defining deliberation.   The first is for deliberation to be recast so that it includes, or 
acknowledges a ‘training phase’ in the process, where individuals are able to learn to 
take part in talk that is ‘rational, constrained, and oriented to a shared problem’ (p. 370).  
This would ensure equality whilst protecting the privileged position of reasoned 
argument as the only form of communication valid in a deliberation.21 
 
The second possibility, one Dryzek himself embraces, is to actively include other forms 
of communication into the model: 
 
Some deliberative democrats, especially those who traffic in ‘public reason’, 
want to impose narrow limits on what constitutes authentic deliberation, 
restricting it to arguments in particular kinds of terms.  A more tolerant position, 
which I favour, would allow argument, rhetoric, humour, emotion, testimony or 
storytelling, and gossip. 
(Dryzek 2000; p. 1) 
 
His criterion for inclusion, then, is two fold.  On one level, it is based on a distinction 
between types of talk that cause individuals to reflect on their preferences in either a 
coercive, and non-coercive manner.  The latter, including manipulation, indoctrination, 
propaganda, deception, and threats, offer no benefits to individuals involved in the 
process and should therefore be excluded.  On the other hand, rhetoric (Dryzek 2010), 
emotion (van Stokkom 2003), testimony (Mansbridge 1990, Sanders 1997) or 
storytelling (Black 2008; Ryfe 2006) each has various positive reasons to be included, 
beyond the fact that they represent much easier ways for ‘everyday’ people to 
participate.  The second level is based on a requirement that any form of talk must 
bridge the gap between the specific and the general.  Just as reasoned argument is able 
to do this, so should any other form of communication if it is to be included in the 
definition of deliberation.  Rhetoric, for example (Dryzek 2010), is claimed to perform 
extremely well on this dimension, as it has the potential to help individuals understand 
the issues and arguments presented by minorities.  Emotion, testimony and storytelling, 
whilst highly personal in nature, also often appeal to universal principles.  Fables, for 
instance, are extremely context specific yet convey a message that is applicable to 
almost everyone in society.  These points, Dryzek suggests, are enough to support their 
inclusion. 
                                                 
21 Although Sanders (1997) might argue this equates to indoctrination into a pre-determined hierarchy. 
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So where does this leave a definition of deliberation? To include these other forms of 
communication into the formulation raises the question of prioritisation.  Whilst 
individuals might indeed utilise these different types of talk at different moments 
(something I will discuss in the structural account below), the more reasoned discussion 
that takes place, the better the quality of the deliberation.  If no reasoned discussion 
takes place whatsoever, it reaches the point that Neblo (2007) identified: it is not 
deliberation.   
   
The Public Principle 
The public principle, then, is related to the previous criterion.  If being ‘reason-based’ is 
a procedural maxim that refers to how speech should be constructed in a deliberation, 
then the public principle concerns the substantive aspect: what the reasons should 
include or be based upon.  First generation accounts of deliberation, particularly Rawls, 
relied on the principle of ‘public’ reason defined as the following: 
 
[…] its subject is the good of the public and matters of fundamental justice; and 
its nature and content is public, being given by the ideals and principles expressed 
by society’s conception of political justice, and conducted upon to view on that 
basis. 
(Rawls 1997a; p. 93) 
 
The argument was simple.  Deliberation, if the objective was to arrive at a consensus, 
should rely on reasons that are substantively applicable to all the individuals 
participating.  This is clearly best achieved by referring to a conception of the common 
good that is supported by all individuals.  Further to this, it is also best ensured by 
making sure that discussion takes place in public, and draws upon language that makes 
this collective nature explicit.  But as I have discussed above, the idea of a single 
conception of the common good cannot be guaranteed, a fact that difference democrats 
have used to challenge the objective of consensus.  In these cases, it impossible for 
individuals to appeal to a substantive point to generate ‘reasons that all can accept’ 
(Bohman and Richardson 2009).  The slightly relaxed position, one most second-
generation accounts adopt, is to then rely on reasons that ‘the public at large could 
accept’ (Chambers 2004; p. 390).  This, it is argued by Mansbridge et al (2010), then 
 37 
also allows for the possibility that statements on the basis of self-interest might be 
accepted as both valid and beneficial to deliberation. 
 
Furthermore the public principle also includes Rawls’ second aspect in his definition, 
often referred to as the Kantian derived ‘publicity principle’.  The fact that it operates in 
public, and reasons are put forward in language that takes this into account, has been 
relied upon by a number of second-generation perspectives to deliver a positive 
outcome in the face of pluralism. Gutmann and Thompson (2004; p. 135), for instance, 
claim that ‘the principle of publicity requires that reason-giving be public in order that it 
be mutually justifiable’, whilst Elster (1997; p. 12) makes a further claim that the 
requirement of making arguments in public will eventually lead to one becoming 
swayed by these considerations.22 To sum up then, whilst deliberation clearly requires 
some element of self-interest at particular times in the process it should indeed prioritise 
arguments that are based on a public principle.    
 
Decision-focussed  
As a concept in its own right, deliberation has been used in a number of different 
contexts (Fung 2007).   Some of these, for example Mill’s articulation in terms of 
education and personal development, require only the process to achieve their desired 
ends.  Nothing need happen other than individuals participating in the deliberation.  But 
at this point, I want to slightly backtrack to the first half of this chapter.  Deliberative 
models of democracy are designed to show how collective decisions can, and should, be 
made by a society.  Because of this, the maxim of being decision-focussed is explicitly 
relevant to formulations of deliberation when used in this context.  Indeed, this is why 
those working on deliberation in areas other than democratic theory continually rely on 
the term ‘democratic deliberation’ (Barge 2002, Gastil 2000).  The thrust behind the 
claim that deliberation must include ‘decision-focussed’ discussion is therefore more 
one of necessity: without some desire to come to a conclusion, it is possible for 
deliberation to have no real end point.   As a maxim for deliberation, then, the maxim of 
being decision-focussed is unique in that it only really refers to the latter stages of the 
process.  In this sense, whilst I include it in the list of behavioural criteria, it occupies a 
unique position in that it is only really relevant when taken in conjunction with the 
structural account of deliberation. It is this approach that I now turn to. 
                                                 
22 Chambers (2004) and (2005) provides a nice critique of these assumptions, and argues that in some 
cases, the publicity principle might be harmful for deliberation.   
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1.3.3 THE STRUCTURAL ACCOUNT OF DELIBERATION 
 
The behavioural approach to deliberation, on its own, offers a description of the nature 
of the discussion that takes place during deliberation. But it says nothing as to what 
exactly is being discussed, and at what point.  It is, if you like, the difference between 
the question “what is deliberation”, and the question “how does a deliberation take 
place”.   This alternative way of looking at the concept is fundamental to devising an 
empirical test of the process at work.  Not only does it provide a loose structure that can 
be drawn upon to establish key subtasks that should be completed in the overall 
deliberation, but it also offers a logical suggestion for the order in which these should be 
done.  Some first generation deliberative theorists in political science have indeed 
pointed towards this debate as important, for example Cohen (1997) writes: 
 
There are three general aspects of deliberation.  There is a need to decide on 
the agenda, to propose alternative solutions to the problems on the agenda, 
supporting those solutions with reasons, and to conclude by settling on an 
alternative. 
Cohen (1997; pp.73) 
 
Whilst a second-generation definition of deliberation in terms of political theory has 
been adapted to include, for example, other forms of communication and other 
justifications for reasons in the model, on its own it fails to then discuss the times at 
which these respective relaxations of behavioural principles are appropriate. The same 
cannot be said for the field of communication studies, where this approach has received 
significant attention (Gastil 1993, McLeod et al 1999, Pearce and Littlejohn 1997).  I 
now want to outline one such articulation, before discussing briefly the normative 
arguments for defining deliberation in this way. I start, then, with a definition of 
deliberation that is rooted in what Gouran and Hirokawa (1996) term the ‘functional 
theory of group-decision making’: 
 
[…] full deliberation includes a careful examination of a problem or issue, the 
identification of possible solutions, the establishment or reaffirmation of 
evaluative criteria, and the use of these criteria in identifying an optimal solution. 
(Gastil 2000; p. 22) 
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This has been further expanded in Burkhalter et al (2002), who offer an account of 
deliberation that is rooted on four key phases.  Each represents a specific ‘task’ that 
must be completed by a deliberating group within the process: 
 
i. Education and Information Phase 
ii. Identification of Solutions Phase 
iii. Evaluative Criteria Phase 
iv. Decision-making Phase 
 
Figure 1.5: The Structural Account of Deliberation 
 
The Education and Information Phase 
The information and education phase is defined as the point in a deliberation that is 
specifically targeted towards ensuring individuals understand the problem they are 
presented with.  In this sense, it involves the presentation, clarification and discussion of 
evidence.  Higher quality deliberation relies on the accuracy and comprehension of such 
knowledge.    Relating this to the behavioural approach for one moment, it is clear that 
relaxations of the maxims of reason-based discussion and the publicity principle are 
perhaps more valid at this point than at any other in the deliberation.  The sharing of 
personal experiences through devices such as story telling or personal testimony are 
without doubt effective devices of discovery, especially when the individuals involved 
are those impacted upon by the issue.   
 
The Identification of Solutions Phase 
The second element of a deliberation, once all participants have gained a thorough 
understanding of the issue, concerns the identification of potential solutions to the 
problem.  In some deliberations, a set of possibilities might be presented to the group 
before hand, whilst in others it might be completely open ended.  In this second case, 
the deliberating individuals must work together to come up with a list of alternative 
polices on the basis of the information they received during the first phase.  At a 
minimum, two solutions must be identified, although as Mill would argue, higher 
quality deliberation is reflective of a wider spectrum of possible outcomes. 
 
The Evaluative Criteria Phase 
Once a full set of potential solutions is identified, the next stage in a deliberation is for 
the participants to then set the terms of evaluation.  One is the possibility that 
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individuals come to agree on a single perspective by which to rank the outcomes, which 
also links with the behavioural criterion of the publicity principle – i.e. ranking options 
of the basis of the common good, or at least according to one conception of it.  The 
second possibility is that they arrive at a restricted domain of legitimate evaluative 
criteria, for example deliberative forums are often claimed to prioritise empirical or 
scientific approaches to a problem.  The final possibility is the rather more minimal 
condition that individuals at least make their evaluative criteria public to the other 
members.   
 
The Decision-making Phase 
Finally, the decision-making phase concerns the outcome of the deliberation, and 
requires that the group make a binding choice or recommendation.  Within a 
deliberation, this might take one of two forms.  Either it allows the individuals involved 
to make a group decision by way of discussion: for example in small groups it might 
simply be obvious to all involved that a position has been arrived at.  Or in larger 
deliberating groups, this is more likely to take the form of an aggregation mechanism – 
a show of hands, for instance.  Whilst these two differ in their modus operendi, what 
they share is the fact that discussion in this phase is required to take on a much more 
decision-focussed element.    
 
All four of these phases, I would argue, are crucial for any effective deliberation to take 
place. Without an information or education phase, for example, the individuals might 
make a decision that is based on incorrect assumptions or a misunderstanding of the 
issue.  Or without an identification of solutions phase that emphasises pluralism, it is 
quite possible for the group to arrive at an inferior decision.  The question that remains, 
then, is if these phases, (articulated as distinct points in a deliberation), should be 
undertaken by individuals in this specific order.  Burkhalter et al (2002) favours a 
definition that does not require linear progression through them, although they point out 
that ‘significant revelations in more primary phases have implications for other phases 
(e.g. changing the evaluative criteria creates the need to revisit the evaluation phase)’ 
(p.420).  Similarly, all second-generation accounts of deliberation conceptualise the 
process as a unitary forum, where overlap between these various phases, which are not 
seen as distinct, is possible.  The very fact that individuals are able to revisit earlier 
phases is an important element of what makes deliberation so different and so 
beneficial. 
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Whilst this is without doubt true, I would suggest an ever so slightly stricter 
interpretation, and identify a crucial normative reason as to why higher quality 
deliberation should at least attempt to follow this order.  Or at the very least, that the 
education and information phase is given some form of independent recognition at the 
start of the process. A major pathology identified in the structure of deliberation has 
been the challenge that minority positions (and persons) present.  When this is taken in 
conjunction with the argument of path dependency put forward by Goodin (2008), a 
serious potential pitfall is made much more likely.  By definition majority perspectives 
(even if they are held by individuals adhering to the maxims of equality and mutual 
respect/reciprocity), have a much greater impact on the eventual decision than minority 
ones.  This means that deliberation is susceptible to what Sunstein (2003) identified as 
the potential of polarisation, or in language that pertains specifically to the dynamic 
nature of deliberation, to a ‘polarisation cascade’ (Hamlett and Cobb 2006). Ensuring a 
thorough understanding of the issue at hand, and then formally investigating the 
possible solutions in a distinct phase before focussing the deliberation on the decision 
should mitigate this risk.  In short, the structured approach aims to safeguard a key 
salutary benefit – that deliberation arrives at the ‘best’ outcome possible, irrespective of 
the nature of the individual(s) supporting it.   
 
1.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
To reiterate then, the first objective of this chapter has been to provide an outline of the 
way deliberation and deliberative democracy have responded and been recast on the 
basis of contestation and evidence: the movement from first to second-generation 
accounts.  In doing so, the final section of the chapter included an outline of what 
deliberation entails, and provided a number of evaluative criteria that might used to both 
judge, as well as promote, deliberation in an empirical setting. 
 
From this foundation, in the next chapter of this thesis I want to examine a particular 
claim made by deliberative theorists working in all areas: that deliberation causes 
‘revision’ and transformation of the individuals involved in it.  As Mansbridge et al 
(2010; p. 78) state, ‘deliberation would have no point if it did not produce change in the 
views of at least some participants’. It is a consideration of this key question that I now 
address.   
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  CHAPTER 2   
A RATIONAL CHOICE APPROACH TO DELIBERATIVE 
REVISION: PREFERENCE, ISSUE AND AGENCY 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
In the previous chapter, I outlined the way in which the twin concepts of deliberative 
democracy and deliberation had responded to various challenges, detailing the shift 
from a first to a second-generation understanding.  Whilst it is most often the case that 
deliberation is argued to impact positively on the basis of legitimacy, other theorists 
have sought other dimensions of justification.  Arendt (1970), for example, particularly 
focuses on the educative power that political deliberation enjoys.  Estlund (1997) on the 
other hand, proceeds explicitly on the grounds that deliberation acts as a sensitive truth-
tracking device, delivering more ‘correct’ collective decisions.   
 
In this chapter, I do not want to settle any of these debates. Deliberation may indeed 
produce better outcomes on all these different dimensions.  Rather, my objective is to in 
fact add a layer of complexity to a claim central to all of the first and second-generation 
accounts of deliberation.  Two key features of these models are firstly, that partial 
authority is handed over to the force of the better argument, and moreover, secondly that 
this authority is now understood as a dynamic concept.  Something that requires 
justification within a process, however, is therefore also quite clearly susceptible to 
being challenged and, by extension, allows for the possibility that a revision might take 
place.  At the very centre of the notion of deliberation, then, is the explicit and quite 
logical proposition that potential collective decisions are subject to the forces of change 
over the course of a sustained deliberation: 
 
The core of the theory, then, is that rather than aggregating or filtering 
preferences, the political system should be set up with a view to changing them 
by public debate and confrontation. 
(Elster 1997; p.11) 
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This sentiment expressed in Elster’s now famous quote is often taken as a definitional 
starting point for deliberative theorists.  Collective decisions are about the aggregation 
or construction of preferences, and therefore this is clearly the most important level at 
which any revision might take place.  Whilst I do not dispute the claim that preference 
revision is important and requires investigation, it is though, not the only way in which 
deliberation can alter the nature of decision-making.   Preferences are one element of a 
three-stage concept.  They cannot exist without an issue upon which opinions can be 
formed. And when these are both present, the individual in question must then decide 
how to act upon them: a step between preferences and action that is often referred to as 
a ‘mode of reasoning’.  A combination of these three interrelated concerns, which I term 
issue, preference, and agency, thus provides the framework upon which the notion of 
deliberative revision should be built, applied and most relevantly, investigated.   
 
This second chapter therefore has three key concerns:  
 
i.       To construct an appropriate analytical framework in which to categorise and 
study the effects of deliberation on the individuals partaking in it.  
ii. To draw on the rational choice approach as a tool to unpack, and explicitly 
articulate, what is meant by the various deliberative claims of revision.   
iii. To show that whilst the notions of preference and issue revision are 
important, (and have been the focus of most empirical work in deliberative 
democracy), that a third concern, agency, should not be ignored.   
 
Indeed this final point then provides the platform for the subsequent conceptual and 
experimental sections of this project.  Once I have established agency revision as both a 
distinct and important research question, I will then consider how it might be 
investigated empirically in order to then re apply the results back to deliberative models 
of democracy.  
 
2.2 DELIBERATION AND PREFERENCE REVISION  
 
2.2.1 RATIONAL CHOICE AND PREFERENCE REVISION 
 
Let me start with the most obvious level, that of preferences.  The application of rational 
choice theory to the question of democracy is nothing new.  Indeed ever since Downs’ 
(1957) seminal work, political science has recognised the advantages of formal 
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modeling.  Being able to restrict and manipulate variables in artificial conditions allows 
different hypotheses to be conceptually tested before an experimental approach is 
applied.  It is imperative, however, not to conflate two related traditions in this single 
vein of study.  One is that of social choice theory, which is concerned predominantly 
with studying how rationality can be applied to different mechanisms of aggregation. In 
this sense, it works almost exclusively at the aggregate level, and concerns itself only 
with the nature of the overall outcome. Early applications of this approach, then, 
included Black (1948) and Arrow (1951), who generated a host of different theoretical 
results that were utilised by Riker (1982) to famously critique wholly aggregate models 
of democracy.  Building on this approach, Miller (1992) and Dryzek and List (2003) 
have then transposed the discussion to deliberative democracy, and have attempted to 
show how social choice theory might be reconciled with this alternative method of 
collective decision-making.  I will return to these various arguments a little later in this 
section. 
 
The second subset of rational choice theory I want to refer to is decision theory, which 
proceeds at the level of the individual and is therefore concerned much more with 
decision-making and human action. On this basis, it is the structure of preferences that 
becomes conceptually relevant in conjunction with the revision argument allied to 
deliberation.  However, whilst social choice informed discussions have generated 
significant attention both conceptually and empirically, the same has not proved true for 
that of decision-theory.  Indeed, Austen-Smith and Fedderson (2006), and List and 
Dietrich (forthcoming) aside, which both concentrate on the mechanism of revision 
itself rather than the end result, there is very little consideration of how these two 
approaches might be combined.   This, of course, leaves the obvious question:  why 
concentrate on the latter aspect of rational choice theory and not the former?  Critics of 
the approach fervently believe that its reach should be restricted to the domain of the 
consumer, and that any foray into subject matters beyond this represents the imposition 
of a wholly inappropriate paradigm (Green and Shapiro 1994).   This claim usually rests 
upon two fallacious assumptions that I quickly want to dismiss.   The first is that 
decision theory is only applicable to instances of a fixed issue at stake, with fixed 
preferences over the different possible outcomes.  Under such rigid convictions, the 
central deliberative claim of revision is therefore quite contradictory. Or to put it 
another way, a decision theory informed analysis of deliberation and deliberative 
democracy is impossible. As List and Dietrich (forthcoming) summarise: 
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[In classical models] a rational agent has fixed preferences over fundamental 
alternatives or outcomes, such as fully described states of the world, and any 
observed changes in his or her preferences over less fundamental alternatives, 
such as policy options, are purely information-driven: they are due to the fact that 
the agent has learnt new information about which fundamental outcomes are 
likely to result from these options. 
(List and Dietrich forthcoming; p. 2) 
 
But there is nothing within the foundations of decision theory, understood as the 
maximisation of utility, which results inescapably in this commitment.  It is just that 
classical models are silent on the issue; with this silence interpreted by critics as saying 
it cannot happen.  In the real world preferences can, in some cases should, and indeed 
do change up to and after a moment of decision-making.23  What is important is that at 
the point where a decision is required, that preferences are fixed for that moment.  
Whilst only recently has this argument begun to establish itself in mainstream research 
under the umbrella term of evolutionary economics, the notion of adaptive preferences 
goes back as far as Elster’s ‘sour grapes’ (1983; pp. 109-140).  In it he discussed a 
number of different ways in which the process might work, for example: 
 
 Adaptive Preferences: unconscious, and reversible. 
 Preference Learning: unconscious and irreversible. 
 Pre-commitment: by committing to prevent certain preferences in the future. 
 Manipulation: other individuals shape your preferences for their own ends. 
 Character Planning: conscious and irreversible, i.e. choosing training. 
 Wishful Thinking: changes perception of the situation, not preferences. 
 
Whilst a discussion of these types of revision in relation to deliberative theory is 
certainly worthwhile24, and indeed links directly to the formal treatment offered by List 
and Dietrich (forthcoming), it is not the focus of my argument.  At this point, I am 
merely concerned with the fact that decision theory does not itself prohibit a central 
claim made in deliberative theory.  Therefore, when deliberative theorists talk of the 
revision of preferences, from a decision-theory perspective at least, what they are 
                                                 
23 Sugden (2006) provides a good discussion of the relevance of this to economic theory. 
24 For example a consideration of which type of preference change compares most accurately with 
deliberative democratic theory. 
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actually referring to is the process of ‘evolutionary preference formation’, or as Goodin 
(1986) calls it ‘preference laundering’. 
 
Nonetheless, it is hard to deny that there are instances of preference change which 
the standard model has difficulties explaining.  Sometimes agents do undergo 
transformations that go beyond information learning in the ordinary sense [for 
example] a capitalist businessman who, after surviving a plane crash, decides to 
devote his life to charity […] 
(List and Dietrich forthcoming; p. 2) 
 
The second erroneous claim to the incompatibility of decision and deliberative theories 
concerns the issue of human motivation.  Quite often, when political theorists are asked 
to consider rational choice approaches, it is the work of Smith (1976b) that immediately 
comes to the fore.  In particular, his now famous discussion of the virtue of selfish 
behaviour relating to the hypothetical situation involving the butcher, baker and brewer 
(1976b; pp. 26-7).   Smith argued that a group of entirely self-interested individuals, 
interacting with each other on the basis of pure self-interest could, due to comparative 
advantage, ensure maximum economic well-being.  But where this (largely historically 
motivated) oversimplification runs into trouble, is that it completely disregards the 
alternative view expressed within Smith’s ‘theory of moral sentiments’ (Smith 1976a).  
In this other treatise, he also explicitly acknowledged other motivatory factors within 
human nature; in particular the effect that an outcome has on other individuals (Sugden 
2002).   
 
How selfish ‘soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in 
his nature which interest him in the fortune of others and render their happiness 
necessary to him though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing 
it. 
(Smith 1759; p.1) 
 
Further to this, the real world as well as experimental economics, provides an 
abundance of counterfactual evidence of non-selfish behaviour.  Charitable donations 
made by city-dwellers to organisations such as the Royal National Lifeboat Institution 
(Sugden 1993) are extremely difficult to explain by appealing to self-interest; as are the 
contributions of money in public goods games made by agents in laboratory conditions 
(Andreoni 1990, 1993).  But again, decision theory, understood as the maximisation of 
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utility, is not irrevocably tied to self-interest: it simply involves the assumption that 
individuals choose the outcome that satisfies their preferences, whatever these are based 
upon.  It is this particular issue, the nature of post-deliberative preferences, which I want 
to now consider. 
 
2.2.2 PREFERENCES AND DELIBERATIVE REVISION 
 
Deliberative theory’s fundamental assumption that a political deliberation should 
change preferences is clearly ambiguous without any sense of the direction this 
movement should take.  As I discussed in chapter one, this question relates directly to 
an issue at the core of the movement from first to second generation accounts.  First-
generation deliberative democrats, then, argued strongly for a reliance on consensus.  
Rawls (1993, 1997a, 1997b) and Cohen (1997) appealed directly to the notion of public 
reason, whereby all individuals would eventually possess preferences reflective of the 
common good.   Habermas (1987, 1990, 1994, 1996a, 1996b, 1999), on the other hand, 
favoured an articulation in terms of a ‘rationally motivated consensus’.  But as I then 
demonstrated via the example of abortion and the ‘incompleteness of public reason’ 
(Schwartzman 2004), a reliance on the notion of the ‘common good’, and the associated 
consensus that normative political theorists have claimed then follows, has proven a 
rather idealistic and at times quite excessive claim for many deliberative democrats.  
Value pluralism, as Dryzek (2000; p.170) argued, was not only inescapable but 
beneficial for democratic decision-making. 
 
A rejection of consensus around a single preference position as a goal for deliberation 
does not mean, however, that a mechanism of preference revision cannot take place.  
And more importantly, it does not mean that a process of deliberation will not enhance 
democratic outcomes that do not reflect complete agreement.  Drawing upon Miller 
(1992), it simply means that the transformation might reflect a mechanism less 
oppressive than that which results in a conclusion favoured by all participants.  This 
second-generation articulation results in what a significant portion of the literature 
categorises as the construction of ‘public spirited’ (Chambers 2003; p. 318) or ‘other-
regarding’ preferences.   
 
The most common way in which the notion of other-regarding preferences (often called 
‘social preferences’) has been understood in a decision theory context emerges from 
Smith’s concept of ‘fellow feeling’.  In this conception, the different levels of utility 
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that outcomes give other individuals are taken into account in the decision making 
process of a given agent.  Essentially, you might say that one person has a preference 
for making sure another person’s preferences are satisfied.  More formally, if each 
individual’s preference ordering can be represented by a function denoted as , which 
is dependent on the choice from a bundle of goods 
€ 
Xi ; then a preference ordering 
motivated merely by individual concerns is denoted by the following
€ 
ui =ui(Xi) .  But 
when an altruistic component is substituted in, the following interdependent utility 
function is obtained
€ 
ui = ui(Xi) + u j (X j ) . In this case the utility of person ‘j’ is an 
element in the utility (and therefore preference ordering) of person ‘i’.  This is what is 
meant by rational choice theorists when they use the term rational altruism (Bardsley 
and Sugden 2006) or pro-social preferences (Van Lange 1999) 
 
The first area I want to discuss, then, is how these other-regarding preferences, revised 
during deliberation, enhance democratic outcomes.  And from this, I then want to 
briefly outline some of the empirical work taking place on this basis. To provide some 
structure to this question, it is possible to differentiate between the two cases that are 
often advanced simultaneously.  The first involves the extent to which deliberative 
preferences are likely to reflect more agreement over a decision, and the second the 
extent to which they might help solve the stability argument presented by Black (1948) 
Arrow (1951), and Riker (1982).25 
 
i. Deliberative preferences lead to less disagreement 
ii. Deliberative preferences lead to more stable collective decisions 
 
The concept of ‘disagreement’, then, is a popular issue with deliberative democrats, 
who place great importance on how it might impact the discursive process (Benhabib 
1996a). A difference in language or mental capacity, for example, might make the 
progression of reasoned deliberation impossible.  But within the confines of this 
chapter, the interpretation of difference that matters is how deliberation might change 
preferences to create outcomes that are more acceptable to more individuals.  Let me 
develop the case for why this might be seen as beneficial then. 
 
To do this, I want to draw attention to Wollheim’s (1962) paradox of democracy, which 
                                                 
25 Dryzek and List (2003) also discuss how deliberation might reduce the propensity of individuals to 
behave strategically in voting.   
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deals with the theoretical inconsistency of why a given individual will obey a collective 
decision at odds with their initial preferences.  Putting aside a discussion of his various 
solutions, the salient question is, of course, on an aggregate level, why is Wollheim’s 
paradox a problem? Does it matter if 51% of the population imposes a decision on the 
other 49%? Is a collective decision with a larger majority in some sense better? 
Intuitively, this comes down to the question of Beetham’s (1991) second aspect of 
legitimacy, justifiability, which dictates that legitimacy is dependant on (a) the degree to 
which the collective decision matches the substantive goals of the people (judged on a 
sliding scale from minority, through plurality, majority and at the extreme unanimity), 
and (b) the degree to which it leads to normatively desirable ends (Parkinson 2003).  
The deliberative claim, to put it quite simply, is that preference revision towards more 
agreement (but not necessarily consensus) therefore leads to more legitimate democratic 
outcomes. 
 
Due in large part to the dominance of an aggregation mechanism that requires 
individuals to simply tick a box stating only their most preferred outcome, this has been 
the traditional intersection between democracy and difference.  It is though, only half of 
the story. Because deliberative models of democracy allow individuals to support their 
case with argumentation, the intensity of preference, implied by the phrase ‘more 
acceptable’, also becomes an important factor to consider.  A given democratic outcome 
might very well enjoy the support of a majority of individuals. But if a particular 
minority feels much more strongly in opposition, then an argument can be made that it 
might not entirely satisfy the maxim of justifiability.   Again, the notion of other-
regarding implies that whilst an individual might not change their preferences entirely 
to match those of another person, they will at least take on the other individuals’ 
perspective; seeing things from their side and ultimately revising the strength of the 
ordering.  It produces what Mansbridge et al (2010; p. 78) refer to as a ‘change in the 
strength and conviction’ with which preferences are held. 
 
To understand exactly how this works, let me provide an example that draws on both 
decision and social choice theories. To make the comparison with deliberative theory 
simple, individuals are argued to enter the deliberation with purely self-interested 
preferences.  The process is then assumed to revise their desires, resulting in an ordering 
which can depicted by a second utility function similar in structure to the one discussed 
above. For example, say we have three agents denoted by J, K and L.  After a successful 
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deliberation over a particular issue, each comes to the opinion that their final 
preferences should now be based on a combination of both self-interest and a regard for 
others. Their new, revised preference function will therefore be dependent on a 
combination of the elements 
€ 
uJ (XJ ) , 
€ 
uK (XK ) , and 
€ 
uL (XL ) .  Linking this with 
deliberative theory, if every individual in the hypothetical were to then value each 
other’s preferences identically to their own, then they would all be choosing according 
to what Harsanyi (1955) famously referred to as an ‘ethical utility function’.   
 
But the very fact that most deliberative democrats choose to weaken the normative 
claim to the phrase other-regarding implies that whilst important, the ethical element 
does not entirely replace that of self-interest.  What this translates to is some form of 
weighting between each component, which allows varying degrees of pro-sociality to 
exist in different preference orderings.  Van Lange (1999; p.338) terms this a ‘proc-
social orientation’.  To see how this translates into practice, consider the following 
example with J, K and L, who have the following cardinal preferences over two 
possible collective outcomes  and . 
 
Table 2.1:  Individual preferences over two alternatives pre deliberation 
Individual Preference Function x y Ordering 
J 
€ 
vJ = u(XJ )  100 80 
€ 
uJ x( ) > uJ y( )  
K 
€ 
vK = u(XK )  100 60 
€ 
uK x( ) > uK y( )  
L 
€ 
vL = u(XL )  10 100 
€ 
uL x( ) < uL y( )  
Aggregate 
€ 
u (X)  70 80 N/A 
 
Graphically, this data can also be plotted on a chart measuring 
€ 
u(x)  on one axis,
€ 
u(y)  
on the other, and with a 45° line providing what effectively denotes indifference 
between the two possibilities.  Intuitively then, the shaded blue area that lies between 
the three individual’s preferences, is representative of the conception of difference 
discussed earlier; it corresponds directly to the amount of disagreement between the 
citizens over the outcome they most prefer.  Additionally, the shaded blue area that runs 
from L to the line of indifference is also indicative of the amount of disagreement with 
the aggregate choice that would obtain if a simple pair-wise comparison were to be 
made.   
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Figure 2.1: Preferences pre deliberation 
 
After the process of deliberation has taken place, preference functions of all agents can 
then be modelled by the following expression: 
 
€ 
vi = α( )ui + β( )u    
€ 
α + β =1 
 
For convenience, now imagine that we take the value of α to be 0.3, and β to be 0.7, 
which roughly translates to the proposition that each individual now values societies’ 
preferences to be of double importance to their own.  A little calculation then gives the 
following other-regarding cardinal utility values for the policy outcomes 
€ 
x  and 
€ 
y : 
 
Table 2.2: Individual preferences over two alternatives post deliberation  
Individual Preference Function x y Ordering 
J 
€ 
vJ =α[u(XJ )]+ β[u (X)] 79 80 
€ 
uJ y( ) > uJ x( )  
K 
€ 
vK =α[u(XK )]+ β[u (X)] 79 74 
€ 
uK x( ) > uK y( )  
L 
€ 
vL =α[u(XL )]+ β[u (X)] 52 86 
€ 
uL x( ) < uL y( )  
 
In this example, the most obvious effect that the addition of an ethical element to each 
preference function has, is to flip the preference ordering of individual J.  But whilst this 
particular result is certainly sufficient, is not however necessary to make the claim that 
deliberation reduces disagreement.  What should become apparent, and this is where a 
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second graphical representation is useful, is that even though agents K and L do not 
mimic this behaviour by changing their preferences entirely, they do however adjust the 
intensity of the ordering.  The revision process therefore makes preferences tend 
towards a point of unanimity, but because the ordering retains a partially self-interested 
motivation, there is still some degree of difference between each agents’ preference 
ordering.  There is convergence, but not necessarily at the level of expressed 
preferences, which is displayed nicely by the reduction in size of the shaded area.  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Preferences post deliberation 
 
I now want to consider the second argument upon which other-regarding preferences, 
formed through deliberation, are claimed to secure better collective decisions.  The 
concept of stability is most thoroughly explored in the social choice literature, 
popularised particularly by the US based Rochester School. Founded upon Arrow’s 
(1951) now infamous possibility theorem, Riker (1988) took the result and offered a 
logically derived argument that all democratic outcomes were meaningless, or due to 
the inability to guarantee stability.  Drawing upon Condorcet cycles (1785), Riker 
showed that transitive social preference orderings, whereby individuals’ preferences are 
aggregated in an attempt to uncover what ‘society’ wants, could not be guaranteed 
without one of four weak axioms being broken: universal domain (U)26, Pareto 
                                                 
26 Which states that the aggregation mechanism should be capable of taking as its domain of operation all 
logically possible orderings by individuals, or in other words, any pair of preferences should be able to be 
compared. 
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inclusiveness (P)27, independence of irrelevant alternatives (I)28 and non-dictatorship 
(D)29.  The inference from which was the potent result that democracy might yield an 
outcome where, for example, given three policy proposals, x y and z, the following 
social ordering might obtain: 
 
€ 
r = x > y > z > x  
 
Accordingly, Riker used this theoretical possibility to critique the entire notion of 
democracy, and, persuaded a large portion of the discipline of political science ‘to doubt 
that the content of social welfare, or public interest, can ever be discovered by 
amalgamating individual judgments’ (1982; p. 137).  But his leap from a theoretical 
possibility to the certainty of casting a judgment upon all democratic outcomes is at best 
rather over-enthusiastic, and at worst wholly cavalier.  Simply because cycles cannot be 
prevented without violating a logical axiom does not mean that they are guaranteed. 
Further still, it is not clear whether all of (U), (P), (I) and (D) are as applicable to 
deliberative models of decision-making as they are to those formed on purely 
aggregative principles.  Indeed, whilst it seems appropriate that any logical combination 
of preferences should be allowed into the deliberative phase (satisfying universal 
domain), preference revision explicitly attempts to prevent certain orderings from being 
taken out of it.  The aggregation stage of the decision-making process is therefore 
characterized by the input of other-regarding preferences, and because, by their very 
nature, commonality now exists between how individuals rank sets of alternative 
outcomes, the possibility of cycles appearing is greatly diminished.   
 
For example, an intransitive social ordering can be produced when three individuals 
have the following self-interested cardinal preferences over three possible alternatives x, 
y and z: 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Is a weaker version of positive responsiveness, and guarantees that if all individuals prefer x over y, 
then the social choice will also prefer x over y. 
28 Which states that a social choice between x and y will only depend on how individuals rank x 
compared to y in their personal preference orderings. 
29 Is a weaker version of anonymity, and guarantees that no named individual should be able to determine 
a social choice in all circumstances (in the sense that the social choice coincides with the ordering of that 
individual whatever others may think). 
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Table 2.3:  Individual preferences over three alternatives pre deliberation  
Individual Preference Function x y z Preference Order 
J 
€ 
vJ = u(XJ )  100 90 75 
€ 
uJ x( ) > uJ y( ) > uJ (z)  
K 
€ 
vK = u(XK )  50 100 95 
€ 
uJ y( ) > uJ z( ) > uJ (x)  
L 
€ 
vL = u(XL )  60 20 100 
€ 
uJ z( ) > uJ x( ) > uJ (y)  
Aggregate 
€ 
u (X)  70 70 90  
 
By pair wise comparison, then, the following intransitive ordering obtains: 
 
 
 
However, following the same process as above, whereby the consequence of a 
deliberation is to shift each individual onto an other-regarding preference function of 
the following form: 
 
€ 
vi = α( )ui + β( )u    
€ 
α + β =1 
 
And where for consistency, 
€ 
α = 0.3 and 
€ 
β = 0.7, then the following preferences are 
constructed: 
 
Table 2.4:  Individual preferences over three alternatives post deliberation  
Individual Preference Function x y z Preference Order 
J  79 76 85.5 
€ 
uJ z( ) > uJ x( ) > uJ (y)  
K  64 79 91.5 
€ 
uJ z( ) > uJ y( ) > uJ (x)  
L  67 55 93 
€ 
uJ z( ) > uJ x( ) > uJ (y)  
 
Which in turn produces the following transitive social ordering: 
 
€ 
r = z > x > y  
 
An altruistic element in each individual’s utility function thus has the consequence of 
creating a shared way of ranking outcomes between different individuals. This link 
reduces the level of disagreement amongst the three individuals, resulting in the 
phenomenon of single peakedness (Black 1948, Dryzek and List 2003).  This, in turn, 
! 
r = x > y > z > x
! 
v
J
="[u(X
J
)]+ #[u (X)]
! 
v
K
="[u(X
K
)]+ #[u (X)]
! 
v
L
="[u(X
L
)]+ #[u (X)]
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prevents the possibility of a Condorcet cycle from appearing.  Deliberative preference 
revision, quite forcefully in theoretical terms, hence provides an effective counter-
argument to Riker’s position: democracy can still be meaningful in the sense the 
outcome reflects the will of the people.  
 
Taken together, these examples demonstrate the usefulness of a rational choice analysis 
of the claim that deliberation leads to more public-spirited preferences.  In combining 
decision and social choice theories, it is possible to conceptually unpack firstly what 
deliberative theory explicitly means, and secondly, how this translates to democratic 
decision-making that justifies the revision as beneficial.  As I suggested in the 
introduction, though, it is also imperative for deliberative theorists to engage with 
empirical reality.  Just as first generation articulations of deliberation and deliberative 
democracy were confronted with the fact that consensus is unlikely and even 
impossible, it is equally the case that the weaker argument of public spirited/other-
regarding preferences needs to be investigated.   
 
The decision theoretic interpretation of the revision process as one that simply adds an 
altruistic element into each individual’s utility function does appear quite reconcilable 
with deliberative theory. It elucidates elegantly what the phrase ‘other-regarding’ 
means, and then matches up nicely with two key arguments behind why deliberative 
preferences might be considered superior to those formed solely upon self-interest. 
However, this is just one possible interpretation of the concept.  Altruism, whilst 
certainly convenient and evidently theoretically successful, is not the only way in which 
the concept of other-regarding preferences might be understood.  Indeed, within the 
scope of decision theory, a number of other potential conceptualisations have been 
generated (see Fehr and Schmidt 2006; pp. 636-644). In turn, each with their own 
degrees of success and failure in securing the democratic benefits that normative 
political theorists claim deliberation obtains.  The phrase other-regarding, for example, 
can also quite plausibly be used as a proxy for the notion of reciprocity, where 
individuals act with altruistic preferences only when they expect others to do the same.  
Or indeed, it is equally plausible that the structure of deliberative preferences might 
mirror something akin to inequality aversion, where an individual favours outcomes that 
offer the same amount of utility to every member of society. Each of these also seems a 
plausible interpretation of the concept (Buchan et al 2006).  
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From an empirical standpoint, the challenge for deliberative theorists is therefore to try 
and map the structure of other-regarding preferences that deliberation yields.  In doing 
so, different conclusions can be drawn and deliberative models of democracy adjusted 
accordingly.  On the level of preference revision, there is a small but developing 
literature in political science that has begun to look at this type of question (Delli 
Carpini et al 2004; Fishkin and Luskin 2005; Mendleberg 2002).  Niemeyer (2004), for 
instance, has utilised Q methodology and found evidence for the claim that deliberation 
induces more environmentally friendly preferences30.  Luskin et al (1999, 2000, 2004) 
have also found support for the claim the deliberation causes preference revision, 
although different experiments have resulted in different ‘types’ of shift.  Finally in 
another study, Farrar et al (2010) use the results from a deliberative poll to test the 
hypothesis regarding single peaked preferences. In doing so, they find some supporting 
evidence for the theoretical proposition over topics they term less salient. As they put it 
themselves: ‘deliberation tends to produce net attitude change and bring preferences 
closer to single-peakedness, at least on issues of low to moderate salience’ (Farrar et al 
2010; p. 344).  The problem for these experiments, however, is the difficulty in coming 
up with a suitable methodology that can distinguish between different other-regarding 
preference structures.31  Even Farrar et al (2010) who proceed on a social choice 
informed basis, do not really engage with the decision-theory side of the analysis. On 
the other side of the coin, studies completed within economics such as Dawes et al 
(1977), Orbell et al (1988) and Roth (1995), do pay closer attention to the structure of 
preferences, but then do not really test the impact of deliberation as conceptualised in 
chapter one. To put it bluntly, I would contend that whilst preference revision has begun 
to enjoy some significant empirical attention, there is much work that remains to be 
done.  And in particular, a more technical approach, such as decision-theory, is required 
to really understand the revisionary effect of deliberation. 
 
Let me briefly summarise this section then.  At the level of preferences, deliberation is 
argued to shift individuals from one utility function characterised predominantly by 
self-interest, to another, which reflects a more pro-social perspective.   When presented 
with possible courses of action in democratic decision-making, an individual is 
therefore modelled to go through the following process of reasoning:  
                                                 
30 Niemeyer (2004) is also an example of deliberation’s effect on issue revision, something I will consider 
briefly in the following section. 
31 See, for example, Charness and Rabin (2002), Charness and Ernan (2002), Cox (2004) or Kagel and 
Wolfe (2001) for some experimental economic approaches to this question. 
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What policy alternative do I favour, given my self-interested preferences? 
 
 
                Deliberative revision 
 
What policy alternative do I favour, given my other-regarding preferences? 
 
However, deliberative theory seems to suggest something more than just creating 
individuals whose preferences take into account the impact of a decision on others.  It 
also seems to suggest a change in the way these preferences are used by the individuals 
in question.  I will take up this matter specifically in section 2.4 regarding the question 
of agency revision. 
 
2.3 DELIBERATION AND ISSUE REVISION  
 
But before I progress to the most crucial section of this chapter, to complete the 
analytical framework I want to very briefly say something about how deliberation might 
positively affect the process in terms of the issue that is being considered.  When 
democratic theory is understood in purely aggregative terms, the issue at stake is often 
taken as exogenous to the process.   Individuals maximise their utility by selecting the 
course of action most likely to satisfy their preferences over the set of alternatives on 
offer.  In many cases though, particularly regarding the election of representatives but 
also in referenda, sets of alternative policies are bundled together in groups, or sets of 
mutually exclusive outcomes.  In particular, this is often the case where ideologies, 
rather than policy effects, are the true focus of the collective decision.  In the UK, for 
example, throughout the 1980s and 1990s the political system was dominated by the 
ideological debate between privatisation and public ownership.  Each party attempted to 
galvanize supporters on these general principles, and then put forward policy proposals 
(in the form of candidates) for the electorate to vote on. The question, then, is why 
might deliberation be beneficial in situations like this? 
 
Let me illustrate my argument by way of a simple formal example. Consider a 
collective decision that is put before an entirely aggregative democratic process. The 
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decision, however, actually contains two issues, each with two policy alternatives such 
that: 
 
First policy decision:   w or x 
Second policy decision:   y or z 
 
Now assume for some reason (i.e. ideological or even for manipulative purposes) that w 
and y are offered to the electorate as linked, such that they are represented by the profile 
of policies α, and so too are x and z denoted by β.  Say we have three individuals J, K 
and L, and they have the following cardinal preferences: 
 
Table 2.5: ‘Bundled’ preferences over alternatives pre deliberation 
Individual u(w) u(x) u(y) u(z) u(α) u(β) 
J 80 20 30 70 110 90 
K 90 10 20 80 110 90 
L 100 0 10 90 110 90 
 
Clearly then, the following is true for all three individuals: 
 
€ 
u(α) > u(β)  
 
Which means when put to a democratic vote, the profile of policies in α, namely w and 
y, will obtain.  However, whilst for all three people it is the case that: 
 
€ 
u(w) > u(x)  
 
It is also true that: 
 
€ 
u(z) > u(y)  
 
The bundling of two issues into a single collective decision, whilst still allowing the 
choice of a most preferred outcome to any of its alternatives on offer, in this case clearly 
subverts the true preferences of the individuals involved.  Two ways in which 
discussion and contestation of the issue at stake can have an impact then, is either to 
suggest entirely new policy proposals that may reflect even more closely the preferences 
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of the people; or in this case, deliberation can be used to decide specifically what the 
issue at stake actually is.  In this case, a deliberation instituted before aggregation might 
identify that the first and second policy decisions are both quite controversial, in the 
sense that individuals in the model prefer w to x, and z to y by large margins.  By 
revising the issue, however, specifically by identifying and unpacking the two different 
decisions to be made within it, and placing them into separate contexts, the democratic 
process is then able to accommodate the profile of choices w and z, represented by θ, 
and x and y, by ω: 
 
Table 2.6: ‘Un-bundled’ preferences over alternatives post deliberation 
Individual u(α) u(β) u(θ) u(ω) 
J 110 90 150 50 
K 110 90 160 30 
L 110 90 190 10 
   
Given that the following is true for all three individuals: 
 
€ 
u(θ) > u(α) > u(β) > u(ω)  
 
Deliberative issue revision therefore allows the profile θ to be chosen.  Since it turns out 
to be more preferable for all three individuals than α, the collective decision that is 
reached post-deliberation can thus be seen as better.  In the same way in which less 
disagreement performed better on Beetham’s (1991) legitimacy framework, it can be 
argued that the collective decision in this example more closely satisfies the will of the 
people. Empirically then, the question of issue revision is linked strongly to that of 
preference revision.  Niemeyer’s (2004) use of Q methodology, for instance, allows for 
both to be investigated simultaneously, although it consequently makes distinguishing 
between the two phenomena impossible.  Again, then, the topic of issue revision has 
begun to enjoy some empirical attention, and is certainly an avenue that requires further 
investigation and analysis.   
 
2.4 DELIBERATION AND AGENCY REVISION  
 
This leads me to the final level at which deliberative revision is possible, and concerns 
the way preferences over different outcomes translate into practice.  By this, I refer to 
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the mode of reasoning that combines the set of possible alternatives with preferences, 
and then determines an individual’s course of action. In this sense, it applies much more 
at the level of the individual, rather than the nature of the democratic decision which 
social choice theory is concerned with.  From the perspective of decision theory, it 
relates explicitly to the concept of rationality, and more specifically, how things like 
probability and uncertainty are factored into the calculation process of a given 
individual.  More often than not then, decision theory is taken as identical to either von-
Neumann Morgenstern’s (1944) expected utility theory (EUT), or Savage’s (1954) 
subjective expected utility theory (SEUT).  Individuals are modelled to act on their 
preferences by comparing the expected utility that each outcome will secure.  For both 
EUT and SEUT, this figure is obtained simply by multiplying the (subjective) 
probability of their preferences being satisfied given their action, by the utility that it 
yields.  For example, given two possible outcomes where x is preferred to y, then a 
given individual will only act in accordance to bring x about if, and only if: 
 
€ 
p[u(x)] > p[u(y)] 
 
One obvious way in which revision can interact with this articulation of decision theory, 
is the value of p that is assigned to each outcome.  As the given parameter fluctuates, 
then so too does the prescribed rational course of action that individuals will pursue.  It 
should be noted that this is something very different to the notion of preference revision, 
since it is not the values of u(x) or u(y) that are altering.  Rather, it is something in the 
structure of the decision calculus, or reasoning, that has changed.  However, as logical 
as the assumptions behind EUT and SEUT are as rational decision rules, a number of 
questions to the validity of the model in certain salient cases have been raised.  One of 
the most famous of which, for example, goes back to the experimental work of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1981), who asked a number of subjects to make a decision 
given the following information and options:32 
 
i.        Each person starts with 1000 [Israeli pounds] 
ii. Now choose between: x = certain gain of 500, and y = 0.5 chance of gaining 
1000 
 
                                                 
32 For simplicity, monetary payoffs are treated as equivalent to utility payoffs. 
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In this first case, 84% of agents stated that they would take the course of action x over 
y.  A second group was then given the following slightly different information: 
 
i.        Each person starts with 2000 [Israeli pounds] 
ii. Now choose between: x’ = certain loss of 500, and y’ = 0.5 chance of losing 
1000 
 
This time, 69% of people chose y’ over x’, even though from the perspective of EUT 
(or SEUT), x is mathematically identical to x’, as are y and y’.  Kahneman and 
Tversky’s result, then, has largely been used to argue for the importance of framing in a 
rational choice approach to decision-making, with two avenues of exploration 
specifically emerging as a result.  The first is to jettison some of the standard 
assumptions behind EUT in order to come up with a different model of decision theory 
applicable in these circumstances. Kahneman and Tversyky’s case of framing requires a 
theory of utility maximisation that takes into account a differentiation that some 
individuals make between potential ‘losses’ and ‘gains’ in utility.   Prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1981), as an example of a non-EUT model of decision theory, 
was therefore offered as an alternative approach. It takes into account ‘reference based’ 
information, and can therefore distinguish between gaining and losing utility. Loomes 
and Sugden (1982) on the other hand, have used behaviour that departs from EUT and 
SEUT to generate a model of decision theory they call ‘regret theory’.  This model 
predicts that individuals will choose on the basis of minimising the potential regret they 
might feel in decision-making under uncertainty.   
 
In a useful review article, Starmer (2000) takes the position that the eventual goal of 
decision theory is to come up with a single formal model of choice that can be used to 
explain all human behaviour.  Whilst this endeavour is surely worthwhile, a different 
perspective might also be taken.  Instead of generating a universal model of choice, an 
alternative line of enquiry is to look at the circumstances that provoke certain models to 
be used by individuals.  Under this interpretation, the claim is that in particular cases, 
individuals will be more or less likely to rely on different models of agency. A plausible 
case, for instance, might be made that the prioritisation of objectivity and rationality 
within deliberation could induce individuals to act in accordance with the most simple, 
and objective model of agency: EUT.  Work done by Loomes, Starmer and Sugden 
(2003), although not strictly concerning deliberation, adds at least some potential 
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support for this idea in their investigation of the erosion of reference dependent choices 
(indicative of prospect theory) during repeated market interactions.  Since deliberation 
is also an example of a dynamic learning process, an intuitive claim to test along these 
lines would therefore be whether allowing a reasoned deliberation in Kahneman and 
Tversky’s (1981) example would affect the decisions made by the individuals in 
question. Would it induce individuals to employ EUT over that of prospect theory?  
This presents one possible hypothesis to explore on the level of agency revision. 
 
However, in this thesis I want to consider a more fundamental change in which the 
concept of agency revision might be understood.  Decision theoretic models like EUT, 
SEUT, prospect theory and regret theory all share the assumption that reasoning on 
behalf of preferences takes place at the level of the individual.  They are premised upon 
methodological individualism (Weber 1968 [1922].  Preferences might include a 
consideration for another agent, but the individual is still modelled to go through the 
following reasoning mechanism: 
 
        Given the alternatives on offer and my preference ordering over them, what 
course of action should I take? 
 
In the following section I want to explore how the individualistic approach to decision 
theory might be relaxed, and in particular how a model of ‘group agency’ might be 
applied to deliberative theory. 
 
2.5.1 DELIBERATIVE AGENCY REVISION: TEAM REASONING 
 
In the section on preference revision, I suggested that deliberative theory was arguing 
more than simply that deliberation transformed preferences to an other-regarding nature.  
Too see what I mean, consider once more Wollheim’s paradox of democracy.  In an 
attempt to establish why individuals freely and legitimately surrender their preferences 
to those produced by the democratic process, Wollheim explored a number of potential 
solutions33 before settling on an answer he felt truly explained what was happening: 
 
By distinguishing between the terms ‘voter’ and ‘democrat’, and that whilst 
                                                 
33 The first was by denying that the citizen was committed to the belief that his original preference for A, 
in the face of the social choice for B, was correct; the second by denying that the citizen actually believes 
the democratic social choice is correct, i.e. remains committed to a belief in policy A, and the other by 
simply consigning it ‘to the flames’ (ignoring the issue). 
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policy A might be the choice of an individual acting merely as a voter, if a social 
choice results in policy B, then this becomes the preference of an individual 
acting as a true democrat. 
(Wollheim 1962) 
 
One aspect of the interpretation of this distinction between the terms ‘voter’ and 
‘democrat’ is covered by the notion of preference revision.  The preference ordering of 
a voter is represented by a given initial utility function; and that of the democrat, by a 
function representative merely of the resultant social choice (an approach similar to 
Margolis 1981, 1984).  An individual, after participating in the aggregative democratic 
process, simply shifts from one ordering to another due to any of Elster’s (1983) 
proposals.  But rather critically, this mechanism does not seem to entirely capture what 
is truly meant in Wollheim’s suggestion.  The term democrat implies more than a 
particular preference ordering.  What I suggest is missing, is due to the reliance on 
individualism that both EUT and non-EUT models of agency have.  For individuals to 
label themselves as democrats, they are clearly embracing an identity beyond that 
represented simply by their utility functions.  They are defining themselves with 
reference to their membership of a particular group of individuals.  In terms of 
deliberative democratic theory, Barber (1984; p. 200) sums this up quite nicely when he 
claims ‘in place of I want Y, the strong democrat must say Y will be good for us’.  Or, 
for another example, Thompson (2008) states: 
 
Discussions framed by asking participants, “what action should we, as a group, 
take?” come closer to the deliberative democracy (creating a genuinely public 
opinion) that they favour […] 
(Thompson 2008; p. 503) 
 
Deliberation is expected to not only change the preferences of an individual, but also to 
transform the way they then reason upon them.  Or to put it more strongly, it assumes a 
very specific case of agency revision takes place.   Instead of asking ‘how should I act’, 
deliberation is claimed to make individuals ask themselves the question ‘how should we 
act’.  This distinction between pronouns is crucial as it reflects a departure from the 
wholly individualistic approach offered in all the previous different models of agency.  
In the language of rational choice theory, revision due to deliberation is argued to 
produce ‘team reasoning’ amongst individuals. 
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What course of action should I take, given my preferences? 
 
 
             Deliberative revision 
 
What course of action should we take, given our preferences? 
 
The idea that teams of individuals can count as agents in their own right, then, is 
nothing new.  Indeed, it has been proposed in various different guises by, amongst 
others, Hodgson (1967), Regan (1980), Gilbert (1987, 1989), Hurley (1989), Sugden 
(1993, 2000, 2003), Bacharach (1999, 2006) and Coleman and Rose (2008).34  To see 
how it works, I first want to outline an argument that gives weight to the viability of 
collective reasoning as a model of agency.  More specifically, consider a particular type 
of encounter between two individuals known as the ‘Hi-Lo’ game: 
 
 Individual 
€ 
j  
 high  low  
high 10 , 10 0 , 0 
 
Individual 
€ 
i  
low  0 , 0 1 , 1 
 
Figure 2.3 The Hi-Lo Game 
 
In this interaction, two individuals i and j are required to choose one of two strategies, 
either ‘high’ or ‘low’.  It is clear that the interests of the players are intrinsically tied 
together: they achieve a preferred outcome only when they co-ordinate their action.  
From a standard game theoretic analysis, two Nash equilibria obtain.  Both [high, high] 
and [low, low] are considered equally rational from an entirely self-interested 
perspective.  Classical individualistic decision theory cannot explain why, when tested 
empirically, high is played with a probability almost equal to one (Sugden 1995).35 
What makes [high, high] the seemingly more rational course of action for both 
individuals to take than [low, low] is the implicit appeal to the principle of payoff 
dominance, which almost all individuals identify when presented with this decision.  
Team reasoning can incorporate such a consideration, since it takes the following 
                                                 
34 A related literature on collective intentions is also present, see Searle (1990) or Bratman (1993) 
35 One possible suggestion is that other-regarding preferences alone may provide a rational basis for 
choosing the high strategy.  I will demonstrate how this logic does not apply to the Hi-Lo game, or indeed 
particular types of prisoners’ dilemma games, in chapter four (section 4.3). 
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approach, expressed most simply in propositional logic by Gold and Sugden (2008; p. 
289): 
 
i.        I am a member of the group S 
ii. It is common knowledge in S that each group identifies with S 
iii. It is common knowledge in S that each member of S wants the value of U to 
be maximised 
iv. It is common knowledge in S that the course of action A uniquely 
maximises U 
 
I should choose my component of A 
 
Applying this to a high-low game, the two individuals taken together form the group S, 
The maximum value of U is given by summing payoffs in each box, in this case it 
equates to 10 + 10 = 20. And finally, the course of action A, denoted by the strategy that 
achieves this, is for both individuals to play high.  In this sense, the Hi-Lo game 
provides an extremely clear example and indeed argument for the validity, of team 
reasoning in action.  It is the most logical form of reasoning that truly explains why an 
individual, acting rationally, will choose the ‘high’ strategy. 
 
Within decision theory, the discussion of the process that causes36 an individual to team 
reason has largely been dominated by two similar, but subtly quite different 
conceptualisations.  The first, offered by Sugden (1993, 2000, 2003), requires slightly 
more than agency revision, and relies on the assumption that team preferences can exist 
in the same manner and form as those represented by an individual’s utility function.  
He terms his approach as ‘team directed reasoning’ (Sugden 2000; p. 1182).  Decision 
theory therefore remains a matter of utility maximisation, with the preferences of the 
team rather than the individual being satisfied.  But interesting, Sugden’s approach also 
pays particular attention to the notion of assurance, and whether an individual has 
reason to believe that everyone else in a given team is likely to reason in an identical 
manner.  In this way, whilst individual and team preferences might take the same form, 
there is a slight difference in the reasoning mechanism that links them to individual 
behaviour.  In cases of their own preferences, individuals need only consider what 
                                                 
36 Whilst this point of departure is certainly important, I want to stress that both conceptualisations still 
result in the same process: i.e. individuals asking themselves the question ‘what should we do’. 
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single course of action is most likely to satisfy them.  In cases of team preferences, 
though, each individual is then required to choose an array of different courses of 
action: one for each team member, and their select their own from this list.  When this is 
combined with assurance, i.e. reason to believe that each other individual will ‘play 
their part’ then team-directed reasoning is employed.  For simplicity then, it might be 
represented by the following propositional account (Gold and Sugden 2008; p. 303): 
 
i.        I am a member of S 
ii. I identify with S and acknowledge U as its objective 
iii. In S, there is cross-personal common reason to believe that each member of 
S identifies with S, and acknowledges U as the objective of S 
iv. In S, there is cross-personal common reason to believe that A uniquely 
maximises U 
v. In S, there is cross-personal reason to believe that each member of S 
endorses and acts on mutually assured team reasoning 
 
I should choose my component of A 
 
The other approach to collective reasoning is that offered by Bacharach (1999, 2006).  
His account envisages the process of team reasoning within variable frame theory, and 
does not claim that groups themselves can have preferences. Rather, he argues that all 
goals must also be representative of the preferences of at least one agent in the overall 
process.  From these two points of departure, his model then illustrates that individuals, 
depending on the frame they inhabit, will view interactions from either an ‘I’ or a ‘we’ 
perspective.  As such, the unit of agency is not chosen by the individual per se, but 
rather primed by the presence of environment they inhabit.  This environment, crucially, 
is exogenous to the model of decision-making, and is depicted as a cognitive context 
that acts upon the individual in question.  In cases where the ‘we’ frame is more 
prominent, individuals will team reason.  In cases where the ‘I’ frame is more obvious, 
then individuals revert to classical decision-theory.  Accordingly, his model might be 
represented more simply by the following slightly different set of propositions (Gold 
and Sugden 2008; p.  297): 
 
i.        I am a member of T 
ii. It is T-conditional knowledge (ω) that each member of T identifies with S 
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iii. It is T-conditional knowledge that each member of T wants the value of U 
to be maximised 
iv. It is T-conditional knowledge that P uniquely maximises U, given the 
actions of non-members of T 
 
I should choose my component of P 
 
Unlike Sugden’s account, Bacharach’s model explicitly demonstrates the rationality of 
team reasoning in the same way that decision theory does with individual action.  As 
Sugden and Gold (2008; p. 296) make clear: ‘for any given individual, if she identifies 
with S and wants U to be maximised, it is instrumentally rational for her to act as a 
member of the T, the team of like-minded individuals’.  What matters in this model is 
the value of ω.  When it is sufficiently high for a given agent, they employ the team 
reasoning account of agency.   
 
From the perspective of reconciling these accounts with deliberative theory then, both 
Bacharach and Sugden’s model provide a coherent empirical comparison.  Crucially, 
both envisage the factors that promote team reasoning as coming from outside the 
rational choice framework.  In Bacharach’s language, it is a question of framing.  
Deliberation in a political context can clearly be viewed as an activity that directly 
contributes to this process in a decision-making situation. Discussion and 
communication, for example, are dynamic factors that cognitively impact upon an 
individual before a choice needs to be made.  On this basis, in the following chapter I 
will consider the link between deliberation, framing and teams in much more depth, and 
in particular explore which features of deliberation are likely to prime the ‘we’ frame.  
But before I do that, I want to say three things about why this should be considered a 
normatively appealing direction for revision in the first place. 
 
2.5.2 THE EFFECTS OF TEAM REASONING 
 
Having made the claim that deliberative democratic theory often assumes a particular 
type of revision at the level of agency, I want to consider the question of the positive 
effects on a political system of creating team reasoners. To answer this, I will split my 
analysis and argument into three related sections: 
 
i.       Team reasoning helps to ‘solve’ social dilemmas 
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ii. Team reasoning provides a ‘bond for society’ (Hollis 1998) 
iii. Team reasoning contributes directly to ‘community generation’ (Cooke 
2000) 
 
Firstly then, consider the impact that team reasoning has at an individual level.  When 
presented with social dilemma type games, for example the Hi Low encounter, 
individualistic reasoning does not result in the most beneficial outcome for those 
involved.  Indeed, this problem is further compounded in games like the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma, where the duality between the outcome that is best for a single individual and 
the outcome that is best for both, is clear.  Take the following (non symmetric) game as 
an example then: 
 
 Individual  
 co operate  defect  
co operate 3 , 3 -2 , 4 
 
Individual  
defect  4 , -3 -1 , -1 
 
Figure 2.5 A Prisoners’ Dilemma Game 
 
From a classical rational choice approach, game theory (the interactive variant of 
decision theory) prescribes that for both players, defect is the dominant strategy.  For 
agents applying an individualistic mode of agency, they receive a better outcome if they 
choose defect no matter what strategy the other individual employs.  In this case, the 
point [defect, defect] is therefore defined as a Nash equilibrium. However, this means 
that a clearly sub optimal position is arrived at.  Both players prefer two other possible 
outcomes.  Individual i, for example, is better off at [defect, co operate], whilst player j 
is better off at [co operate, defect].  And most crucially, both are better off at [co 
operate, co operate].  How, then, can individuals reason so they both play the co-
operative strategy and end up at a more preferable outcome?37   
 
                                                 
37 One answer that has been suggested is that social dilemma games of this particular structure might also 
be ‘solved’ by giving both individual players other-regarding preferences (Rabin 1993, Basu 2006).  This 
is a point of contention I will consider in more depth during chapter four, where I devise an experimental 
setup that tests only for agency revision. For the purposes of my present argument, however, let me just 
state that this particular encounter is non-decomposable, which means co-operate cannot be sustained as a 
rational choice even on other-regarding preferences.  Moreover, even if it could, it doesn’t diminish the 
argument that team reasoning also might also ‘solve’ the game by inducing a cooperative strategy choice. 
! 
j
! 
i
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If the game is viewed under Bacharach’s (1999, 2006) ‘we’ frame, then the strategic 
nature of the interaction is partly removed.  Approaching the strategy choices using 
reasoning which asks “what should we do” makes it rational for both individuals to then 
select the choice of co-operate.  Team reasoning leads to an outcome that is payoff 
dominant, or in other words, an outcome that represents the most preferred from a 
group’s perspective.   In terms of political theory, social dilemmas such as the game 
above are examples of the problem of what Olson (1965) famously labeled ‘collective 
action’.  Democratic participation such as voting, or action such as contributing money 
to charitable organisations, are all cases of decision-making where the outcomes for 
society and the individual are in conflict with each other.  Individuals who employ team 
reasoning in these cases, therefore, are more likely to contribute or participate.  To put it 
simply then, deliberative agency revision that creates more ‘team reasoners’ should be 
preferred if we judge such actions as voting and charitable donations to be valuable to 
society. 
 
Building upon this, my next point extends this analysis and specifically considers what 
it means for two individuals to be engaged in team reasoning together.  But whilst the 
first argument took a consequentialist approach in demonstrating the positive impact 
that team reasoning has on the outcome of the interaction, this second point is rooted 
much more in the nature of the reasoning itself.  What does it mean to say that two 
individuals are engaged in team reasoning?  In his final book Trust within Reason, 
Hollis (1998) focused explicitly on the concept of rationality in decision-making.  Built 
around an allegory that describes a walk between two individuals Adam and Eve, Hollis 
demonstrates the problem of backwards induction that pervades individual models of 
agency.  Let me quickly outline his case: 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: The Enlightenment Trail (Hollis 1998; p. 16) 
A1 A2 A3 
E1 
[1 , 0] 
E2 
[3 , 1] [5 , 3] 
[0 , 2] [2 , 4] 
 AE 
[4 , 5] 
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Consider the two individuals Adam and Eve, who whilst walking down an imaginary 
road decide they would like to stop off at a pub.  Along the trail are six different venues 
(A1, E1, A2, E2, A3 and AE), each providing different levels of utility as shown on the 
diagram above.  Both Adam and Eve agree that as they progress along the walk, they 
will take it in turns to decide whether to stop off at that particular venue.  Adam chooses 
at A1, Eve at E1, and so on.  If all other pubs are passed, then AE will be the final 
stopping point for both.  Individual reasoning, then, prescribes the following result.  If 
both individuals choose not to stop at any of the first four pubs along the route, then 
Adam will clearly choose to stay at A3, since he prefers it to AE.  Knowing this, 
however, Eve then has a rational incentive to stop at E2, one pub before, as she prefers 
this to A3.  Yet this makes it rational for Adam to therefore choose to stop at A2, as he 
prefers this to E2.  Again aware of this, Eve therefore would choose to stop at E1, which 
thus makes it rational for Adam to stop at A1, the first possible venue along the walk.  
In doing so, they end up at a venue that is clearly suboptimal: the outcome that is least 
preferred for Eve, and second least preferred for Adam. 
 
As Hollis points out, both can do much better if Adam aims for the venue he prefers as 
second best.  In this case, he might promise Eve that once they get to A3 he will decide 
to stop there.  But under classical rational choice reasoning, Eve has no reason to 
believe Adam’s promise. If she agrees to his proposal, Adam should take advantage of 
the situation, choose not to stop, and they both end up at his most preferred location of 
AE.  Without any justification for Eve to believe Adam’s promise, the backwards 
induction argument simply runs its course again, and they end up at A1.  Hollis’ (1998; 
pp. 137-142) solution, then, is to suggest that trust is included within the team-reasoning 
model of agency.  If both individuals approach the walk from the standpoint of a group, 
and ask themselves the question ‘what should we do’ at each stage, then each has a 
justification to believe the promise made by the other individual.  The very fact that an 
individual team reasons in this multiple stage interaction assumes they trust their co 
player to do the same, or else risk ending up at a less preferred outcome. As Hollis 
(1998; p. 159) puts it ‘in seeing ourselves as persons with interdependent reasons for 
action, we clear the way for a liberal society as a community where trust is secured by 
mutual respect and generalised reciprocity among reasonable persons’.  It is important 
to point out that this is a very different argument to the one presented in relation to 
social dilemma games.  In that example, I made the case that team reasoning led to 
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certain outcomes that were beneficial.  In this example the claim I make is that team 
reasoning itself is the better outcome. 
 
Considered together, these two points form the thrust of my final argument. By 
demonstrating that team reasoning can be valued on both instrumental (outcome) and 
non-instrumental (processual) grounds, it is possible to combine them both into a 
broader point.  Cooke (2000; p. 949), in discussing five different arguments for 
deliberative democracy, touches upon the claim that ‘the process of deliberation has a 
community generating power’.  She draws out a number of possible features of this 
position, including Cohen’s (1996; p. 102) democratic assertion that it ‘expresses the 
equal membership of all in the sovereign body responsible for authorising the exercise 
of that power’; and the Habermassian ideal that deliberation requires all individuals to 
think about what counts as good reasons for all members of society.  But, she also 
claims that the argument fails to really provide an adequate justification for deliberation 
in its own right. In particular, she claims that ‘the community generating-argument runs 
up against the problems […] of how to show that deliberative participation in public 
affairs is superior (in its community generating effects) to non deliberative participation 
[…]’ (Cooke 2000; p. 950).   
 
I would contend, then, that both the previous points can be used to answer this criticism. 
Let me start by assuming that team reasoning, as a product of deliberation, does result in 
the following beneficial outcomes: 
 
i. More participation in socially valuable, but individual costly, activity. 
ii. Higher levels of trust amongst individuals. 
 
As Hollis (1998; pp. 150-154) argues, a point of comparison can be made with 
Rousseau’s ‘remarkable change in man’.  The movement from individual to team 
reasoning represents a significant change in both the perspectives and actions of the 
individuals involved.   Team reasoners trust others, and place the interests of society 
above that of the individual in a way that people employing individual agency do not.  
In doing so, their participation has a direct positive impact on the sense of community 
amongst a population.   
 
To summarise the overall argument of this section then.  If deliberation causes agency 
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revision to team reasoning amongst the individuals involved, which is then 
characterised by these two elements of community-generation; then deliberative models 
of democracy might then be justified alone on this basis.  In short, there is a strong 
normative ground for the desirability of a political system that provides such a 
revisionary effect. 
 
2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
In this second chapter, then, I have outlined a three-fold model of deliberative revision, 
drawing upon the rational choice approach to distinguish between the distinct levels at 
which this was possible.  I then provided a discussion of the two most obvious levels, 
that of preferences and the issue at stake.  In the final section of the chapter, I developed 
a case for the suggestion that deliberative theory argues for revision at another level that 
is often overlooked, that of agency.   I then discussed a number of ways in which 
agency revision might be conceptualised, before focusing on the topic of ‘we’ thinking 
in the form of team reasoning.   
 
After outlining Sugden (1993, 2000, 2003) and Bacharach’s approaches (1996, 2006), I 
settled upon the jointly held concept of framing as an appropriate line of further inquiry 
into the effects of deliberation.   Following a similar sentiment expressed very briefly in 
Dryzek and List (2003; p. 12), I conclude this chapter with the following testable 
research question: 
 
To what extent does deliberation make the ‘we’ frame more prominent and 
trigger agency revision, causing individuals to team-reason? 
 
To answer this (fundamentally) empirical question, a number of preparatory stages must 
be considered.  In the following chapter, I consider the conceptual link between 
framing, deliberation and team reasoning, which sets up the experimental approach 
outlined in chapters four and five. 
 
 
 
 
 
Q 
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  CHAPTER 3   
FRAMING AND TEAM REASONING: HOW 
DELIBERATION PRIMES SOCIAL IDENTITY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
In the first chapter of this thesis, I discussed the notions of deliberation and deliberative 
democracy.  In the second chapter, I then drew on the rational choice approach to 
analyse the various claims made regarding deliberation, and used it to identify three 
levels at which revision was possible. After noting that the third, that of agency, has 
been ignored both on conceptual and empirical grounds, I outlined three key arguments 
for a political system that triggered this type of revision.  My task now, is to show how 
this might be reconciled with the concept of deliberation.  
 
This chapter will address the following two points: 
 
i.        A discussion of the theory behind, and empirical testing, of factors that have 
been found to induce individuals to identify as part of a team, therefore 
making them likely to employ team reasoning as a mode of reasoning. 
ii. An analysis of the specific features (and process) of deliberation to see how 
they reconcile with these determinants of social identity. 
 
In demonstrating a theoretical argument for the link between deliberation, framing and 
team reasoning, it lays the foundation for the latter empirical investigation. To 
understand why individuals might identify as part of a team (and therefore team reason), 
a significant amount of conceptual path clearing is required though.  For instance, what 
is meant by the term ‘identity’, what constitutes a ‘team’, and how do the two concepts 
interact with each other?  Further still, to what extent can these terms even be applied in 
conjunction with the rational choice approach? Answering these initial questions should 
then provide a foundation for the construction of a model of identity formation – which 
can then be applied to the key features of micro-deliberative processes to theoretically 
test the normative claim that deliberation might induce team reasoning. 
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3.2 IDENTITY THEORY AND RATIONAL CHOICE: DEFINING THE ‘SELF’  
 
3.2.1 DEFINING THE SELF: PERSONAL IDENTITY 
 
Conceptual discussions of identity then, are predominantly located within the domain of 
social psychology.  When any individual employs terms including ‘I’, ‘me’, or ‘you’, it 
is clear on one level that they are referring to a defined entity.  But what is much harder 
to ascertain is the extent to which these labels are actually referring to something more 
nuanced, more complex than just a physical object.  It is this distinction that led to the 
now established research agenda on the concept of ‘the self’.38  To give a brief 
overview, then, the field can be subcategorised into two broad categories: the American, 
and the European traditions – a geographical distinction used primarily for its ability to 
offer a degree of memorability. I will deal with the latter in the next section. 
 
The American tradition, then, deals with the self from a largely individualistic 
perspective – focusing on the person in question, and making reference to personal 
features that make an individual distinct from their contemporaries.   For example, 
psychological research on this area has been dominated by investigation and discussion 
of terms such as self-schema, self-complexity, self-verification or self-affirmation.  
What should be immediately obvious is that all these terms are highly personalised, and 
are reflective of an approach focussed on the internal process of the individual during 
identity formation.   An interpretation of the self-concept along these lines has lead to 
experimental work predicated on the importance of the term after the hyphen then.  
Markus (1977), for instance, has looked at the extent to which individuals report the 
particular trait of independence as important to their self-definition.  On the other hand, 
the idea of self-affirmation has been investigated by, for example, Koole, Smeets, Van 
Knippenberg and Dijksterhuis (1999) to show it reduces the prevalence of reflective 
thinking (ruminence) post failure.  What remains central to these types of investigation 
though, is the assumption that identity is a highly personalised concept that can be 
studied without reference to a social context.   
 
Personal identity is the individuated self – those characteristics that 
differentiate one individual from others within a given social context.   
                                                 
38 The literature surrounding this concept is so vast, that Deaux (1992; p. 9) comments ‘in a recent edition 
of my social psychology textbook, for example, 11 self-hyphenated terms ranging from ‘self-concept’ to 
‘self-serving attribution bias’ are defined in the glossary […]’. 
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(Brewer 1991; p.5) 
 
Relating this to the methodological approach taken by the previous chapter of this 
thesis, the concept of identity might seem a rather odd topic, particular as rational 
choice theory treats the notion with very little regard.  Indeed, even this may be putting 
it a too strongly.   Conceptually and operationally, decision theory depicts the self 
simply by the information contained in a utility function: individuals are defined only 
by what they desire.  As such, stark similarities can therefore be drawn with the 
American tradition: identity is highly individualised and an entirely personal matter. To 
see this more clearly, it is helpful to consider the matter using a simple schema of 
reasoning: 
  
i. a is a defined personal identity 
ii. Preferring x to y, and y to z are characteristics of a 
iii. Individual i prefers x to y 
iv. Individual i prefers y to z 
 
v. Individual i has the identity a 
 
 
In this example, it is important to note the order in which the statements are made.  The 
implication is that an individual possesses certain features; in this case a specific 
preference ordering, that determines their identity.  Individual i has the identity ‘a’ 
because they prefer x to y to z, they do not prefer x to y to z because they have the 
identity ‘a’.  In this sense, identity is therefore depicted as a post-hoc concept, 
applicable for description and justification rather than for prediction.  Interestingly, up 
until the last twenty years or so, this was in fact the predominant trend in empirical 
psychological research on the self, with, for instance, Wyhe’s (1974) seminal review 
concluding that it was almost impossible to see the trend being reversed.  Yet in the 
early 1980s, the treatment of the self-concept changed dramatically, with Suls (1982), 
Schlenker (1985) providing some early impetus behind what eventually became an 
apparent paradigmatic shift.  Empirical studies began to reflect an idea that the self need 
no longer be envisaged as something that just ‘reflected on-going behaviour, but instead 
mediated and regulated this behaviour’ (Markus and Wurf 1987; p. 299).  In other 
words, identity became a predictive variable, rather than an explanatory device, in 
studying human behaviour. 
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In terms of the example above, if identity is then denoted as the motivation behind 
human behaviour, the order of the statements then changes to the following: 
 
i. ‘a’ is a defined personal identity 
 
ii. Characteristics of a are preferring x to y, and y to z 
iii. Individual i has the identity a 
iv. Individual i prefers x to y 
v. Individual i prefers y to z 
 
Crucially, the shift in empirical focus was also mirrored by a much more fundamental 
adjustment in the assumptions behind the stability of any given identity.  Previously, the 
self was considered more akin to a generalised view of an individual – an average of all 
elements of that person (Block 1981; Costa and McCrae 1980), with some studies 
suggesting that individuals even take great pains to maintain and protect their respective 
self-conceptions (Swann and Hill 1982).  But as with the argument above, the early 
1980s again saw experimental psychology embrace a much more nuanced line of attack, 
with numerous new approaches to the issue all premised on the idea of multiplicity.  
Articulated using a plethora of different terms including images, schemas, prototypes, 
goals and even tasks, the core message remained that individuals are more than simply 
one self, they are in fact a combination of multiple selves.39   
 
But how does this social psychological perspective on identity then reconcile with the 
rational choice informed approach that I developed in the previous chapter?40  At this 
point, at least, two issues must be resolved: the first is that identity is now deemed a 
determinant of behaviour, and the second is that any given individual possesses many 
such identities simultaneously.  Surprisingly though, neither statement proves 
impossible to deal with.  Firstly, rational choice theory is very clearly able to encompass 
the notion that identity dictates behaviour.  Indeed, the two schemes of propositions 
above make this point nicely, since the second contains no new information than the 
first.  In this case, identity ‘a’ is the factor (or frame) which determines that individual i 
acts according to the preference ordering x > y > z.  Classically, this is exactly what has 
                                                 
39 Markus and Nurius (1986) also discuss the issue of possible selves. 
40 Chase (1992) also attempts to consider this issue, although he fails to really show how the models are 
actually compatible with each other.
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been interpreted as the ‘rational economic man’ in the work of Becker (1976) or von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).  The second question, on how multiple identities 
might fit with decision theory, relies on an argument made a little earlier in the thesis.  
In chapter two, I showed how the notion of preference revision was entirely compatible 
with a methodology that relied on utility maximisation.  Using Elster’s (1983) sour 
grapes for some examples of the many different ways in which revision might be 
possible, the argument on identity then becomes a logical extension of that conclusion.  
If each self has a designated set of preferences that are relevant to it, then for 
preferences to change one of two possibilities must be true.  Either the preferences can 
change for a specified self, or the actual self itself can change.  But imperatively, 
because identities are simply equivalent to preferences: these statements prove to be 
identical.  In effect, if rational choice theory can allow preference revision, then it must 
also be able to cope with multiple personal identities. 
 
3.2.2 DEFINING THE SELF: SOCIAL IDENTITY 
 
Up to this point then, when defining the self, consideration has only really been made of 
the natural, or put another way, the personal, idiosyncratic properties of the individual 
in question.  This reflects very strongly the principles espoused in the American 
tradition, and reconciles nicely with classical decision theory.  The European tradition, 
on the other hand, reacting in part to the constraints of the former approach, has 
embraced a set of more collective features when defining the self (Farr 1981; Markova 
1987).   Born from this refocus, Tajfel (1974, 1978, with Turner 1986) offers an 
alternative picture of the self, one determined and represented by Social Identity Theory 
(SIT).  Premised upon a distinction between types of situation that involve 
interpersonal, and those that involve group processes, the core motivation behind SIT is 
the idea that when participating in the latter, individuals are more likely to self identify 
in terms of the group of which they are a member.  Put more simply, the self can be 
imagined to lie somewhere on a continuum, with wholly personal, and wholly social 
identity lying at each extreme: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: The Continuum of Identity 
Personal Identity Social Identity 
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Irrespective of the way the relationship between these different types of identity can be 
modelled (see Hogg 1992), the fundamental assumption is that behaviour reflective of 
social identity displays a number of unique characteristic features.  In-group bias, for 
example, is defined when individuals choose courses of action that are explicitly 
targeted to benefit a subset of individuals, of which they are a member, over another.  
Discrimination, where individuals actively make choices that punish individuals they 
consider outside of their group. Conformity41, where individuals ‘give in’ to social 
pressure and accept the ideas of the group over their own. Or stereotyping (Haslam et al 
1999; Smith and Henry 1996), where individuals begin to take on the stereotypical 
properties/characteristics associated with the group.  These, and a host of other 
characteristics are all typical of behaviour that is promoted by group identity.  And quite 
crucially, as Bacharach (2006), Colman et al (2008) and Sugden (2003, 2008) all argue, 
as is agency transformation that induces individuals to act on behalf of the group – 
causing them to team reason.  
 
If group membership can cause this very different type of identity and thus behaviour, a 
key issue clearly then becomes the study of such phenomena (see Brown 1988).  Do all 
types of group have this effect of depersonalisation (Diener 1977; Oakes et al 1994), 
when individuals see themselves as being part of something ‘above’ their personalised 
self?  It is obvious that throughout a person’s life they will come into contact with 
numerous different types of groups: from social groups, to sports teams, to political 
parties.  All have very different characteristics, consisting of different members, social 
norms, rules and objectives. So how might they be classified in order to provide a 
meaningful addition to the social identity framework? Olson (1965), for instance, 
famously used the distinction of efficacy in order to identify small, latent and large 
groups - where the amount of impact that an individual could have on the group’s 
objective was the single criterion on which to distinguish between them.  Hogg (1992), 
on the other hand, bases the distinction on the concept of cohesiveness (Festinger et al 
1950), and asserts that it is possible to compare any group in terms of this scale.  The 
more cohesive the group, the more likely it is to cause deindividuation and thus social 
                                                 
41 Abrams et al (1990) distinguishes between compliance and conformity – the former implies simply 
bowing to the groups wishes in public, whilst the former implies a much more true notion of acceptance 
of these ideas. 
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identity.  Others, including Brewer and Harasty (1996), Hamilton and Sherman (1996) 
or Sherman et al (1999), take a similar approach to Hogg in terms of a variable scale, 
although discuss it with reference to the notion of entitativity. Conceptualising groups 
according to this latter concept is particularly relevant when the focus of the 
investigation is on team reasoning.  In terms of social psychology, entitativity was first 
defined as the point where a collection of individual elements has the ‘nature of an 
entity, of having real existence’ (Campbell 1958; p. 17).  Whilst a number of different 
causal factors behind this process will be discussed a little further down, the point I seek 
to make right now relates to back to the consequences of such a process.   
 
Team reasoning, which occurs when individuals ask themselves the question “what 
course of action should we take”, can clearly only happen once a particular group has 
been identified as a single entity – the ‘we’ must be clearly defined.  Without the 
process of entitativity, neither Bacharach’s (2006) model of individuals reasoning on 
behalf of a team, nor Sugden’s (2000, 2003) argument of team preferences is possible.   
They both rely on the assumption that a collection of individuals can become a single 
entity beyond a mere aggregation of the members. 
 
However, even with an appropriate scale of how to analyse groups in place, it does not 
yet provide a robust theoretical description as to how the processes of entitativity, 
deindividuation and social identity work.  By merely stating that two types of identity 
(with characteristic behaviour) exist, and that being a member of a particular group is 
likely to trigger one or the other, a number of metatheoretical issues remain 
unaddressed.  Firstly, it should be obvious that individuals will find themselves as 
members of many different groups throughout their lives.  The concept of a single social 
identity, then, is far too limited – individuals clearly move between different social 
identities depending on the context.  And secondly, because of this, any theory must 
then be able to offer some explanation or prediction as to when an individual is likely to 
identify in terms of one social identity over another. Finally, without these adjustments 
in place it is also clear that social identity theory offers no clarification on the notion of 
personal identity, thereby allowing any behaviour that cannot be explained by a 
particular social identity to be cast aside or ignored.   
 
3.2.3 SOCIAL CATEGORISATION THEORY 
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Social categorisation theory (Turner 1982, 1985, et al 1987) attempts to build on social 
identity theory through addressing these issues.  Fundamentally then, it proceeds on the 
following three claims: 
 
i.        Individuals are able to categorise themselves at varying different levels of 
abstraction – from ‘humanity’ at one end, to ‘group’ in the middle, to the 
unique ‘person’ at the other. 
ii. The level at which individuals categorise themselves is determined by the 
level of salience of these varying different identities. 
iii. Salience of a particular self-category is determined by ‘accessibility x fit’ 
formulation (Oakes and Turner 1986). 
 
These three assumptions agree with the proposition that a distinction needs to be made 
between personal and social identity.  They rely on the concept of entitativity in so 
much as it is required for a group to be used as the unit of self-identification.  But what 
it also offers, is a description of the cognitive process which underpins the discussion of 
why particular social identities are activated, or ‘in play’ at certain times.  
 
The concept of salience is a particularly subtle one.  Thomas Schelling (1960) famously 
used the term when considering the degree to which participants in coordination games 
managed to reach outcomes that classical rational choice theory did not support.  By 
way of examples and metaphors, he used the term interchangeably with ‘prominence’, 
and suggested it as one reason as to why individuals converged on ‘focal points’ during 
such encounters.  In the case where two individuals were tasked with meeting each 
other in New York without any agreement or discussion beforehand, the choice of 
Grand Central Station was chosen because it was deemed a more salient answer than, 
for instance, Times Square.  But critically, the exact way in which the phenomenon of 
salience works, or indeed a strict definition, was never discussed explicitly.   
 
Whilst experimental work in economics has been performed to test this idea more 
scientifically42 (Mehta et al 1994), it is the conceptual literature within social 
psychology that again proves quite fruitful. Oakes and Turner (1986), for example, 
suggest salience can be split into two aspects.  The first, accessibility, refers to the 
                                                 
42 I use the term ‘scientific’ because Schelling famously critiqued his own work by labelling his 
experiments as ‘unscientific’.  
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‘readiness’ of an individual to accept a particular self-category, i.e. how much it fits 
with their previous goals, past experiences or current motives.  Fit, on the other hand, 
has two further aspects (Oakes 1987): comparative and normative.  The former involves 
a metacontrast, or put more simply, the degree to which the self-category in question is 
seen as being more cohesive than the alternatives on offer.  The latter, normative, then 
extends this onto a scale. For example, to distinguish between two groups ‘a’ and ‘b’, 
individuals in ‘b’ must be both more similar to each other than in comparison with 
members of ‘a’, as well as be different in a very specific way. Factors that affect the 
salience of a particular social identity, then, can broadly be placed in one of these 
categories: they become determinants in the ‘accessibility x fit’ model.    
 
Self-categorisation theory thus offers a robust conceptual model of identity formation, 
and describes the way in which individuals are able to move between multiple self-
conceptualisations, depending on their relative levels of salience. 
 
But before I proceed to discuss the various factors that have been found to act as 
determinants of salience, I wish to briefly discuss the extent to which this addition to the 
model of identity reconciles with the rational choice approach I drew upon in chapter 
two.  The highly individualistic nature of a classical interpretation of decision theory 
seems quite antithetical to that of social identity.  But, if there is nothing to stop 
individuals switching between utility functions, therefore preferences, therefore 
personal identity – surely there is nothing to prevent an individual acting on the basis of 
a utility function belonging to a particular group? Indeed, this seems to be nothing new.  
Margolis (1981) for instance argues that people cannot only switch between utility 
functions, but also between individual and social ones.  Feeding this information back 
into the schema or reasoning format:  
 
i. a is a defined personal identity 
ii. b is a defined social identity 
 
iii. Characteristics of a are preferring x to y, and y to z 
iv. Characteristics of b are preferring y to x, and z to y 
v. Individual i has the identity b 
vi. Individual i prefers x to y 
vii. Individual i prefers z to y 
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From a rational choice perspective, there is again nothing in this model that proves 
impossible to deal with.  Yes, it might cause a reduction in the predictive power of 
positive political theory, but this is the entire reason for the addition of the social 
psychological framework – to offer predictions about where and when particular 
identities will become salient.  In Bacharach’s (1993, 1996, 2006) model of team 
reasoning, this is exactly what is meant by the term ‘framing’.  The rational choice 
element, as a theory of decision-making, then helps to create an experimental approach 
that allows for this to be observed.  In short, combining both approaches leads to a more 
comprehensive theoretical way of examining and modelling human decision-making 
under these circumstances. 
 
3.2.4 EXPERIMENTAL FACTORS PROMOTING SOCIAL IDENTITY 
 
Now that a theoretical framework of social identity has been mapped, the next point I 
want to consider concerns the specific factors (or determinants in the accessibility x fit 
model) that have been found to trigger this self-categorisation in terms of a group.  A 
considerable amount of experimental work has been done of this area (see Brewer and 
Miller 1996), with much in particular drawing upon social dilemma games (see Chase 
1992) and other associated encounters.  Very briefly, I want to consider a number of the 
most prominent factors that have been identified in this literature. These include 
belonging to an ad hoc group (Billig and Tajfel 1973; Locksley et al 1980; Tajfel 1970), 
belonging to the same social group (Dion 1973; De Cremer and van Vugt 1999; Kramer 
and Brewer 1984), the presence of an out-group (Kramer and Brewer 1984; Mullen et al 
1992; Tajfel 1970), having common preferences, the use of common language 
(Dieckhoff 2004; Perdue et al 1990), having shared experiences (Drury et al 2009; 
Prentice and Miller 1992), face to face contact or discussion (Bornstein 1992; Dawes et 
al 1988, Orbell et al 1988; Wilder and Thompson 1980) and ‘interdependence’ (1985 
Cookson 2000; Bacharach 2006; Sherif et al 1961; Turner 1981, 1982).  Let me 
consider them each in a bit more depth. 
 
Belonging to an ad hoc group  
Some of the most early experiments on social identity were completed using the so-
called ‘minimal group paradigm’, where individuals were assigned as members of 
arbitrary groups, by researchers under experimental conditions.  Locksley et al (1980), 
for example, went as far as to make sure the individuals knew such an allocation was 
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entirely random, showing them lottery tickets to elucidate how the selection process 
worked.  Even under these minimal conditions, participants continually displayed 
ethnocentric behaviour – discriminating in their choices to favour members of the same 
group they were assigned to at the beginning of the experiment.   The conclusion from 
this evidence was quite clear then, social identity could be triggered by even the most 
trivial of group characteristics. 
 
Belonging to the same social group  
Following on from the minimal group concept, belonging to the same social group as 
other individuals has also been found to promote a social identity, and cause behaviour 
to favour the in-group.  De Cremer and Van Vugt (1999), for example, used the 
distinction of whether participants were led to believe they were playing social dilemma 
games with either (i) generic university students, or (ii) those students at the same 
institution as themselves. Unsurprisingly, the results matched that of the minimal group 
studies, as players consistently favoured students from the same institution.  A social 
identity, based on belonging to a particular social group, was clearly in evidence. 
 
The presence of an out-group 
Strongly related to the idea of an in-group is, of course, the reciprocal concept. Whilst it 
is quite possible for individuals to be members of a universal group (for example all 
people are part of the ‘human race’), membership is also often accompanied with the 
idea of an out-group: a collection of individuals who have formed an alternative, even 
competing association.  In Tajfel’s (1970) original experiments then, this formed part of 
the actual setup, as behaviour was not only found to favour the in-group, but also 
crucially to discriminate against members of the out-group.  By recognising a group that 
a particular individual does not self-identify with then, the features of the one they do 
becomes more salient, and therefore social identity in reference to that group is more 
readily primed. 
 
Common preferences 
One particularly strong determinant of group identification is, quite clearly, the presence 
of similar preferences or interests amongst a group. More often than not this is almost 
definitional, as many groups themselves are ordered, or convened on this basis.  
Personal preferences, on their own, are components of personal identity.  But when 
individuals with the same personal identity are brought together in one group, and are 
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made aware of this fact, significant in-group bias is found to occur in their behaviour.  
Individuals doing so are clearly therefore treating the collective group as a single entity, 
and acting on a social identity primed by this common set of preferences. 
 
Use of common language 
Language has also been found to have a strong effect on identity – but on two slightly 
different levels.  The first is on a more macro scale, where the use of a shared 
vocabulary or dialect creates a very meaningful and visible shared identity amongst a 
population (Dieckhoff 2004).  The second concerns the actual content of the language.  
For example, Perdue et al (1990) tested whether the use of words explicitly connected 
with social identity, i.e. ‘us’, and ‘them’ affected how individuals ranked neutral 
‘nonsense syllables’ to which they were coupled.  The results were quite stark, as 
individuals consistently ranked those corresponding to an in-group more favourably 
than to those of an out-group – even though none showed any awareness of this 
ethnocentric behaviour/pattern. 
 
Having a shared experience 
Another factor that has been demonstrated to induce individuals to self-categorise in 
terms of a group has been the presence of a shared past experience.  Drury et al (2009), 
for example, recruited individuals who had been involved in significant public disaster 
events, including the 1989 Hillsborough football stadium crush, and the Fatboy Slim 
beach party crush in 2002.  By performing both a descriptive and qualitative analysis 
post interview, they conclude that there is significant support for the idea of a shared 
social identity amongst individuals from the same disaster, as well as potentially 
between individuals from comparative events.  Past experiences, it therefore suggests, 
can cause deindividuation as the group, affected by the specific event (or type of event), 
becomes seen as a single social identity. 
 
Face to face contact or discussion  
The penultimate factor I wish to discuss is perhaps one of the most obvious, as it deals 
with a very visible characteristic of groups.  Contact, either verbal or face to face, is one 
of the single most powerful explanatory variables for social identity - for instance, 
Festinger et al (1950) found that even proximity seems to produce some form of social 
bond between individuals.  Experimentally, Wilder and Thompson (1980) looked at the 
behaviour of two groups of students assigned on the basis of college identity.  They 
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found that discussion within the group led to heightened levels of in-group bias, as 
individuals began to identify with their relevant group more strongly.  Conversely, 
contact between groups, where individuals were forced to interact with members of the 
other group, led to diminished social identity and less ethnocentric behaviour.  Dawes et 
al (1988), asking individuals to play simple binary choice social dilemma games, also 
found significant evidence for the positive impact that discussion, in particular, has on 
social identity.   
 
Interdependence 
The final factor to consider is perhaps the most complex, as it deals with the objectives 
of the group itself.  Interdependence and the phrase ‘common interests’ are often used 
as synonyms, particularly in the social psychological literature.  But when social 
dilemma games are used to investigate choice behaviour (particularly in experimental 
economics, see Cookson 2000), it becomes clear that a subtle distinction is required.  To 
say that a group of individuals has common interests, is to say there are certain 
outcomes that might be beneficial to all those involved.  But it says nothing as to how 
these goals can be achieved.  Bacharach (2006; pp. 81-85) provides a particularly nice 
discussion of this debate, and suggests that whilst the definition of interdependence as 
‘having common interests… that can only be achieved together’ (p. 84) might seem 
useful, it omits from consideration certain types of encounter.  Mixed motive games, 
like the classic prisoners’ dilemma encounter, allow for the possibility that there are 
outcomes that might be best for both players when taken as a single entity, whilst 
simultaneously subordinate to another outcome when viewed under rational self 
interest.  Because these games do not strictly conform to the general definition of 
common interests, interdependence is thus defined as a trait where a favoured outcome 
can only be achieved through the actions of all individuals, in cases where this 
behaviour is not assured.    Experimentally, this effect has been consistently found to 
occur in public goods games before any treatment phase is initiated: individuals have 
played strategies associated with social identities simply on the basis of the game and 
payoffs offered (Andreoni 1988, 1990, 1995; Sugden 1984).43   
 
Let me summarise where I have got up to in this chapter.  By outlining a framework that 
provides a justification for the construction of social identity, which in turn links 
directly to the idea of ‘framing’ in Bacharach and Sugden’s models of team reasoning, I 
                                                 
43 See Ledyard (1995) for a good survey of some of the most important early results in this field. 
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have completed the explanation of the rational choice side of the agency revision 
process.  Or in other words, I have provided a generalised discussion of both how and 
why team reasoning occurs.  The next step is to take a closer look at the extent to which 
deliberation might play a role in making social identity more salient for the individuals 
involved. 
 
3.3 DELIBERATION AND SOCIAL IDENTITY   
 
I now return to the dual concepts of deliberation and deliberative revision.  The claim 
that deliberation is likely to make individuals revise their agency and reason on behalf 
of a team is made on the basis that it will trigger individuals to self-define in terms of a 
specific social identity (Warren 1992).  This leaves two related questions that must be 
answered in this final section of the third chapter.  Do the features of deliberation 
discussed in chapter one match up to the arguments surrounding self-categorisation and 
social identity?  And therefore, can the hypothesis made in chapter two, that 
deliberation causes people to team reason, be sustained on a comprehensive theoretical 
basis?   
 
Before I do this though, I need to undertake some further path clearing and say 
something about what ‘type’ of deliberation I am talking about.  In chapter one, I 
established a behavioural definition that was predicated on the idea of scale.  On one 
end sat ‘ideal’ deliberation characterised by discussion that completely satisfied a 
number of normative criteria.  At the other sat discussion that violated all the said 
maxims, and could not be termed deliberation in any meaningful sense.  Between these 
points, however, is the idea of ‘better’ or ‘worse’ deliberation – dependent on the 
relaxation of certain criteria.  In this thesis, my concern is to map the social 
psychological approach onto the idealised account of deliberation.  Once I have done 
that, and following each point that I make, I will make a few suggestions as to how 
various relaxations might interact with these processes.   
 
For the purposes of my argument, and to facilitate later analysis, this needs to be broken 
down into two different sub-sections. The first is to look at the key principles of 
deliberative behaviour, and to evaluate the extent to which these might cause an 
individual to self-identify in terms of the deliberating group.  The second is to then draw 
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on the structural account, and see if this is more or less likely at any given point in the 
deliberation.   
   
3.3.1 THE BEHAVIOURAL ACCOUNT OF DELIBERATION AND SOCIAL IDENTITY 
 
As I outlined in chapter one, in the vast majority of the literature in political theory (and 
communication studies), deliberation is understood as a dynamic, communicative 
process between more than one individual. Without restating this debate, Mansbridge 
(2010; p. 65) defines it nicely as ‘communication that induces reflection on preferences, 
values and interests in a non-coercive fashion’.  The first key word in this definition is 
communication.  Deliberation is a very particular form of discussion, but it remains just 
that – discussion – and because of this, it has a number of features that reconcile nicely 
with social identity and self-categorisation theories.  First, and most obviously, it can be 
compared to the results seen in the experiments of Wilder and Thompson (1980), 
Dawes et al (1988) and Dieckhoff (2004).  Deliberation, as a discursive process that 
takes place within the group and utilises the same language and dialect, clearly has the 
potential to make a social identity more salient, as individuals begin to see the group 
they are communicating with as a single entity. Moreover, this is likely to be heightened 
by the classification of the individuals as being such a group by the process itself, 
whether participants really ‘buy into it’ on social group grounds (De Cremer and Van 
Vugt 1999), or on the basis of a simple ad hoc classification (Locksley et al 1980).   
Deliberation that satisfies the maxim of interactive communication then, reconciles 
nicely with the possibility of priming social identity.  But what might happen when the 
maxim is relaxed ever so slightly? For example, take the case of online deliberation, 
where discussion is interactive but takes place behind the veil of a computer terminal.  
In this case, whilst a number of the same social identity comparisons can be made, it is 
also the case that the face-to-face element is lost.  It is plausible to suggest, at least 
theoretically, that deliberation of this type might therefore have a lower propensity to 
trigger team reasoning.44   
 
Moving now to the second comparison between deliberative behaviour and social 
identity.  If the discussion reflects equality, mutual respect and reciprocity, then it is 
possible to argue that the link to social identity is strengthened further.  Individuals that 
                                                 
44 The degree to which any of these hypotheses regarding relaxations are true, is of course, an empirical 
question.  Whilst it is not the focus of my project, which attempts to examine the effects of ‘ideal 
deliberation’, it is something I will discuss further in the final chapter regarding further research 
questions. 
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allow all other members to participate freely, and in doing so listen to and attempt to 
fully understand their points, are much more likely to find some degree of agreement 
with each other.  Any form of agreement or common ground, then, is directly related to 
social identity.  It allows individuals to describe the decision in terms of language that 
reflects entification of the group i.e. ‘we all agree on x, y and z’, in which case they 
share common preferences.  Or even ‘we all agree on the scale to rank x, y and z’, in 
which case they share a common way of conceptualising these preferences.  Either way, 
doing so can lead to deindividuation, and results in self-categorisation in terms of the 
group agreement and thus group identity.  However, just as with point one, relaxing 
these maxims can have a significant impact on the potential for this effect.  Consider 
what happens if mutual respect and reciprocity are relaxed.  In this case, individuals are 
no longer required to empathise with other members of the deliberation.  Removing this 
requirement reduces the possibility that any shared experiences, common preferences or 
common language might come to light.  This, in turn, reduces the prospect that social 
identity will become more salient for the individuals involved. Again then, relaxing the 
idealised criterion has the potential to weaken the link between deliberation and social 
identity. 
 
Thirdly, when deliberation is (i) based on reason (ii) made on the public principle and 
(iii) directed towards a final goal of decision-making, there are a number of ways it can 
be linked to social identity.  The first, quite clearly, is through the use of language.  
Reason based argument involves the use of logical statements that are intended to prove 
a link between action and consequence, i.e. ‘choose x, so that y will occur’.  In the arena 
of deliberation, the prioritisation of reasoned argument means that individuals are 
required to present claims in this format.  Further still, when the public principle, 
incorporating Rawls’ idea of public reason, is introduced, it then becomes necessary to 
both present the argument linguistically in terms of the group, i.e. ‘we should choose 
policy x, so that outcome y will occur’, as well as secondly, to propose the policy that is 
most likely to benefit all the individuals concerned.  In this case, the deliberative claim 
must be made in the format of ‘we should choose x, so that y will occur, because it is 
best for all of us’. These two aspects of reasoning can be traced directly back to two of 
the experimental factors discussed above. The use of the pronoun ‘we’ discussed in 
Perdue et al (1990), and the impact that shared interests and references of a group have.  
Both are present in deliberative reasoning of this nature, and thus it is logical to predict 
that it has the potential to make social identity more salient within the individuals. 
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However as with the previous two points, I also want to consider how a relaxation of 
these ideal deliberative criteria might impact on this debate. For example, consider 
deliberation over a topic that is characterised by deep disagreement, where pluralism 
dictates that complete satisfaction of the public principle is impossible.  In this 
circumstance, the second best alternative is for individuals to rely on reasons that are 
characterised as ‘public spirited’ (Chambers 2004).  Where two individuals already 
share common ground, this might indeed serve to prime social identity in the same way 
as a strict interpretation of public reason suggests.  But in cases where two individuals 
occupy differing perspectives, both emanating from reasonable and popular positions, 
then it is possible to see how public-spirited reasoning might in fact work in the 
opposite direction.  It is difficult to imagine, for example, a deliberation making social 
identity more salient amongst a single group consisting of individuals from different 
sides of the abortion debate.  In short, deliberation in cases where public reason is 
impossible might do more to make personal identity more salient. 
 
Finally, deliberation understood as a dynamic process between two individuals that 
incorporates these features, is clearly of a reciprocal nature.  It is, for instance, 
impossible to have a deliberative conversation with a second individual if this person 
pays no attention to the norms of: (i) equality, because they talk too much; (ii) mutual 
respect, because they ignore what you say; (iii) reason centred argument, because they 
offer no justification for their claims; (iv) the public principle, because they talk only 
about what is good for their own self interest; or (v) decision-focussed approach, 
because they have no interest in ever reaching an agreement.  I suggest then, that the 
single largest way in which deliberative behaviour is likely to make social identity more 
salient is through the concept of interdependency. For deliberation to occur between 
individuals, it is crucial for all those involved to behave in a very specific way.  Just as 
with the prisoners’ dilemma game, where a socially optimal outcome exists that is only 
obtainable on the basis of behaviour that is not assured, high quality deliberation can 
only exist when all the participants adhere to these behavioural norms.  When 
deliberation does occur, then, it becomes an almost self-fulfilling phenomenon.  
Individuals ‘x and y’ decide to deliberate according to these principles, and in doing so, 
become aware that it is only possible because they have both have participated in such a 
manner.  This makes social identity more salient, which in turn motivates the 
individuals to maintain these behavioural norms. 
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Let me briefly summarise the main points I have made in this section. By examining the 
various behavioural criteria that idealised deliberation satisfies, it is possible to see how 
the agency revision argument put forward in chapter two might be substantiated on a 
theoretical basis.  When discussion reflects all six of the criteria, the potential for social 
identity to become more salient than that of personal identity rises, and in turn, so does 
the propensity of individuals to employ team-reasoning.  The next task is to look at how 
this effect might change during the different stages (or subtasks) of the deliberative 
process. 
 
3.3.2 THE STRUCTURAL ACCOUNT OF DELIBERATION AND SOCIAL IDENTITY 
 
Education and Information Phase 
Moving on to the deliberative process, the first stage of education and information is 
characterised by the discovery and consideration of knowledge: where participants are 
expected to spend time learning about the issue(s). It is possible to think of education as 
a highly individualistic, personal endeavour – it is difficult, for instance, for more than 
one person to share the same copy of a text, and whether you understand a particular 
point is often dependent on your personal history, background or intellectual abilities.  
Conceived in this manner, it might seem that the first phase actually serves to promote 
personal, rather than social identity.  But in a deliberation, especially on complex topics 
where the participants are selected because they have no prior interaction with the 
subject matter, the educational process is intended as a much more social, collective 
venture.  Participants are often put in a situation where all members of the group are 
starting from the same point in terms of the issues under consideration, and because of 
this, the process to understand and clarify information becomes a collective activity.  
The focus, to put it bluntly, is on the group itself learning, rather than individuals 
gaining as much knowledge as they can.  
 
Moreover, as I discussed in chapter one regarding the relaxation of the reason-based 
discussion criterion, the way information is presented in a deliberation also plays a 
substantive role.  Whilst expert witnesses, briefing documents and other externally 
arranged information sessions are often conducted along highly rationalist lines (see 
Habermas 1984), the same is not true for personal testimony or whilst bearing witness 
(Barber 1984, Sanders 1997).  The latter is a much more social form of communication, 
where emotion and empathy become relevant in the educative process.  If a deliberation 
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includes this type of information, it allows for past experiences to come into play, and 
thus the possibility that a group identity might form on this basis.  For example, if 
person ‘a’ relates a specific policy back to an event in their past that is shared by others, 
as Prentice and Miller (1992) or Drury et al (2009) demonstrate, individuals may begin 
to self-identify as belonging to this group.  This is particularly relevant when a 
deliberation occurs over a topic that has had significant impact upon a number of the 
individuals involved – where members are able to recall past incidents that demonstrate 
the effect of these issues on their lives. Doing so constructs this shared experience, and 
therefore this phase has the potential to raise the salience of a social identity amongst 
the members.  Because of this, whilst it might seem on first glance that the first task of 
the deliberative process is likely to work against raising the salience of a social identity, 
it simply isn’t the case once a more thorough analysis is made.   
 
Identification of Solutions Phase 
The identification of solutions phase requires individuals to discuss as many different 
possible courses of action that might be taken to resolve the issue.  Some options are 
already present in the discussion, because they come up either in the 
education/information phase, or because they are commonly known by the participants.  
Others are formulated as a direct result of the deliberation itself, where innovative ideas 
and solutions can be generated.  In this case, there is a strong reason to think that 
deliberation may make social identity more salient.  If a discursive group comes up with 
a proposal itself, and moreover that this proposal is identified as original, it is quite 
plausible for individuals to think of the group as a single entity.  By doing so, and 
seeing themselves as part ‘owner’ of the policy, they have essentially become de-
inviduated in favour of the group.  Consider a slightly more obvious example then. 
Imagine a collection of individuals in a park, when someone happens to produce a 
football.  Players are randomly allocated onto different sides, and an impromptu game 
commences.  Whilst the very act of classification serves to prime a social identity 
(individuals describe themselves as being members of team ‘a’ or team ‘b’), this is 
further strengthened, for example, when one team scores.  It is plausible for participants 
of the scoring team to describe the incident in one of two ways: either ‘individual x 
scored a goal’ or ‘our team scored a goal’.  With the latter, which is often the case when 
a goal involves many members to score, it is clear that the individual is responding from 
the relevant social identity.  The exact same process is at work when deliberation leads 
to a new proposal made by the participants.   It is possible, and even likely, for 
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individuals to describe the proposal as ‘ours’ referring to the deliberative group – at 
which point they are giving the group entatitivity, and therefore raising the salience of a 
particular social identity.  Again then, the identification phase also seems a plausible 
element of the deliberative process to help trigger individuals to self-conceptualise in 
terms of a social identity. 
 
Evaluative Criteria Phase 
Once various solutions have been identified and understood by all the participants, the 
next stage in the deliberative process is for individuals to establish a way of evaluating 
the different proposals. Because of the way deliberation requires individuals to make 
claims regarding their preferred policies (the public principle), it is easy to see that the 
very task is one of cooperation and public reason.  Individuals must work together in 
order to find an acceptable set of criteria upon which to analyse the policy proposals – 
drawing upon both the previous sessions. If individuals are expected to work together as 
a group to come up with their own ranking, then it is clear that a number of factors will 
be at work. Interpersonal communication (Wilder and Thompson 1980) will be used in 
order to come to an agreement, and shared experiences (Prentice and Miller 1992) will 
be drawn upon in order to elicit cooperation.  But just as important as all of these, it is 
also the first time the group must come to an explicit decision over a set of possible 
outcomes. 
 
Following the same argument suggested in the section on equality and mutual respect 
above, it is crucial to acknowledge that the requirement of this phase is not to secure 
agreement on the policy decision/recommendation.  The evaluative criteria element of a 
deliberation only requires individuals to make a decision on the way in which the 
various proposals identified in the previous phase are ranked.  Metaconsensus, as it is 
termed in Niemeyer and Dryzek’s paper (2007), is therefore a much weaker level of 
agreement for the group to reach.  Whilst it is correct to suggest that the act of making a 
decision as a group has the potential to make the group/social identity more salient, the 
level at which this happens in this phase also means the impact should be much less 
pronounced than when compared to decision-making over actual policy proposals.  For 
a group member to say ‘we choose policy proposal a’, it is clear that the group must 
have a level of entatitivity, as well as the possibility that the identification of a common 
preference position has occurred - found to trigger social identity in experimental work. 
Yet it is much more difficult to imagine the statement ‘we all agree on the process of 
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how the policy proposals should be ranked’ as achieving the same outcome.  Indeed, the 
extent to which metaconsensus might affect individual behaviour in group situations is 
an emerging area: where there has been no experimental work designed to explicitly test 
this hypothesis up to this point.  Conceptually, at the very least, the point does appear 
justifiable.   
 
To briefly restate then, the evaluative criteria phase certainly seems to have a number of 
features within it that are likely to raise the salience of group/social identity.  What is 
apparent more in this section than any of the previous two, however, is that the degree 
to which this is likely is very difficult to predict.  I’ll go into this in more depth in 
section 3.3 below. 
 
Decision-making Phase 
Although the more controversial of the four stages of the deliberative process, I want to 
look at the decision-making phase for two reasons.  The first concerns a simple 
restatement of the way in which some form of agreement is likely to trigger entatitivity 
and therefore social identity – covered in the equality/reciprocity section on deliberative 
behaviour, and the evaluative criteria section of deliberative phases.  The second way, 
however, concerns the point at which the decision is made.  In chapter one I discussed 
the way in which the concept of consensus had been used in deliberative democratic 
literature, and specifically, that a debate existed as to what the ends of an ideal 
deliberation should be.  Some argued explicitly for unanimous agreement, whilst others 
suggested this as oppressive or simply impossible.  However, the conclusion that I 
arrived at, based on a distinction between ‘objective’ and ‘result’, is crucial here.  By 
setting a consensus as the objective of the decision-making phase, whilst simultaneously 
acknowledging the ‘fall back’ of a majoritarian outcome, this element is more likely to 
involve discussion that reflects points (iii) to (vi) in the key principles of deliberative 
behaviour.  Because of this, it is therefore more likely to have a similar impact on social 
identity that these features predict. 
 
However, the very fact that a decision must be made at this point also introduces a 
concern that less deliberative behaviour is perhaps made more likely.  By this, I mean 
the extent to which individuals might relax the ideal criteria in their attempts to make 
the final decision more closely match their preferred outcome. In effect, it is possible to 
imagine a situation where the decision-making phase prompts those involved in the 
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deliberation to act strategically. Again then, consider a topic categorised by deep 
disagreement such as the abortion debate referred to earlier.  If a group of individuals 
reflective of all sides of the issue are required to agree on a single set of policy 
proposals (i.e. legalisation or criminalisation), then a consensus is impossible.  This is 
very different from the situation where consensus is possible but improbable, as it now 
removes the incentive for individuals to make deliberative claims according to the 
public principle.  Why bother presenting an argument in terms of ‘x is best for all of us’ 
if you know half the group believe ‘y is best for all of us’ and will never change their 
opinion.  In this type of deliberation, and particularly at this stage of the process, it is 
therefore possible to imagine personal rather than social identity of the group becoming 
more salient for those involved.  I will return to this specific point in chapter six of the 
thesis. 
 
3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
The objective of this chapter has been to provide a more robust theoretical foundation 
for the claim made in chapter two, that deliberation might trigger agency revision, and 
cause individuals to team reason.  By engaging with the social psychological literature 
on social identity, I have provided an argument that both reconciles with rational choice 
theory (through Bacharach’s notion of framing) as well as reconciling with key 
principles of deliberation and deliberative behaviour.  
 
With the theoretical model now firmly in place, the next step is to examine the extent to 
which practice might live up to this theory.  In the next two chapters of the thesis I now 
turn to the question of how this phenomenon might be investigated empirically. 
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  CHAPTER 4   
MEASURING TEAM REASONING: AN EXPERIMENTAL 
ECONOMICS METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
In chapter two I presented a three-fold analytical model to which the concept of 
deliberative revision can be applied to decision making, with the rational choice 
approach to political science used as a tool to elucidate a number of key supporting 
arguments offered by deliberative theorists.  Two of these levels, namely issue and 
preference, have been the subject(s) of the recent empirical turn in deliberative 
democratic theory.  The third, agency, has largely been ignored.  Having demonstrated 
the applicability of such a revision to deliberative claims in chapters two and three, I 
now progress to the experimental section of this thesis.  To what extent does the 
hypothesis regarding deliberation and agency revision hold true empirically? 
 
This chapter therefore has the following two objectives: 
 
i.       To develop an appropriate method through which the phenomenon of agency 
revision, leading to team reasoning, can be investigated in relation to 
political deliberation. 
ii. To provide the details of the experimental economics side of the 
investigation, in particular the structure of the games and the specific 
instructions that were given to participants. 
 
Once both these objectives have been completed, in chapter five I will then discuss the 
details of the deliberation that was used as a case study. 
 
4.2 WHY EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS?  
 
Experimental economics, the empirical, investigative arm of rational choice theory, 
usually considers its subject matter in one of two ways.  Originally, its role was 
constrained merely to the testing of pre-existing theories of rationality.  It was, 
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essentially, an endeavour to discover whether actual human decision-making conformed 
to the rigid assumptions of microeconomic theory.  Individuals were placed in 
experiments designed to approximate economic decision contexts, given choices to 
make, and the results were then compared directly to theoretical prediction.  Yet once 
consistent discrepancies were found between classical economic prediction and reality, 
for example the work referred to earlier of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) or Loomes 
and Sugden (1982), its role shifted dramatically.  Experimental economics then 
established, and now currently fuels, a large and expanding literature on what Starmer 
(2000) terms ‘the hunt for a [universal] descriptive theory of choice under risk’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: The Methodology of Experiment Economics 
 
As a discipline in its own right, the research agenda within experimental economics has 
predominantly remained fixed on the second stage of the diagram – each new 
‘universal’ theory of rational choice ultimately proving not so ‘universal’ as robust 
anomalies are identified.  However, the investigative portion of this thesis does not, it is 
important to state, share the same stated end goal as experimental economics.  The 
argument that deliberative mechanisms, such as citizens’ juries, transform agency and 
thus induce individuals to team-reason does not mean that either (i) it is the only 
transformation of how people reason that might take place, or (ii) that if it does not, the 
entire notion of team reasoning should be abandoned as concept entirely.  What is 
important for this study is simply whether deliberative mechanisms induce this specific 
shift. 
   
Analysis of results 
Anomalies 
Theory of 
rationality 
New theory of 
rationality 
Experimental Test 
Stage One 
Stage Two 
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There are, then, a number of significant reasons as to why the experimental economic 
approach to social science proves most suitable to the task of investigating agency 
revision due to deliberation.  These can be apportioned into five separate arguments: 
 
i.       Observation ability 
ii. Clarity 
iii. Spill-over effects 
iv. Issue effects 
v. Agency isolation 
 
Dealing with the issue of observation ability first. In reality, preferences and agency 
cannot be examined directly.  There is no device that can simply ‘scan’ an individual to 
measure what they like or dislike, and more so, how they act upon these desires.  
Further still, merely asking individuals to surrender such data, for example in simple 
question form, is also highly problematic as well as unreliable.  Experimental economic 
methodology, though, works by utilising the link between choices, and the preferences 
and modes of reasoning (agency) that underpin them.  These choices can be observed, 
and therefore preferences and modes of reasoning are uncovered in an indirect manner.  
As Colman et al (2008) put it: 
 
Neither preferences nor modes of reasoning can be observed directly, but 
predictions can be made about choices that would result from collective utility 
maximisation and team reasoning, and that behaviour can be observed directly. 
(Colman et al, 2008; p. 4) 
 
Secondly (and related significantly to the first point), is that it should be apparent that 
experimental economics is not the only approach that works on the principle that claims 
choices can reveal preferences and agency.  Q methodology, for example, takes 
statements that are reflective of different policy positions and asks individuals to rank 
them in order of agreement. Preference orderings, and to an extent, how people reason 
on them, can then be inferred.  Yet approaches to investigating the effects of 
deliberation that are based on real-life examples, with complex policy alternatives, 
provide fundamental problems with discovering the true nature of preference and 
agency revision.  Interpersonal comparisons of utility that are necessary for any concept 
of pro-sociality to work become increasingly difficult to make when dealing with 
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outcomes that affect individuals in such different ways.  For example, consider an 
individual (post deliberation) with the following new utility function over a decision x: 
 
€ 
ui =α[ui(x)]+ (1−α)[u j (x)] 
 
The utility that individual i gains from the choice of x is, as I have discussed in chapter 
two, now dependent on the utility that individual j in turn receives.  There are then, two 
clear difficulties.  For the individuals involved there is an information gap to bridge: 
what value does individual i denote to the term 
€ 
[u j (x)] in their utility function?  In 
multifaceted policy decision-making, where in this case the choice of x may have 
unknown (to i) consequences for j, the estimation of such a value becomes increasingly 
difficult.  Secondly, this difficulty is multiplied even more for an empirical political 
scientist trying to measure the extent to which, for instance, preferences do become 
more ‘other-regarding’. Without a clear transposition between outcome and utility, 
making interpersonal comparisons in some sense ‘meaningful’, no such technical 
conclusions can be made.  By using monetary values to represent outcomes then, a 
larger degree of clarity is secured: it is, for example, reasonable to assume the 
individuals prefer more money to less, and since money is universal (it can be spent on 
anything the individual desires), it is also an extremely useful proxy for utility.  
Interpersonal comparisons thus become much easier for the individuals within the 
experiment to make, and importantly for the political scientist, to observe and make 
meaningful conclusions from. 
 
The third argument for using an experimental economic approach, then, concerns the 
status of the issue in deliberative revision.  Many of the benefits that deliberation is 
argued to yield have no real link to the problem being considered.  Individuals who 
partake in citizens’ juries, for instance, are expected to leave them not only with revised 
preferences and agency on the topic at hand, but as different, or ‘better citizens’ 
(Fishkin 1995).  If this is the case, then these ‘spill over effects’ – whereby deliberation 
over one issue causes individuals to approach others from the same perspective – are 
undeniably an important area for empirical investigation.  The nature and set up of 
experimental encounters within economics, in particular the use of artificially 
constructed games, thus provides a clear separation between the topic that is discussed 
in a deliberation, and the decisions which individuals are then required to make.  This, it 
is important to note, is especially relevant to the debate that surrounds the impossibility 
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of institutionalising deliberative mechanisms within a large democratic society.  If some 
of the benefits that mechanisms like citizens’ juries secure can be achieved by only 
attending one such forum, then the implications for the macro-arguments are significant. 
This is a matter I will return to in chapter seven. 
 
Fourthly, and perhaps the most important argument I have made so far, concerns the 
influence of the issue itself on the nature of a deliberative revision.  As I demonstrated 
in chapter two, there are some convincing arguments for why a revision of the issue 
being discussed in a deliberative mechanism can benefit the decision-makers in 
question.  Generating entirely new alternative policies that may not have existed before 
hand, or allowing compromise positions not originally designated options are but two 
examples.  In such cases, it therefore becomes extremely difficult to truly capture how 
preferences and agency have changed: the new preferences and modes of reasoning may 
simply reflect what was true (but not available) in the first place.   By keeping the issue 
constant, so that individuals are faced with exactly the same issue and associated 
decisions to make both before and after they partake in a deliberation, these 
inconsistencies are guarded against.  A true, or in some sense more ‘pure’ result of the 
deliberation can be identified. 
 
Finally then, just as this fourth point demonstrated the ability of an experimental 
economic methodology to remove the effects of issue revision from the investigative 
process (to truly capture preference and agency revision), the fifth point is concerned 
with how the same logic can be applied in order to distinguish between these two 
remaining levels.  Yet largely as a result of the highly subtle conceptual distinction 
between individuals who “I” reason with pro-social preferences, and those who team-
reason, this is a much more complex task.   
 
4.2.1 ISOLATING AGENCY REVISION FROM PREFERENCE REVISION 
 
In discussing the benefits of agency revision in chapter two, I suggested that triggering 
individuals to employ team reasoning should be considered beneficial for society, since 
they will voluntarily participate in the provision of socially valuable public goods.  It 
might seem, then, that all that is required to test the presence of team reasoning is to 
reverse this logic, and place individuals into exactly these types of games.  If they 
choose the strategy characterised as defect in a one shot prisoners’ dilemma encounter 
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before deliberation, and cooperate after; then there are grounds to argue that the process 
has caused agency revision in this manner.45   
 
However, whilst it is likely that some individuals who choose the strategy cooperate in 
many prisoners’ dilemma games are doing so as a result of having team reasoned, it is 
also quite plausible that some are not.  Some prisoners’ dilemma games can be ‘solved’ 
merely by the presence of other-regarding preferences (Basu 2006).  In these cases, it is 
impossible to ascertain from the change of strategy choices whether agency revision has 
definitely occurred.   The objective, then, is to find a game theoretic encounter with a 
collectively rational outcome that cannot be the product of a choice other than one 
arrived at by an individual who also team-reasons.  One such encounter then, as I 
described in chapter two, is the Hi-Lo game featured heavily in both Sugden and 
Bacharach’s work.   Here, when individuals partake in the game on the basis of self-
interested preferences, two Nash equlibria at [high, high] and [low, low] exist.  Yet 
from a ‘we’ perspective (and the associated maxim of payoff dominance), [high, high] 
is the sole rational outcome: 
 
 Individual  
 high  low  
high 10 , 10 0 , 0 
 
Individual  
low  0 , 0 1 , 1 
 
Figure 2.3 (restated): The Hi-Lo Game 
 
The question, of course, is why can’t high be deemed a rational strategy in Hi-Lo by 
appealing to other-regarding preferences?  Suppose, then, that individual i now shifts to 
a utility function with an altruistic concern, representative of rational altruism (Bardsley 
and Sugden 2006) or pro-social preferences (Van Lange 1999).  More specifically, 
player i now considers player j’s payoffs to be equally important to their own, so that 
their utility function is depicted by: 
 
€ 
ui = 0.5[ui(x)]+ 0.5[u j (x)] 
 
                                                 
45 Of course, it is also worth noting that some individuals, when confronted with public goods games, 
often play the cooperate strategy as a simple matter of course – these individuals do not require a 
deliberative mechanism to induce such a shift (see Frank 1988 and Marwell and Ames 1981).  I will 
consider this debate in relation to ‘ceiling effects’ below. 
! 
j
! 
i
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Due to the symmetric structure of the game however, the resultant other-regarding 
payoffs are merely the same as those from an entirely self-interested perspective.  
Looking at the [high, high] outcome, for example: 
 
€ 
ui = 0.5[10]+ 0.5[10]
ui =10
 
 
In fact, given any combination of weighting between the altruistic and self-interested 
elements, precisely the same result obtains. Preference revision does not alter the 
structure of the interaction, and thus cannot rationally explain why the strategy high 
should be played consistently over that of low.  Further still, an identical result is also 
obtained when a second common derivation of this pure ‘co-ordination’ game, the Stag 
Hunt, is played: 
 
 Individual  
 left right 
left 10 , 10 0 , 8 
 
Individual  
right  8 , 0 1 , 1 
 
Figure 4.2: The Stag Hunt 
 
From the deduction that individuals who choose high in Hi-Low and left in the Stag 
Hunt do so only as a result of employing team reasoning, then it might seem that both 
games would be useful in investigating the impact of deliberation. However, two 
significant problems arise with both: one practical, and one more technical.  The first is 
that when played experimentally, almost all players automatically choose high and left 
respectively.  At the same time as being used as a justification within game theory for 
the application of team reasoning to economic interactions then, both games are 
therefore also highly unsuitable for investigating agency revision in deliberation.  The 
structure and payoffs of the game itself are enough to induce all individuals to approach 
the game from a “we” perspective: in terms of the three-fold model developed earlier, 
the issue triggers agency revision without the need for any deliberation.   The second 
problem with using either the Hi-Lo or Stag Hunt encounter, is that whilst individual, 
self-interested reasoning does not offer an argument as to why high or left are played 
consistently, it also does not offer a definitive reason to why they should not be played.  
Since in each game two Nash equlibria occur, at least some strategy choices of high and 
! 
j
! 
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left can therefore be explained on the basis of self-interested preferences and individual 
agency.  Any result that deliberative revision may have, then, becomes obscured. It is, 
essentially, impossible to definitively conclude why a strategy choice has been made. 
 
Because of these foundational problems, i.e. the need to find a game that requires 
agency revision (from I to we) to induce a particular strategy to be played, and the 
strong framing effects of many games with collectively rational outcomes, the actual 
construction of the interactions becomes a quite technical endeavour.  Colman et al 
(2008), in the first experimental paper explicitly investigating the phenomenon, offer an 
extremely useful starting point in their second section.  In fact, as Sugden (2008) argues 
in a related commentary, their fifth interaction in particular provides a powerful 
comparison between how individuals who reason from a “I”, and those who reason 
from a “we” perspective play the game.   In their investigation, individuals were 
presented with the following written instructions (Colman et al 2008; p. 7-8): 
 
You are now going to make [several] decisions, from which you can earn more 
money.  There are no scenarios with these – they are purely cash decisions.  You 
and the other person will be presented with the identical problems.  To work out 
the likely consequences of any decision, you will have to take into account what 
the other person is likely to choose.  Once again, one of these problems will be 
chosen at random by a computer, and you and the other person will receive the 
amounts shown, in cash, depending on both your choices for that problem. 
 
And asked to play the following game: 
 
 Individual  
 C D E 
C 8 , 8 5 , 5 5 , 9 
D 5 , 5 6 , 6 6 , 7 
 
Individual  
E 9 , 5 7 , 6 7 , 7 
 
Fig 4.3: A 3x3 Game Theoretic Interaction 
 
From a classical (self-interested and individual) perspective, only one Nash equilibrium 
at [E, E] can be sustained: strategy E is the best reply for each individual to make given 
that the other is also playing E.  Nash reasoning therefore argues that rational players 
will follow such logic.  But not only that, it is also the case that E is a dominant strategy 
! 
j
! 
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for both players – meaning strategy E choices are the product of self-interested 
preferences without the more stringent requirement of Nash reasoning.  By symmetry, 
then, the following is true for both individuals: 
 
i.       If player i plays C, player j should play E since 9 is greater than 5 (D) and 8 
(C). 
ii. If player i plays D, player j should play E since 7 is greater than 6 (D) and 5 
(C). 
iii. If player i plays E, player j should play E since 7 is greater than 6 (D) and 5 
(C). 
 
Given this result, it would seem that any individual who plays strategy E before 
engaging in a deliberative process, and C thereafter (where [C, C] is evidently a 
collectively rational outcome), does so on the basis of having undergone agency 
revision to that of a “we” perspective.   But to see whether this statement entirely holds 
true, it must be ascertained whether the choice of strategy C can be explained by 
anything other than an individual who employs such reasoning?  Can deliberative 
revision that produces other-regarding preferences, for example, transform the payoffs 
of the game to sustain an equilibrium at [C, C], thus making strategy C choices rational? 
If this is impossible, then the game successfully distinguishes between preference and 
agency, and depending on the framing effects of its construction, would provide a useful 
experimental game for studying this specific impact of deliberation.  Formally then, if 
other-regarding preferences can explain C choices, then the following statement must be 
true, 
 
i.       Given a utility function in the form of 
€ 
ui =α[ui(x)]+ (1−α)[u j (x)], there is 
a value of 
€ 
α  that yields a Nash equilibrium at [C, C].  
 
The following payoff functions can be constructed for player i, dependent on the 
choices of player j: 
 
€ 
u(C,C) =α(8) + (1−α)8 = 8
u(E,C) =α(9) + (1−α)5 = 4α + 5
u(D,C) =α(5) + (1−α)5 = 5
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Re-arranging a little shows that when the following is true, C becomes the rational 
strategy to play when agent j also plays C: 
 
€ 
α < 0.75  
 
Which is exactly the same as saying that when the ‘other-regarding’ weighting in the 
utility function is greater than 0.25, then by symmetry, [C, C] is a Nash equilibrium.  It 
would seem from this result, that the strategy which team reasoning equates to is also 
the strategy that a particular set of other-regarding preferences might rationally explain. 
Or in other words, that both agency and preference revision can explain the choice of C 
in this game.  Rather crucially for this methodology, however, this assertion is incorrect.  
The above game may have the property such that when 
€ 
α < 0.75  then an individual 
maximising 
€ 
α[ui(x)]+ (1−α)[u j (x)] will do best by choosing strategy C.  But in this 
game, an individual simply cannot maximise this function because they do not know 
what strategy the other player will choose; the game is what Sugden (2008) calls ‘non-
decomposable’.   
 
To understand specifically what this means, consider another simple prisoners’ 
dilemma, with two players i and j, and two strategies for each player.  Player i must 
choose between up and down, and player j between left and right.  The most common 
way to describe this type of game is in a simple 2x2 matrix format as follows: 
 
 Individual  
 left right 
up 1 , 1 -1 , 2 
 
Individual  
down  2 , -1 0 , 0 
 
Figure 4.4: A Decomposable Prisoners’ Dilemma 
 
This game, though, can be articulated in a different manner.  If player i chooses up, no 
matter what j does, he loses 1 (either going from 2 to 1, or 0 to -1) and j will gain 2 
(going from -1 to 1, or 0 to 2).  Similarly, if player j chooses left, then she loses 1 (going 
from 2 to 1, or 0 to -1), and i gains 2 (going from -1 to 1, or 0 to 2).  Put more succinctly 
still, i chooses between up = {-1. +2} and down = {0,0}.  Player j then chooses between 
left = {+2, -1} and right = {0,0} where the first entry in each vector is the net change in 
payoff to i, and the sector entry the net change in payoff to j.   
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i. Vector table for player i: 
 
Payoff Effect  
Player i Player j 
up -1 +2 
down 0 0 
 
ii. Vector table for player j: 
 
Payoff Effect  
Player i Player j 
right +2 -1 
left 0 0 
 
In a decomposable game such as this example, each individual can then therefore decide 
what strategy to choose simply by looking at his or her own ‘effect’ vectors.  For 
example, with the following other-regarding preferences, where the utility function is 
given by 
€ 
0.5(ui) + 0.5(u j ), individual i can simply work out their best course of action 
by applying the function to their two vectors, and seeing which one yields the greatest 
increase in payoff: 
 
€ 
[0.5u(i) + 0.5u( j)] →  {−1,+2} = +0.5  
€ 
[0.5u(i) + 0.5u( j)] →  {0,0} = 0 
 
In this type of prisoners’ dilemma, other-regarding preferences can therefore be used to 
rationally explain choices that are also indicative of a team-reasoned strategy.  From a 
methodological point of view, the imperative question to consider is therefore how to 
distinguish between games that can be decomposed (and are thus unsuitable for testing 
the presence of team-reasoning), and those like Colman et al (2008)’s 3x3 game above, 
that cannot.  The answer, to put it most simply, lies in the symmetry within the payoffs 
in the game.  For instance in figure 4.4, when individual j is playing ‘left’, individual i 
does better by playing ‘down’, with an increase of 1 in their payoff.  Imperatively, the 
identical argument is also true when individual j plays ‘right’.  It is this symmetry in 
payoff changes that allows the decision vector for player i to be entirely independent of 
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the strategy taken by player j, allowing the game to be decomposed.  To prevent this, 
and to retain the strategic nature of the interaction, the differences in payoffs across the 
available strategies must vary.  For example, consider the following alternative 
prisoners’ dilemma: 
 
 Individual  
 left right 
up 1 , 1 -1 , 2 
 
Individual  
down  3 , -1 0 , 0 
 
Figure 4.5: A Non Decomposable Prisoners’ Dilemma 
 
Now, the difference in payoff for player i when they play down is dependent on the 
strategy that player j takes: either {+2}, from 1 to 3, or {+1}, from -1 to 0.  The 
interaction therefore cannot be decomposed into simple independent decision vectors 
for each player.  For completeness, then, consider again Colman et al (2008)’s 3x3 
game, it is quite obvious that the differences between payoffs for i are not consistent 
across the strategy choices of j.  Indeed, the differences when j is playing C are {-3, 
+4}, when j is playing D are {+1, +1} and when j is playing E are {+1, +1}.  The 
payoffs to i are thus totally dependent on the choice of j.  Since i has no independent 
reason to believe j will play C, then they are in fact unable to maximise an other-
regarding utility function, and thus pro-social preferences cannot be used as a rational 
justification for either player to choose C.  It is, therefore, an example of a game that 
can be used to test whether an individual is team reasoning, and thus represents a case in 
point for the usefulness of an experimental economic methodology to this project.  In 
short, non-decomposable games are suitable for investigating whether individuals are 
employing team reasoning, rather than just acting on other-regarding preferences. 
  
4.3 PROBLEMS WITH THE EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS APPROACH  
 
Having discussed a number of arguments in favour of an experimental economic 
methodology, I also want to answer some possible critiques than might be levelled at 
such an approach.  For reasons of simplicity, they can be more or less split into two 
broad categories: those which fundamentally attack the experimental approach to social 
science in general, and those which are specific problems associated with combining the 
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methodology to the study of deliberation.  Let me start with the more general problems, 
before moving on to those specific to this project. 
 
i.        Internal and external validity 
 
Internal validity refers to the ability of the researcher to make accurate causal 
conclusions from empirical data; or to put it another way, the truthfulness of the 
proposed relationship between cause and effect within the study.  Relating this purely to 
experimental economics, this concern can be interpreted in perhaps two different ways.  
Most fundamentally, it examines the link between preferences and modes of reasoning, 
and the choices that result from them – questioning the very basis of what makes an 
individual act.  More practically though, it manifests itself in the extent to which the 
conditions of the experiment match the assumptions of the theory or model being tested 
– it is a matter of experimental design.  In this sense, the most crucial question that 
internal validity poses is whether certain strategy choices that are played within game 
theoretic interactions can be attributed to the specific types of preferences and modes of 
reasoning that are being investigated.  Essentially, this requires a simple restatement of 
the arguments posited directly above, where the isolation of agency transformation 
(from issue and preference) is made possible.  The notion of internal validity, thus, is 
not only a rather vapid critique, but in fact turns out to be a particular strength of the 
approach. 
 
Regarding external validity, the critique surrounds the extent to which data, and 
conclusions based upon it, can be generalised to a wider context (Lowenstein 1999).  
Are studies completed in a laboratory applicable to examples within society more 
generally?  Most political scientists (or even economists for that matter) from a 
behavioural tradition would argue quite vociferously that it is here where the 
experimental economic approach falters.  When individuals are asked to act in true 
political contexts, such as voting in a referendum, then the process by which they make 
their decision is markedly different from that when making decisions over monetary 
payoffs.  The claim isn’t that that experimental economics approach offers no useful 
data (for this would be an internal validity argument), but rather that the context is so 
artificial (and specific) that conclusions based upon evidence it provides simply cannot 
be applied to any other situation. 
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For experimental economics, quite clearly, the trade-off between internal and external 
validity is a critical area for consideration.  What degree of reality must be sacrificed in 
order restrict the number of variables impacting the process under investigation?  It is 
this logic, or in some sense a cost-benefit calculation, which dictates the appropriateness 
of the methodology for this project.  Because of the highly subtle nature of the 
distinction between outcomes that are the product of individuals employing individual 
reasoning with other-regarding preferences, and those that are the product of individuals 
employing team reasoning, then an approach which utilises monetary payoffs is the 
most precise way to grasp the technical structure of preferences and modes of reasoning 
that ‘are in play’.  Moreover, the laboratory conditions of the experiment, by reducing 
the influence that other variables might have, should in fact offer a much more robust 
conclusion as to the impact of political deliberation specifically on agency revision. 
 
It is important to make clear though, that removing variables is not the same as 
removing the context in which decisions are made.46  In particular, a common argument 
levelled against the experimental economic approach, using the concept of external 
validity, is that decision-making over money itself often causes individuals to become 
unnaturally self-interested.  But fundamentally, this investigation makes no claims 
regarding the natural level of pro-sociality of human beings.  The initial preferences of 
an individual, and the mode of reasoning used from them, are in one sense irrelevant – it 
is the change between pre and post deliberation that is important. In fact, since one of 
the most significant problems with using these types of games is the strong framing 
effect of the collectively rational outcome, then ensuring the context can prevent this 
automatic agency revision proves pivotal.  The apparent tension between internal and 
external validity within experimental economics as a discipline then, tends to suggest a 
sacrifice of the latter to ensure the former.   Yet, because the research question of this 
thesis is directed towards an entirely different goal (investigating the impact of 
deliberation on agency, rather than finding a universal theory of choice under risk), the 
same conclusions do not obtain.  Indeed, it appears that a strong case can be made for 
the approach offering a more, not less universal, conclusion as to the effect that 
deliberation has.  
 
                                                 
46 It is important to distinguish between the decision context (i.e. the problem that an individual is 
required to make a decision over), and the more general notion of context, used here, to denote the 
general conditions (i.e. location, the type of decision being made) of the experiment. 
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With the more general debate regarding the use of an experimental methodology in 
social science considered, it is now necessary to confront some of the more specific 
problems in applying this approach to the study of political deliberation.  I suggest these 
can be broken down into five different points, which I now want to consider in turn:   
 
i.       Status quo bias (testing and instrumentation threat) 
ii. Individual-type bias (selection threat) 
iii. Situation-type bias (selection threat) 
iv. Incentives 
v. Understanding (game complexity) 
 
Investigating the impact that deliberation has on how people reason, by its very nature, 
requires a ‘pre-test/post-test’ research design. Individuals must play games both before 
and after they participate in a deliberation.  One of the features of the experimental 
economic approach, as I stated earlier, is that it can remove the effect that a revision of 
the issue being considered might have on individual behaviour – since the interactions 
(payoffs and strategies) are fixed and not subject to the forces of change.  As a 
consequence though, this allows for the possibility that a status quo bias may arise.47  
Individuals, faced a second time with the same set of decisions to make, with the same 
information and same decision making context, are at least partially likely to simply 
follow their original choices.  Path dependency, in this sense, could be triggered by a 
desire to look consistent in the eyes of the researcher, a desire to look consistent in the 
eyes of the other players, or even a misunderstanding that somehow, consistent 
behaviour will be rewarded.  To guard against these three potential problems, 
experimental economics has established a number of conventions, including strict 
anonymity between the decision-maker and the researcher, as well as between the 
decision-maker and their assigned partner (Hoffman et all 1994, Lowenstein 1999).  
Moreover, written and verbal instructions are presented in a manner so as to make clear 
that each game is entirely independent from another, and that a strategy choice in one 
interaction has no impact on the strategy choice in another.  Specifically, the 
information that is given out before and after the deliberative mechanisms are 
undertaken must stress all these points in order to ensure that decisions are made only 
on the basis of current preferences and current modes of reasoning. 
                                                 
47 It is important to note that these games are still to be considered ‘one shot’ games – since no results of 
the interactions in the pre-test are given until after any post-test is concluded.   
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The second and third potential problems once again go back to the likelihood of a 
ceiling effect within the experiment.  Except, rather than the framing effect as the 
product of the games (and thus to a certain extent minimisable by the researcher), they 
concern the types of individuals participating in the study, as well as the location in 
which the investigation is conducted.  Deliberative mechanisms such as citizens’ juries 
usually select their participants according to two principles: representation and 
randomisation.  The first, by using some form of stratified sampling, is necessary to 
ensure that the panel represents a good cross section of the population affected by the 
issue under consideration. The second, randomising the selection of individuals within 
these groups by using something like electoral roll data, further guarantees the 
credibility of any policy recommendations that the jury may make.  However, 
irrespective of the fact that many of these forums often offer a small honorarium for 
participation, there is still a choice to give up leisure (or professional) time in order to 
attend them.  Demographically, the forums might indeed be diverse; but the self-
selection bias towards those with a naturally more pro-social perspective, willing (even 
eager) to participate in a collaborative decision making process, poses certain possible 
problems.  There is, for instance, a possibility that all the individuals involved might 
already employ team reasoning during the pre-test phase.  If this is true, it becomes 
impossible to investigate whether deliberation may trigger the specific revision from an 
‘I’ to a ‘we’ perspective.  Moreover, since (for logistical reasons) both the pre and post-
test stages are to be conducted at the site of the forum, it might also be the case that the 
physical surroundings – actually being at the site of the deliberation – might also yield 
the same problematic result.   
 
To a certain extent, these problems are rather inherent to the project, and would require 
significant financial resources to entirely negate them: large payments would have to be 
offered to attend the forums, as well as the partaking individuals being asked to 
complete the pre-test before attending.  Without such resources, the most obvious way 
to circumvent these ceiling effects (other than in the game design itself) is to therefore 
construct the experimental administration in a manner so it primes individual, self-
interested behaviour to counter the more pro-social influence that person-type and 
situation-type bias may involve.  As long as the same context is provided in both the 
pre-test and post-test phases, then it is still the effect of the deliberative mechanism that 
is being measured – it remains a ceteris paribus analysis.   
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There is also a potential difficulty with the monetary incentives used as payoffs in the 
game interactions.  For starters, the debate introduces the question of whether actual 
payoffs are needed, or if hypothetical values are sufficient for the task (such as those 
used in some of the early work in experimental economics, see Thurstone 1931). The 
single most persuasive reason for adopting the latter, then, is undeniably a matter of 
ease of application.  After examining a series of identical experiments conducted with 
both real and hypothetical payoffs, for instance, Thaler (1987) found that there was in 
fact not a significant difference between the two sets of results for particular types of 
experiments.  Yet, in some reported cases  (as far back as Smith 1962), there has been 
divergence between results based on the two different approaches.  Wallace and 
Friedman (1942; pp. 179-180), in particular, provided the seminal economist rooted 
attack on the hypothetical approach, arguing: 
 
For a satisfactory experiment, it is essential that the subject give actual reasons to 
actual stimuli […] Questionnaires or other devices based on conjectural responses 
to hypothetical stimuli do not satisfy this requirement.  The responses are 
valueless because the subject cannot know how he would react. 
(Wallace and Friedman 1942; p. 180) 
 
The central point of conflict between hypothetical and real payoffs, then, does not rest 
on a logical assertion that the former is in any way better than the latter.  Instead, it is an 
issue of sufficiency: do individuals treat hypothetical outcomes the same as real ones 
when considering a decision they face?  In experiments that use a large number of 
participants, and where individuals are required to make repeated choices during lots of 
different games, it is easy to see why using imagined payoffs might be preferable.  But 
in the context of this research project, where only a small number of individuals are 
required, there appears little reason as to why some monetary rewards cannot be 
offered.   
 
Finally then, a particularly strong argument levelled against much experimental work in 
economics is the claim that certain games are simply too complex for individuals not 
trained in a social science discipline to be able to fully comprehend.  This is especially 
true for games with a number of different alternative strategies, where confusion 
regarding the impact that specific choices might have can cloud a rational calculation 
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made by the players. Two-person games with three choices are, to some degree, 
susceptible to this problem (or at the least more susceptible than games with less players 
and choices).   If individuals are unable to make meaningful choices based on rational 
calculation, then the link between preferences/modes of reasoning and human action is 
broken.  If this link is broken, then the experimental approach becomes unsuitable.  To 
minimise the potential for this to happen, one of two courses of action are usually taken: 
either individuals are allowed to participate in a number of practice games before the 
real ones are attempted, or that more simple games are used initially (with meaningful 
data still generated) in order for players to ‘learn’ how to play them.  In relation to this 
project, a mixture of both techniques to minimise the potential for this problem can be 
applied. There is no need to go beyond games with two strategy choices per individual, 
and practice encounters can be offered for players to become familiar with the set up of 
the experiments. 
 
To summarise very briefly, up to this point in the chapter I have discussed a number of 
issues regarding some of the general methodological considerations that must be taken 
into account in this thesis.  I have demonstrated that an experimental economic 
approach to the question of whether deliberation revises agency within individuals, 
inducing them to team reason, is both an entirely appropriate and effective methodology 
to investigate such a hypothesis.   
 
4.4 CONSTRUCTING GAME THEORETIC ENCOUNTERS  
 
To restate some points made earlier in this chapter, each interaction must have the 
following properties if it is to satisfy the internal validity requirement that certain 
strategies are indicative of certain preferences and, most importantly, certain modes of 
reasoning: 
 
i.       There must be a single Nash equilibrium on the basis of individual, self-
interested preferences. 
ii. The strategy choice that yields (i) must also be a dominant strategy for both 
players. 
iii. A collectively rational outcome that is the product of another set of 
strategies, that is not a Nash equilibrium in its own right. 
iv. The interaction must be non-decomposable. 
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With these four distinct requirements in place, five different games were constructed.  
Each was then also subjected to basic preliminary testing (asking ten random University 
of York students to play them) in order to identify whether any were susceptible to the 
ceiling effect discussed above.  The five games that were chosen, and the associated 
preliminary test results, are now detailed. 
 
4.4.1 FIVE DIFFERENT GAMES 
 
 
 Individual  
 A B 
A 5 , 5 10 , 4 
 
Individual  
B  3 , 10 7 , 7 
 
Figure 4.6: Game Theoretic Encounter One 
 
In this game, there is a Nash equilibrium at [A, A]: if individual i plays strategy A, then 
individual j should follow the same course of action, since: 
 
€ 
u(A) = u(5)
u(B) = u(4)  
 
It is also the case that A is a dominant strategy for player i: 
 
If player j plays A, player i should play A since 5 is greater than 3 
If player j plays B, player i should play A since 10 is greater than 7 
 
There is also a collective rational outcome at [B , B].  However, it cannot be sustained 
as a Nash equilibrium with other-regarding preferences because the game cannot be 
decomposed into independent decision vectors: the differences in payoffs between 
strategies A and B for player i are {-2} when j plays A, and {-3} when j plays B.   
 
A preliminary test showed 30% of individuals played the team reason strategy 
automatically. 
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 Individual  
 A B 
A 7 , 7 2 , 11 
 
Individual  
B  10 , 2 4 , 4 
 
Figure 4.7: Game Theoretic Encounter Two 
 
In this game, there is a Nash equilibrium at [B, B]: if individual i plays strategy B, then 
individual j should follow the same course of action, since: 
 
€ 
u(A) = u(2)
u(B) = u(4)  
 
It is also the case that B is a dominant strategy for player i: 
 
If player j plays A, player i should play B since 10 is greater than 7 
If player j plays B, player i should play B since 4 is greater than 2 
 
There is also a collective rational outcome at [A , A].  However, it cannot be sustained 
as a Nash equilibrium with other-regarding preferences because the game cannot be 
decomposed into independent decision vectors: the differences in payoffs between 
strategies A and B for player i are {+3} when j plays A, and {+2} when j plays B. 
 
A preliminary test showed 30% of individuals played the team reason strategy 
automatically. 
 
 Individual  
 A B 
A 10 , 10 20 , 2 
 
Individual  
B  2 , 16 15 , 15 
 
Figure 4.8: Game Theoretic Encounter Three 
 
In this game, there is a Nash equilibrium at [A, A]: if individual i plays strategy A, then 
individual j should follow the same course of action, since: 
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€ 
u(A) = u(10)
u(B) = u(2)  
 
It is also the case that A is a dominant strategy for player i: 
 
If player j plays A, player i should play A since 10 is greater than 2 
If player j plays B, player i should play A since 20 is greater than 15 
 
There is also a collective rational outcome at [B , B].  However, it cannot be sustained 
as a Nash equilibrium with other-regarding preferences because the game cannot be 
decomposed into independent decision vectors: the differences in payoffs between 
strategies A and B for player i are {-8} when j plays A, and {-5} when j plays B. 
 
A preliminary test showed 20% of individuals played the team reason strategy 
automatically. 
 
 Individual  
 A B 
A 11 , 11 2 , 16 
 
Individual  
B  17 , 3 4 , 4 
 
Figure 4.9: Game Theoretic Encounter Four 
 
In this game, there is a Nash equilibrium at [B, B]: if individual i plays strategy B, then 
individual j should follow the same course of action, since: 
 
€ 
u(A) = u(3)
u(B) = u(4)  
 
It is also the case that B is a dominant strategy for player i: 
 
If player j plays A, player i should play B since 17 is greater than 11 
If player j plays B, player i should play B since 4 is greater than 2 
 
There is also a collective rational outcome at [A , A].  However, it cannot be sustained 
as a Nash equilibrium with other-regarding preferences because the game cannot be 
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decomposed into independent decision vectors: the differences in payoffs between 
strategies A and B for player i are {+6} when j plays A, and {+2} when j plays B. 
 
A preliminary test showed 30% of individuals played the team reason strategy 
automatically. 
 
 Individual  
 A B 
A 4 , 4 20 , 2 
 
Individual  
B  3 , 20 13 , 13 
 
Figure 4.10: Game Theoretic Encounter Five 
 
In this game, there is a Nash equilibrium at [A, A]: if individual i plays strategy A, then 
individual j should follow the same course of action, since: 
 
€ 
u(A) = u(4)
u(B) = u(2)  
 
It is also the case that A is a dominant strategy for player i: 
 
If player j plays A, player i should play A since 4 is greater than 3 
If player j plays B, player i should play A since 20 is greater than 13 
 
There is also a collective rational outcome at [B , B].  However, it cannot be sustained 
as a Nash equilibrium with other-regarding preferences because the game cannot be 
decomposed into independent decision vectors: the differences in payoffs between 
strategies A and B for player i are {-1} when j plays A, and {-7} when j plays B. 
 
A preliminary test showed 20% of individuals played the team reason strategy 
automatically. 
 
4.4.2 ALLOCATING CO-PLAYERS: DEFINING THE ‘WE’ 
Before I discuss the exact process of how the tests were administered, I need to discuss 
an important point regarding the allocation of co-players.  To make sure the games 
represented one-shot encounters, and therefore strategy choices could not be affected by 
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repetition, allocation of co-players was anonymous and randomised.  However, when 
studying a phenomenon that is directly related to social identity, the group from which 
each co-player j is chosen will clearly have a significant impact on the strategy choices 
of the individual i.  In this case, the most obvious level at which a social identity can 
exist is within the deliberating group itself.  On this basis, an individual who team 
reasons when participating in such an encounter has done so because that particular 
social identity has been made most salient.  This is the hypothesis that was developed in 
chapter two, and expanded upon in chapter three. 
 
However as I also made clear, there are alternative groups that social identity might be 
formed on the basis of. Deliberation might indeed trigger team reasoning in relation to 
members of the deliberating group, but it also might have an impact beyond this.  It is 
possible that by priming one specific social identity, others may also become more 
salient for a given individual.  For example, one possibility is to broaden what counts as 
the ‘we’ to include members of any deliberating group.  On this account, social identity 
therefore refers to the group of individuals involved in a deliberation, but not 
necessarily with each other.  If individual i chooses the team reason strategy when 
playing a game with an anonymous individual j from an alternative deliberation, then a 
social identity amongst ‘deliberators in general’ has clearly emerged.  Similarly, it is 
also possible to broaden the definition of the ‘we’ to the most universal level: the 
general public.  In this case, the experiments will show the extent to which an identity 
(arguably) similar to that of a citizen has been created.  A shift from individual to team 
reasoning would be indicative of a process that has primed a sense of common feeling 
amongst all individuals irrespective of their participation in the deliberation.    
 
There are then, numerous other prospective definitions of a ‘we’ that might be 
investigated in the process.  Yet the presence of team reasoning within a deliberating 
group remains the fundamental proposition to examine, as it represents the simplest 
level at which deliberation can impact upon social identity.  Given this result, the first 
three games are devoted to testing the presence of team reasoning within the 
deliberating group, the fourth in relation to a member of the general public, and the fifth 
in relation to a member of any deliberating group.  The choice of these other two forms 
of ‘we’ will be more comprehensively justified and discussed in chapters six and seven 
of the thesis.   
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4.4.3 INSTRUCTIONS AND EXPERIMENTAL ADMINISTRATION 
 
The last point I want discuss in this section concerns the administration of the 
experiment, and how the games were both presented to, and played by, the individuals 
involved.  Following convention in experimental economics, and to ensure both 
standardisation across different participants as well as different stages, identical and 
clear instructions were given at each point in the process. Immediately before any 
individuals were presented with the games, the following verbal information was given: 
 
You are going to make several decisions, from which you can earn points that 
will be converted into lottery tickets to win two prizes of £100.   
 
You are will be paired up with a second, anonymous individual, and will be 
presented with the identical problem.  You will then be asked to choose one of 
two courses of action, either A or B.  To work out the likely consequences of any 
decision, you will have to take into account what the other person is likely to 
choose.   
 
Please be aware that in games one, two and three, you will be partnered with an 
anonymous member of this deliberating group.  In game four you will be 
partnered with an anonymous member of the general public.  In game five you 
will be partnered with an anonymous member of a second deliberating group. 
 
Your decisions are completely anonymous, to both your co-player and the 
researcher.  Please also be aware that your choices in one game have no impact 
on the choices you make in another.  Each game is entirely independent. 
 
Finally, participants were then given the five games to play at various points (which I 
will outline in more depth during the next chapter).  A copy of the experiment layout, 
and instruction sheet, is given in appendix one.   
 
4.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
In this fourth chapter, I have outlined both why experimental economics provides an 
effective technique to investigate the presence of team reasoning, and moreover, why it 
is appropriate in combination with studying political deliberation.  Having set out the 
case for the experimental side of the methodology, I now progress to how it is applied.  
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Or in other words, in the next chapter I outline the structure of the deliberation, in this 
case a mini public, which was used to empirically test the hypothesis regarding agency 
revision and team reasoning. 
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  CHAPTER 5   
THE CASE STUDY OF DELIBERATION: A PEOPLE’S 
INQUIRY INTO PERSONAL INFORMATION 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
During the first chapter of this thesis, I discussed the concept of deliberation, and its 
relationship with democratic theory.  I then used the rational choice approach to 
distinguish between the three layers at which deliberative revision was possible, 
offering an account of some of the empirical work currently being undertaken in this 
field.  I then focussed on the third layer, namely agency, and argued that deliberation 
has the potential to induce individuals to reason on behalf of a team – drawing largely 
on a conceptual framework developed in social psychology.  In chapter four, I then 
outlined a specific methodology that can be used to measure such a shift, before 
detailing the setup of the experimental side of the investigation. 
 
To complete this account of the methodology, then, the next step is to provide the 
details of the specific deliberation that was used as a case study for the investigation.  
As such, my three concerns in this chapter are as follows: 
 
i.       To provide a brief outline of the various attempts in deliberative theory to 
create different forums used to approximate the ideal conditions of 
deliberation. 
ii. To identify the key criteria that help ensure high quality deliberation in 
practice. 
iii. To provide an outline of the actual deliberation used to investigate the 
presence of team reasoning amongst individuals, and analyse it with 
reference to the key criteria identified above. 
 
Once both these objectives have been achieved, I can then progress to the final sections 
of the thesis: an analysis, and then application of the results back to deliberative 
democratic theory. 
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5.2 DELIBERATION IN ACTION  
 
In an attempt to institutionalise political deliberation, and deliver the benefits that 
normative theory so suggests, a number of different types of deliberative forums have 
been developed.  Commonly referred to under the general heading of ‘mini publics’ 
(Goodin and Dryzek 2006), these different initiatives have included citizens’ juries, 
assemblies, consensus conferences and even Deliberative Polls.  On one side, they have 
often been used in order to inject increased levels of legitimacy and democracy into 
decision-making.  On another, though, empirical deliberative theorists have also used 
them to study the effects of deliberation on the individuals involved.  It is this latter 
endeavour that proves relevant here. 
 
In this chapter I want to start by outlining some of the more common ways in which 
deliberation has been institutionalised in these real life settings.  In doing so, my 
objective is to provide the context for the identification of a number of empirical 
criteria (see figure 1.3 in chapter one) relevant for securing high quality deliberation in 
practice.  But before I do this, and following in the footsteps of Goodin and Dryzek 
(2006), one of the most commonly discussed examples of a deliberative process needs 
to be considered and then dismissed.  Crucially, in doing so, it generates the first 
empirical criterion relevant for the construction of a successful deliberative forum. 
 
Participatory budgeting in Porte Alegre (Brazil) undoubtedly represents one of the first 
incursions of a formal deliberative process into public policy, where from 1989, 
massive inequality motivated the city to take drastic action on the manner in which 
public funding was allocated.  Split into three different levels, participatory budgeting 
involves Regional Assemblies (open to the general public), who then elect members to 
serve on the Regional Budget Forums, who then in turn elect members onto the 
decision-making Municipal Budget Councils.  Clearly, this process has many features 
associated with deliberative models of decision-making – most obviously the 
involvement of ordinary citizens who are asked to debate and discuss policy decisions.  
But whilst it may fulfil many of the obligations to claim deliberative status, it also fails 
in a bid for the label of being a genuine mini public for one distinct reason.  The 
participants involved in the process are either self-selected in as much as anyone can 
attend a Regional Assembly, or in the case of the latter two levels, only if they are 
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elected.   What makes the mini public model so different, as is claimed in both Smith 
(2009) and Goodin and Dryzek (2006), is the selection process for participants 
employed by those running the forum.  All mini publics rely on some form of random 
selection48 to obtain their participants – although the exact manner in which this takes 
place can differ from one forum to another.  Whilst I will discuss the technicalities of 
the mechanism of randomised choice a little later, with respect to the concept of 
representativeness, for now, though, one empirical criterion can be established: the 
random selection of participants. 
 
Citizens’ Assembly: British Columbia, Canada (2004) 
Held on the topic of electoral reform, and specifically the proposal for an alternative 
voting method, the British Columbia case study provides an almost paradigmatic 
example of how an effective and well-conceived deliberative process can be run (Lang 
2007, Warren and Pearse 2008).  It involved 160 randomly recruited citizens (one male, 
one female from each province), who were brought together on various weekends over 
the course of a year.  The first four months in Vancouver were spent largely on 
educative matters, as members learned the various intricacies and features of different 
electoral systems, the electoral history of the province, and general demographic 
information about the changing population. 
 
Once this phase had been completed, a preliminary statement was issued on the subject, 
and the citizens then spent around two months travelling around the province, taking 
evidence from a wide variety of stakeholders including (conflicting) interest groups, 
policy makers and the general public. Further to this, over 1600 written submissions 
were made to the assembly, with members taking time over the summer period to read 
and reflect upon them.  Finally, 10 months after the process was first set in motion; the 
assembly spent six weekends back in Vancouver undertaking the final stages of the 
official deliberation.  Debating the advantages of various electoral systems with respect 
to a set of criteria decided upon by the assembly itself (fairness/proportionality, voter 
choice and effective local representation), the final outcome of the process included a 
comprehensive report with associated recommendations, and a binding referendum held 
on the following question: 
 
                                                 
48 The idea of random selection forming a crucial part of a democratic process, of course, is nothing new. 
As Held (2004) points out, even ancient Athens had particular offices of state that were filled on the basis 
of probability and chance, rather than democracy.   
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“Should British Columbia change to the BC-STV electoral system as recommended by 
the Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral reform?” 
 
With significant media coverage surrounding the origin of the referendum the motion 
passed with 58% of the vote (winning in 77 of 79 constituencies), though unfortunately 
for most involved in the assembly, was just shy of the 60% super majority required.  
 
Citizens’ Juries: Health Policy, UK (1996)  
Citizens’ Juries, on the other hand, are much smaller in scale than the Assembly 
example of British Columbia.  Originally conceived and then popularised in the 1980s 
by the independent American based Jefferson Centre, it wasn’t until the late 1990s, 
particularly driven by the impending general election and subsequent victory of Tony 
Blair’s Labour Party, that this model found its way across the Atlantic to the UK 
(Parkinson 2006).  Usually requiring 12-24 randomly selected citizens, the jury format 
involves lots of small-scale facilitated deliberation; evidence from expert witnesses with 
the power to question/recall them; and the publication of a report detailing the findings 
and decision of the group.   
 
The example discussed in Coote and Lenaghan (1997) then, describes five separate 
juries on the general topic of health care.  Each jury was given their own specific sub 
question to consider, ranging from how the NHS should be funded, to the provision of 
mental health services in a local area.  Individuals were recruited by an external 
commercial organisation using a stratified methodology, based on a ‘profile of the local 
population derived from census and other data’ (1997; p.9), and paid £200 each.  The 
five juries were then brought together for four days, with the IPPR compiling the 
agenda, as well as ultimately in charge of writing the final report.  Finally, two trained 
facilitators were employed throughout the four days. 
 
Consensus Conference: Telecommunications Industry, USA (1999) 
The third common form of mini public, the consensus conference, originates from the 
Danish Board of Technology in the late 1980s, and to date over 60 have been run across 
the globe (Hendriks 2005).  Similar in many respects to a Citizens’ Jury, the original 
incarnation utilised 15 individuals (split into three groups of five), who initially met for 
two weekends to plan the four-day deliberative forum.   
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For example, in 1999 a number of US partner institutions including the Education for 
Public Inquiry and International Citizenship (EPIIC) programme at Tufts University, 
Technology Review Magazine at MIT, the College of Social and Behavioural Science at 
UMASS, and the National Science Foundation, came together to organise the first US 
incarnation of this form of mini public.  Held on the topic of telecommunications, and 
more specifically the question of universal provision of Internet access, the organisers 
recruited seven men and seven women respectively, who after the familiar weekends 
spent preparing for the event, then met for three days worth of discussion and 
deliberation.  On the final morning, a provisional four page ‘consensus statement’ was 
issued at a press conference. 
 
Deliberative Poll: Power 2010, UK (2010) 
Originally and most often associated with James Fishkin and the Stanford based Centre 
for Deliberative Polling, Deliberative Polls ® have become some of the most high 
profile examples of mini publics in action.  The fundamental design includes the 
collection of up to 500 random citizens, who are given a preliminary survey to complete 
on the topic of the forum.  Held over one to two days, the members are further split into 
smaller groups of around 15-20 individuals, each led by a trained facilitator, and are 
asked to discuss/debate with each other, as well as come up with questions for various 
expert witnesses made available to them.  The event culminates in a second completion 
of the original survey, to test any change in attitudes that have occurred over the course 
of the deliberation.  Crucially, no binding decision (in any format) is required in the 
process, other than the individual questionnaire submissions.   
 
The Power 2010 poll then, as an example, collected a sample of 130 citizens from 
around the UK, on a demographic representative basis according to gender, age, marital 
status, party affiliation, income, ethnicity, employment and region inhabited; as well as 
a number of other more nuanced factors such as interest in current affairs (very 
narrowly defined by purchase of daily newspaper, consumption of news media etc).  A 
significant amount of balanced pre release material was then sent out to each participant 
on the topic of political reform, including information on the current state of UK 
democracy and the various proposals being discussed in the public sphere.  Finally, 
participants were then brought together at a large venue in London, and spent two days 
split into smaller groups of 10-12 individuals, discussing the various proposals before 
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‘distilling the many ideas’ they received into a manageable shortlist.  This shortlist has 
now been published, and forms the core campaigning principles of the movement. 
 
Let me summarise this section very briefly then.  By outlining some of the more 
common ways in which the theory of deliberation has been put into practice, I have 
touched upon some key operational features common across the different types of 
forum.  Relating this to the research question of this project, the relevant issue to 
consider is the impact these features have on determining the quality of deliberation, 
and therefore, the extent to which any forum is truly deliberative in the normative 
political sense discussed in chapter one.  It is this point that I now take up, firstly 
identifying and secondly discussing the key empirical criteria emanating from these 
examples.   Once I have done this, I will then be able to normatively ‘judge’ the case 
study used for the agency revision investigation. 
 
5.3 EMPIRICAL CRITERIA FOR DELIBERATION  
 
From examining these four different types of mini publics, a number of empirical 
criteria that directly affect the quality of deliberation can be identified, which I now 
discuss in turn.  These will then be used as a framework to evaluate the particular forum 
chosen for the study. 
 
5.3.1 RANDOM AND REPRESENTATIVE SELECTION OF PARTICIPANTS 
 
Already established as the first criterion, the notion of random selection is a stated 
requirement for all of the different mini publics.  Where individuals are required to 
make decisions, on any topic, the makeup of the group will clearly be pivotal to the 
final result.  Deliberative projects, at their very epicentre, are premised on the 
prioritisation of citizenship and the involvement of the public in democratic decision-
making.  Due, in large part, to the nature of how mini publics have been used as a proxy 
for this, it is clear that without some form of selection criteria for the participants, it is 
both possible and even probable, that the makeup of the assembly, jury, conference or 
poll will form victim to some kind of bias.  In particular, where the topic under 
consideration is controversial, and participation in the deliberation open to the general 
public (as in the case of Porto Allegre), then we are likely to see those with a raised 
level of interest in the outcome, those who simply love participating, or indeed those 
with a particularly controversial perspective on the issue getting involved in 
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disproportionate numbers.  Conversely, we are also unlikely to see those individuals 
who might declare themselves as uninterested or unfamiliar with the topic; or even 
those who might consider such forums as intimidating.   
 
The element of this criterion, representative selection, is linked to the first in that it is 
also concerned with the make up of the deliberative forum.  For any mini public to 
claim legitimacy – either in the case of directly affecting public policy, or by making a 
recommendation to the general public – then the demos must respect the outcome of the 
process as being valid.  Clearly, this is directly related to the individuals involved in the 
process.  If it does not reflect the population affected by the decision, then its legitimacy 
can be called into question.  The question, of course, becomes in what sense, or on what 
level should this comparison be made?  In aggregative accounts of decision-making, it 
is clear that the most important dimension is via preferences or values.  If all that counts 
is the representative’s vote, then it is obvious that individuals will feel most legitimately 
represented by a forum that includes participants who cast their ballot in the same 
manner as they would themselves.  Extending this to mini publics, the logical deduction 
would therefore be to ensure the makeup of raw preferences of the participants matches 
the makeup of raw preferences of the population as a whole.  But this is exactly where 
the difference with deliberative models of decision-making lies.  Mini publics are 
dynamic, where a fundamental assumption is made that preferences post deliberation 
are more important, or carry more weight, than those that are raw.  Because of this, the 
way in which an individual both acts and changes over the course of the deliberation is 
of equal importance as the preferences they initially hold. In other words, deliberative 
representation becomes a much more complex notion, one which needs to consider a 
host of other descriptive features of the participants.   
 
Both these issues are particularly relevant when considering how the makeup of the 
deliberative forum impacts upon the quality of the deliberation found within it.  In 
circumstances where it is disproportionately dominated by individuals already involved 
in an issue, or indeed by those who might attend to pursue a particular agenda, then a 
number of the behavioural criteria established in chapter one are much more difficult to 
obtain.  For example, if the forum makeup consists wholly of people already committed 
to a specific policy or perspective, then the maxim of mutual respect and reciprocity is 
more likely to be relaxed.  Individuals are more likely to listen to, but then ignore, other 
people’s points in a discussion.  Additionally, the public principle is more likely to find 
 127 
itself relaxed, as individuals already committed to specific positions find it more 
difficult to take a new, public perspective.  By randomising the representative selection 
of the participants, these potential problems are guarded against, and thus higher quality 
deliberation in the forum is promoted. 
 
5.3.2 SMALL GROUP DISCUSSION 
 
Fundamental to all of the mini publics discussed above is the focus put on small-scale 
deliberation.  Even in the case of the two larger forums, Deliberative Polls and Citizens’ 
Assemblies respectively, smaller subgroups are consistently utilised for discussion 
during the course of the overall process.  There are a number of key reasons for this, all 
of which relate directly back to nature and quality of the discursive process.  Firstly, as I 
have already discussed in chapter one, deliberation is an extremely time consuming 
endeavour.  How effective a discussion on a complex topic is, which includes 
comprehension and consideration of all points of view, challenging evidence and 
assumptions, and then culminating in a decision-making phase, is linked to the number 
of individuals involved in the process.  By this, I mean there is a strong positive 
relationship between the time that is required for such a process to take place, and the 
amount of people participating in the actual discussion.  The greater the number of 
perspectives that is included in the process, then the longer, by definition, it will take.   
 
Moreover deliberation, as articulated in chapter one, is a very particular form of speech.  
It is not simply ‘talk in action’ (Heritage and Clayman 2010), and is characterised by 
the various behavioural criteria established earlier.  One of which is the maxim of 
equality.  According to this criterion, deliberation should include ample opportunity for 
all members to contribute equally to the discussion.  Since most, if not all, mini publics 
have defined timescales that are often dictated by factors such as cost, it is imperative to 
ensure that the quality of deliberation is not compromised.  Breaking larger groups 
down into smaller subgroups throughout the course of the process is essential if the 
maxim of representative selection, is to be satisfied at the same time as guaranteeing 
that deliberation, in this technical sense, can take place.  In short, reducing the size of 
the deliberating group at particular points in the wider process allows higher quality 
deliberation to take place, without wholly sacrificing the legitimacy of the overall forum 
by restricting the number of different inputs into it.49 
                                                 
49 This, of course, raises legitimacy questions, as the restriction of inputs can have a significant effect on 
the outcome of the deliberation.  I will consider this particular point in chapter seven, when I discuss the 
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Finally, it is also worth pointing out that deliberating in small groups is much less 
intimidating for individuals to take part in, where fears over public speaking might 
prevent some members from offering opinions and challenging points of view.   This is 
particularly relevant for those who hold minority perspectives.  Deliberation should 
value ideas and opinions on the basis of their content (the public principle), rather than 
the number of participants who come into the process holding them.  For example, in 
cases where a particular perspective performs well against deliberative criteria but is 
held only by a single individual, then it is plausible to imagine a situation where it might 
not be put forward for fear of contradicting a large majority.  By reducing the size of the 
discussion group, though, more equality in participation should be secured as 
individuals face much less pressure when contributing in the deliberation.  In short, 
small groups help to ensure higher quality deliberation on this dimension. 
 
5.3.3 FACILITATED DISCUSSION 
 
Although not directly present in the normative statements on deliberation, the use of a 
facilitator during mini publics is almost universally accepted as a requirement for an 
effective deliberation to take place.  There are a number of crucial reasons for this, but 
all rely on the proposition that left to their own devices, a group of individuals cannot be 
guaranteed to both self manage, and participate in, a deliberative process that would 
compare favourably to the normative ideals already discussed.  Firstly, there are clear 
organisational/administrative benefits from having an individual involved in the group, 
but playing no ‘substantive’ role in the deliberation.  Having time to focus on making 
sure deadlines for decisions are met (acting as time keeper), that all topics are 
considered, and that evidence/information can be requested throughout the process, are 
all essential for the effective functioning of any mini public.  The facilitator in each 
group, more often than not, fulfils these operational roles. 
 
Secondly, whilst utilising small group deliberation allows for the capacity of equality to 
be realised – there is enough time for all individuals to participate in the discussion – it 
does not, however, ensure this maxim is satisfied.  Capacity and actuality are two very 
different notions, and although there might be enough time for every individual to 
contribute, it does not necessarily follow that this will happen.  Deliberation on a 
                                                 
shift from second to third generation models of deliberative democracy in relation to the experimental 
results. 
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controversial topic, with participants who are directly affected by the outcome and 
therefore have a personal stake in the group’s decision, can be easily hijacked or 
manipulated by single participants.  Shaping the discussion by talking more often or 
even louder than other individuals, or forming strategic alliances with other members to 
dictate the trajectory of a discussion, are both possibilities when there is no independent 
third party to moderate or safeguard the process.50   
 
Extending beyond this, because mini publics should be made up of individuals from a 
wide variety of different social circumstances and with a varying degree of discursive 
capacity (reflecting the demos), the role of the facilitator is also just that – to facilitate 
the discussion. Prompting individuals to listen actively, helping them to uncover shared 
vocabularies (Miller and Rose 2008) so they understand each other’s points of view 
more fully, and ultimately, setting the tone of the deliberation as one of mutual 
cooperation, are just three of the possible tasks that good facilitation demands.  In short, 
whilst the concern of those partaking in the deliberation is the topic being considered, 
the facilitator focuses only on the nature of the discussion.  In this sense, their role is to 
ensure both the behavioural and structural criteria of deliberation (identified in chapter 
one) are fulfilled.   
 
5.3.4 PRE-RELEASED MATERIAL 
 
One of the fundamental normative principles that underpin deliberation, that it helps 
individuals or groups to make ‘better’ decisions, is premised on the idea of education 
(Arendt 1970).  In fact, the argument that debate and discussion is required for humans 
to make rational choices goes as far back as Mill, who famously defended the right to 
free speech on the grounds of fallibility.   It should be no surprise, then, that the most 
common topics chosen for mini publics are those that on first glance, appear quite 
complex and require a certain degree of specialist knowledge to comprehend.  Subjects 
such as electoral reform, which demands at least a basic understanding of how various 
mathematical social choice mechanisms work, or health care reform, which demands an 
understanding of both medical and governmental practices and institutions, are two 
good examples.  Deliberative preferences are assumed to be not only ‘better’ according 
to the public principle, but also on educational grounds. 
                                                 
50 Sunstein’s (2002) ‘Law of Group Polarization’ is a particularly nice possibility of what can happen 
when deliberation goes wrong, and is hijacked by individuals from the extreme ends of the policy 
spectrum.   
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Clearly, within the deliberative processes of evidence submission, discussion and 
debate, there is a large scope for education.  Not simply learning what others think 
about an issue, or how a particular policy might affect a particular group of individuals, 
but rather learning in the purer sense of the term.  In the case of British Columbia for 
example, before they could take part in any debate on the merits of a particular voting 
system, the participants first had to understand exactly how they all functioned.   The 
differences between systems such as alternative vote, alternative vote plus or single 
transferrable vote are extremely subtle, and require an understanding of the rather 
formal distinction between preferential and proportional outcomes.  Whilst 
presentations from defined ‘experts’ on topics like this are used to inform/educate the 
members during the mini public itself, it is done so, equally as often, in conjunction 
with pre-released material. 
 
Sending out detailed information, whether in written, audio or multimedia format, 
before individuals arrive at the actual mini public has a number of positive externalities.  
Firstly, where there is a requirement to convey simple, more factual data (such as 
figures of electoral turnout or break down of voting patterns etc), then it is obvious that 
time is better spent understanding and digesting this before individuals arrive at the 
forum.  Time spent sitting and reading, is time not spent questioning, discussing and 
debating.   Secondly, pre released material helps to minimise the ‘expert effect’ within 
the small group discussion.  By giving all members some basic knowledge of the topic 
before they arrive, the objective is to remove the distortive impact that an individual 
with a little familiarity with the topic might have, preventing them from dominating the 
discussion under the auspices of being a self-nominated expert.  And thirdly, it helps to 
prepare the individuals for the ethos and atmosphere of the mini public they are 
attending.  Participants are much more likely to arrive with the mindset of an individual 
taking part as a responsible citizen, rather than a consumer attending a focus group.  On 
the basis of these points, the use of pre-released material therefore has a distinct positive 
impact upon the quality of the deliberation found within a forum.  On one level by 
priming individuals before they attend a forum, it helps to ensure that the various 
behavioural criteria of good deliberation are satisfied.  And on a second level, it also 
plays a significant role in the first phase of the structural account of deliberation, 
educating the individuals involved in the process on the topic being discussed.   
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5.3.5 OUTCOME INFLUENCE 
 
The last empirical feature that I want to discuss also relates to a particular phase of the 
structural account of deliberation.  This time, though, it concerns the final point of the 
process, where participants are required to come to a collective decision.  As I have 
already discussed in chapters one and three, the presence of this phase has a distinct 
impact on the nature of deliberation.  But there is also a second aspect to this feature 
that has not been considered, one that concerns the way in which the decision reached is 
then used.  To put it most simply, forums that are convened on the basis that the 
decision will be put into practice are likely to operate differently from those where no 
consequence is attached to the collective decision.  Indeed, it is quite true of everyday 
life that individuals moderate and alter their behaviour when interacting in particularly 
important circumstances.  Goodin (2008; pp. 19-36), discusses a number of different 
ways in which mini publics have traditionally impacted the policy process: 
 
i.       Actually making policy 
ii. Being taken up in the policy process 
iii. Informing public debates 
iv. Shaping policy by market testing 
v. Legitimating policy 
vi. Confidence building 
vii. Popular oversight 
viii. Resisting Co-option 
 
Normatively speaking, there are clearly many reasons why it is preferable to involve 
more citizens directly in policy-making processes.  But that still does not really give a 
sense of a) how this might affect the nature of the deliberation, or b) how this might 
then be categorised according to some kind of scale.  I suggest all these different 
examples of impact can be analysed according to how they answer two different 
questions.  Firstly, is the decision of the mini public binding?  Clearly, in cases where 
the outcome of the deliberation must be accepted by the commissioning body, there is a 
heightened sense of importance aligned with the decision-making phase.  If participants 
are aware that the actual policy or proposal they recommend is the one the organisation 
must take on, then a likely consequence is for them to take the process much more 
seriously, and ultimately, to partake in the deliberation more fully.  This, in turn, has a 
direct impact on the nature and quality of the deliberation.  If individuals take the 
 132 
process more seriously, and see their role as central to the process, then it is plausible to 
suggest they become more likely to act in accordance with the behavioural criteria 
established earlier.   This is particularly true if the ‘rules’ (or norms) are made explicit 
early on in the process.  Secondly, the other question that must be answered concerns 
the power of the commissioning body to then act upon the decision that has been made 
by the forum.  In cases where the body has the ability to directly translate decision into 
policy, then the outcome of the deliberation is made even more significant.  In this 
example, individuals partaking in the forum will be much more aware that their 
contributions will have a direct effect on the lives of individuals linked to the issue 
being considered.  Again, this will re enforce the seriousness of the forum, and 
ultimately help to ensure higher quality deliberation. 
 
5.4 THE CASE STUDY: PERSONAL AND PRIVATE INFORMATION   
 
With these empirical criteria established, and more importantly, the manner in which 
they might affect the quality or nature of deliberation discussed, the next step is to offer 
an outline of the forum used for the experimental investigation.  Once I have done this, I 
will then apply the former to the latter, to demonstrate the appropriateness of this 
particular mini public for investigating political deliberation in practice. 
 
5.4.1 THE COMMISSIONING BODY AND TOPIC 
 
The mini public chosen for the case study was a process commissioned by the London-
based think tank Demos, in collaboration with both the Information Commissioner’s 
Office (ICO), and the organisation Consumer Focus.  It was held on ‘Private and 
Personal Information’, a topic which had generated significant amount of media 
attention since an incident in 2007, where the National Audit Office and HMRC lost 
two discs containing the personal information (including NI numbers, bank account 
details and addresses) of 25 million individuals and 7.25 million families.  The stated 
objectives of the project were: 
 
i.      To obtain a considered insight into what people really think about how 
personal information is (mis)used, and; 
ii. To formulate some appropriate controls and governance structures, that 
people think should be applied to this industry. 
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5.4.2 RECRUITMENT OF PARTICIPANTS 
 
Due to the nature of the topic, familiarity with technology and in particular the amount 
of interaction with online services was recognised very early as a likely strong 
influencing factor on the debate.  Because of this, the decision was made to run two 
forums concurrently.  One based in London, with residents from all over the capital, and 
the other based in Bradford.   By convening forums in cities with the highest (London), 
and lowest (Bradford) home internet penetration rates in the UK, the idea was to 
additionally investigate the extent to which this variable in particular might affect the 
deliberation, and consequent outcome of the process. The participants for both forums, 
then, were recruited by Criteria, an external firm specialising in UK-wide social science 
fieldwork and market research.    
 
5.4.3 DEMOGRAPHIC OF PARTICIPANTS 
 
The demographic break down of the participants in both forums was as follows. 
  
By sex: 
 
Table 5.1: Sex of Participants 
Location Male Female 
London 63.2%  36.8%  
Bradford 61.1%  38.9%  
 
By age: 
 
Table 5.2: Age of Participants 
Location 18 – 30 years 31 – 40 years 41 – 50 years 
London 36.8%  36.8%  26.4%  
Bradford 38.9%  33.3%  27.8%  
 
By ethnicity: 
 
Table 5.3: Ethnicity of Participants 
Location White British British Asian British 
Indian 
British 
African 
British 
Caribbean 
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London 73.7%  5.3%  15.7%  5.3%  5.3%  
Bradford 61.1%  38.9%  0%  0%  0%  
 
By social class: 
 
Table 5.4: NRS Social Grade of Participants51 
Location B C1 C2 D 
London 26.3%  36.8% 21.1% 15.8% 
Bradford 16.7% 38.9% 11.1% 33.3% 
 
5.4.4 THE STRUCTURE OF THE DELIBERATION 
 
Each forum, whether in London or Bradford, took place over the course of a month long 
period from October 21st and October 24th 2009 respectively.  Participants attended four 
weekly sessions, lasting approximately four hours each, at the same venue on either 
Wednesday evenings or Saturday mornings.  Both forums were randomly split into 
three discussion subgroups, comprising of six to seven individuals, each with a Demos 
facilitator.  Each week, a modest amount of pre release material was given to all 
members of the group on the following week’s subject, which included both factual and 
polemic pieces of text. 
 
The general topic for each week was as follows, with the actual break down of the 
sessions available in Bradwell (2010): 
 
Week 1:  Privacy, consent and control 
Week 2:  Personal information online 
Week 3:  Personal health information 
                                                 
51 A Little explanation of this variable is probably useful.  The NRS grading system is a commonly used 
tool (in market research) to grade individuals according to a ‘social scale’. The rankings represent the 
following descriptions, and are assigned via a combination of user response and recruiter evaluation: 
 
Code Social Class Descriptor % National Population 
(2008) 
A Upper Middle Higher managerial or professional 4 
B Middle Middle management or professional 23 
C1 Lower Middle Supervisory, clerical or administrative 29 
C2 Skilled Working Skilled manual work 21 
D Working Semi-skilled and unskilled manual work 15 
E Lower Unemployed, casual grade work 8 
Source: NRS website (http://www.nrs.co.uk/lifestyle.html) 
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Week 4:  Regulation, safeguards and policy 
 
There are a number of reasons as to why the overall topic was broken down into these 
four sessions.  Most importantly, it represents a substantive escalation in terms of both 
complexity and specificity.  Session one, for example, was designed to help the 
participants gain a general understanding of what constituted personal information, and 
moreover, to comprehend some of the legal definitions, possibilities and constraints 
upon it.  The second session, however, then took this enhanced understanding, and got 
the participants to apply it to the most common source of controversy on the topic – 
online information.   Week three took this a step further still, and focussed the group on 
a particular industry’s use of this data, that of the health sector.  And finally, the fourth 
week looked at the future, and asked the participants to critique current policy before 
coming up with agreed proposals in light of this.  The premise was for each session to 
act as part of the educative process for the next one, and ultimately, for the first three to 
provide the foundation for the final decision-making phase. 
 
Indeed, this links quite nicely to perhaps the most distinctive departing feature of this 
mini public compared with those discussed above.  Instead of holding the entire forum 
over a condensed time period of two to three days, the aim was to create a different type 
of deliberative event. One that took on board the common features discussed above, but 
also looked to innovate in order to address some of the potential issues that arise in the 
more common mini public models.  In particular, the forum was designed to depart 
from the conventional mini public model on two dimensions, which I now briefly 
consider. 
 
Separation of Deliberative Phases 
The most important element of difference, by far, was the desire to separate out the 
various stages within the deliberative process.  Distinguishing between heavily 
educative, discursive and decision-making phases was considered, by the organisers, of 
paramount importance for the topic – in large part because of the complexity of both 
legislation and the current model of governance.  This was particularly salient in 
sessions one and two, which had some significant technical concepts to understand and 
consider.  The decision to focus more heavily on expert presentations and questioning 
during these first sessions was a direct attempt to nudge the participants away from 
discussion for persuasion, and onto discussion for education.  It was, to put it quite 
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bluntly, an attempt to create a more independent and distinct learning phase of the 
deliberation. 
 
After the initial weeks the focus of the sessions shifted to reflect the different stages in a 
deliberative process (reflecting the structural account of deliberation).  Week three, in 
particular, asked the participants to debate the use of personal information in the 
provision of health care.  Again, this topic was chosen because it both applied to all the 
participants, and secondly, because of the inherent personal nature of the issue.  The 
objective was to promote as much discussion as possible, and moreover, for participants 
to become familiar, and even comfortable, with challenging each other’s points of view.  
Again, to put it simply, it was an attempt to help participants learn how to deliberate, 
and to give them the confidence to debate ideas in their groups. And lastly, week four 
represented the climax of the event, where the topic of government regulation was 
introduced.  The objective for this final week was for participants to come up with a 
number of agreed policy proposals that could be taken forward by Demos and the two 
other stakeholders.  This session was designed to induce much more cooperative 
reasoning, and asked participants to draw on the previous three weeks of learning and 
debate, to decide as a group the courses of action they felt were appropriate.    
 
To briefly conclude this point, by separating each section of the deliberative process out 
from each other, the aim was that individuals could (and would) focus more heavily on 
making sure they engaged fully in every session.  For example, having an individual 
take part in the discursive phase without having taken part fully in the educative 
sessions is clearly not ideal.  Or similarly, having the educative phase dominated by 
individuals jockeying for influence to exert during the decision-making stage also works 
to subvert the aim of that part of the process. Breaking the forum up into these defined 
subsections helped guard against this type of problem, and ultimately, was done to 
promote higher quality deliberation overall. 
 
‘Opening Up’ Mini Publics 
As well as the substantive investigation into the subject matter, a secondary objective 
was to develop a methodology that allowed deliberative mini publics to be utilised more 
commonly by public policy making organisations.  Deliberative forums that are 
organised to run over two days require a significant amount of time and resources to 
run. But they also require the participants to give up a significant amount of personal 
 137 
time in order to attend them.  Taking two days away from work, or even two days away 
from a family is simply not an option for many individuals, and because of this, their 
participation in deliberative forums becomes unlikely.   
 
Opening up the process by breaking it down into these four distinct sessions (each 
lasting four hours long), the objective was to widen the scope for more individuals to 
attend.  The drawback, clearly, was the potential for individuals to pick and choose the 
sessions they felt were more relevant or more interesting, or indeed it was possible for 
personal circumstances to prevent an individual from attending all four.  But the use of 
a monetary reward for completing the process – including a bonus for attending all four 
sessions – worked almost perfectly to prevent this.52  And indeed, what soon became 
apparent after the first week was the importance of camaraderie amongst the members, 
who after buying into the process very early on began to look forward to the following 
week’s session. 
 
5.5  THE CASE STUDY: HOW DOES IT COMPARE?  
 
Having established both a set of empirical criteria to analyse deliberative mini publics, 
and then given an overview of how my case study was constructed, the final step is to 
apply one to the other.  How does the People’s Inquiry into Personal and Private 
Information fare in terms of deliberative criteria specified in section 5.3.  This final 
section of the chapter is crucial in determining whether the results of the experimental 
investigation can be seen as representative of high quality deliberation, and therefore, 
whether they can be used to draw any conclusions back to deliberative models of 
democracy.53  Let me now discuss each criterion in relation to the case study. 
 
Random and Representative Selection of Participants 
The selection of the participants was completed entirely at random, with each individual 
being paid £50 to attend the four sessions, and a £50 bonus for completion.  None of the 
participants who attended had been involved in anything similar to this before, and 
indeed, none displayed a particularly strong opinion on the topic or methodology. The 
                                                 
52 Indeed only one individual in the Bradford group, and none in the London group, failed to attend four 
sessions. 
53 This is, of course, only one way of ‘measuring deliberative quality’.  Another method would be to 
employ something like the Discourse Quality Index mentioned briefly in chapter one.  However, the 
research question of this thesis is concerned merely with investigating agency revision in high quality 
deliberation, and therefore this approach is deemed sufficient.   
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selection process employed by Demos (in conjunction with Criteria) specified a wide 
mix of individuals from each area.  The criteria this was based on: sex, age, ethnicity 
and social class, are relevant demographic variables.  The problem, however, is that no 
comparison was made with the region (city) that was being selected for. Because of this, 
it is difficult to argue that the forum truly satisfies the maxim of representative selection 
on the basis of legitimacy.  However, according to the second dimension in which 
representativeness matters, the argument that the diversity of opinions and backgrounds 
can have a significant impact on the nature of the discussion, the case study fares much 
better.  Both London and Bradford forums included a diverse set of individuals 
according to the designated criteria, and as such, the case study clearly performs well on 
this second element.  
 
Comparison: the case study performs well on randomisation and diversity of 
participants, although poorly in terms of being representative of the population in 
question.  
 
Small Group Discussion 
Although both forums selected 20 participants each, once the sessions began London 
attracted 19, and Bradford 16 individuals respectively.  Each forum then split the 
participants, (randomly at first) into three separate subgroups.  Whilst during 
presentations and question and answer sessions with expert witnesses, the three groups 
were brought together; discussion always took place amongst these smaller entities.  
This continued for all four of the sessions, although after week two a decision was made 
to alter the makeup of each discussion group.  This was done on the basis of making 
sure all participants experienced full deliberation with all members, as well as to 
improve the quality of deliberation in each subgroup. 
 
Comparison: the case study performs extremely well on this criterion.  
 
Facilitated Discussion 
The facilitators employed throughout the course of the process were all members of 
staff from the Think Tank Demos, working in various research programmes within the 
organisation.  Before each session, the organisational group (including facilitators) 
would convene a meeting, where all topics and objectives of the session would be 
discussed.  This meeting also involved feedback from the previous week, where any 
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problems or best practice was shared across the three facilitators.  Each individual was 
primed on the various criteria that deliberative behaviour should reflect, and were 
mindful of the various tasks involved in a full deliberation. 
 
Comparison: the case study performs well on this criterion, although professional 
facilitators working specifically in deliberation would have been preferable. 
 
Pre-Released Material 
Firstly, the structure of the mini public included an overt and quite intensive educational 
phase in weeks one and two, where participants were asked to focus solely on 
understanding key concepts, terminology and regulation.  This was supported by a 
regular stream of pre-released material for each week that included both factual and 
some more controversial pieces of text for individuals to read.  Additionally, each week 
there were a number of expert witnesses available to the groups for questioning, and 
beyond this, each facilitator had access to a laptop for researching any issues that came 
up during the discussion. 
 
Comparison: performs extremely well on this criterion, although there were times 
when participants had not had time to adequately digest and comprehend the 
material. 
 
Outcome Influence 
The outcome of the project consisted of a Demos report entitled Private Lives: A 
People’s Inquiry into Personal and Private Information, which participants were made 
aware of throughout the process.  The report has been used as the basis of a number of 
roundtable discussions with government ministers.  But more importantly, one of the 
two major stakeholders, the Information Commissioners’ Office (ICO), has used the 
findings in the report (and particularly the recommended courses of action) to inform a 
number of policy reviews they were involved in.  
 
Comparison: Demos were bound by the findings, but had now power to act 
on them; whilst the ICO were not bound by them, but did have limited 
power to act.  The case study therefore performs adequately on this 
criterion. 
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5.6  CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
To summarise this chapter, it is clear that a number of empirical features commonly 
associated with deliberative mini publics can have a significant impact on the nature and 
quality of deliberation that they rely upon.  By identifying these key variables, and then 
applying them to my case study, I have established the areas in which the People’s 
Inquiry into Personal and Private Information fares well in promoting deliberation, and 
those areas in which it performs poorly.  The overall conclusion, though, is a positive 
one.  The structure of the mini public chosen for the experimental investigation satisfies 
most, if not all of the empirical criteria of high quality deliberation to an acceptable 
standard. Because of this, the next section can then be deemed relevant to the normative 
model of deliberation discussed in chapter one. 
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  CHAPTER 6   
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS: DOES DELIBERATION 
TRIGGER AGENCY REVISION? 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
In chapters two and three of this thesis, I provided an empirically viable hypothesis 
regarding the impact that deliberation has on the individuals involved in it – namely that 
it has the potential to alter their agency, and induce them to team reason.  In chapters 
four and five, I then outlined both an experimental approach to test the extent to which 
this was true, as well as describing the particular case study of deliberation upon which 
the study was based.  I turn now to the results of these experiments. 
 
My concern in this chapter, then, is three fold: 
 
i.       To provide a description of the results of the experimental study using the 
deliberative mini public. 
ii. To discuss and explain these results on a conceptual level with reference to 
rational choice and social psychological theory. 
iii. To relate this conceptual explication to the theory of deliberation at the 
micro level. 
 
To do this effectively, it is therefore relevant to structure the first section of this chapter 
according to the types of games that were played.  Games one to three deal with 
individuals playing with an anonymous member of the same mini-public; game four 
deals with individuals playing with a member of the general public; and game five with 
a member of an alternative specified mini public.  As I discussed in chapter four, each 
of the three types of game is distinct in that whilst it measures the same type of 
deliberative shift, it does so in relation to a very different ‘we’. Because of this, these 
three sets of results need to be treated as distinct, although the conclusions and 
explanations derived from them will be linked.   
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6.2 STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY  
 
The structure of the results section, then, is quite simple.   Each game will first be 
subjected to simple descriptive analysis, to identify whether any visible changes in 
strategy choices have occurred over the time period that covers the four deliberative 
sessions. If a pattern or relationship is identified, the second stage will be to perform a 
more detailed analysis to ascertain both the extent and statistical significance of this 
relationship. 
 
Because of the particular characteristics of the data though, these two endeavours are 
slightly more complex than a simple regression or hypothesis test.  More specifically, 
the binary/categorical nature of the data (in so much as individuals were asked to state 
only either selfish or team reason strategy choices) means a number of the important 
assumptions made in standard regression models are no longer met.  In particular, it is 
not possible to assume normality in terms of the distribution of the data – in this case, 
the binomial structure means neither the mean nor the variance are independent.  
Logistic, or logit regression, conversely, deals with proportions and probabilities as 
opposed to continuous information, and transforms the scale of a probability or 
proportion to a plus or minus infinity.   
 
The logit link function has the following form, with the term in the square brackets 
equivalent to the odds of any specific event occurring: 
 
€ 
Logit(P) = Log P1− P
 
  
 
  
 
 
The linear logit model applicable for these results can therefore be expressed by the 
following equation: 
 
€ 
Log Pi1− Pi
 
 
 
 
 
 =α + β1time  
 
In this case  is the probability that an individual will choose the strategy choice ‘team 
reason’,  is a constant, and most crucially  the likelihood that the given time period 
! 
P
i
! 
"
! 
"
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has an impact on determining the strategy choice of the individual.  And for non-linear 
logit regression, the following equation is used:    
 
€ 
Log Pi1− Pi
 
 
 
 
 
 =α + β1 + β2time 
 
With the appropriate statistical approach now in place, the next step is to consider two 
issues that are relevant to the way this model is applied to the data.  The initial question 
concerns the nature of the results. Firstly, if time is taken as a proxy for the deliberative 
event as a single entity, then one simple way of looking at the data might be to imagine 
the process as a basic pre-test/post-test mechanism.  What is therefore important in this 
conception is simply the overall change (if any) of the strategy choices employed by the 
individuals.  But because of the way the mini public was structured, and specifically 
that there were four separate sessions corresponding largely to four important phases 
within the deliberation, it is also possible to look within the data itself.  Readings were 
taken at the following five different time points: 
  
t0 – baseline measurement (before the first session commenced) 
t1 – after session one (information and learning phase) 
t2 – after session two (questioning and clarification phase) 
t3 – after session three (discussion and debating phase) 
t4 – after session four (discussion, debating and decision-making phase) 
 
The usefulness of this additional layer of investigation is that it allows for a slightly 
more nuanced analysis to take place, where interesting and important patterns contained 
within the data can be uncovered.  Moreover, when it comes to providing a theoretical 
justification for any overall relationship, more credibility can be attached to the relevant 
conclusions if they also support any smaller substituent phenomena.  But what should 
be apparent, of course, is that the deliberative process is cumulative.  This means that 
whilst it becomes possible to test the impact of the deliberative process at, for example, 
t3, the reading does not give the result of that specific session’s effect on the individuals 
in question.  Rather, it serves to compare the total effect of all sessions up to that point, 
in comparison with the baseline reading at t0.   
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6.3 RESULTS AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS  
 
6.3.1 GAMES ONE TO THREE 
 
The tabular form for game one is given by the following, with the individual playing the 
game denoted by individual i. 
 
 Individual  
 A B 
A 5 , 5 10 , 4 
 
Individual  
B  3 , 10 7 , 7 
 
Figure 4.6 restated: Game Theoretic Encounter One 
 
The results for game one are as follows: 
 
Table 6.1: Experimental Results for Game One 
Time Period Selfish Strategy  Team Reason Strategy  
Pre Deliberation (t0) 60% 40% 
Post Deliberation 1 (t1) 54.3% 45.7% 
Post Deliberation 2 (t2) 42.4% 57.6% 
Post Deliberation 3 (t3) 48.6% 51.4% 
Post Deliberation 4 (t4) 48.6% 51.4% 
 
The tabular form for game two is given by the following, with the individual in question 
denoted by individual i: 
 
 Individual  
 A B 
A 7 , 7 2 , 11 
 
Individual  
B  10 , 2 4 , 4 
 
Figure 4.7 restated: Game Theoretic Encounter Two 
 
The results for game two are as follows: 
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Table 6.2: Experimental Results for Game Two 
Time Period Selfish Strategy  Team Reason Strategy  
Pre Deliberation (t0) 60% 40% 
Post Deliberation 1 (t1) 57.1% 42.9% 
Post Deliberation 2 (t2) 39.4% 60.6% 
Post Deliberation 3 (t3) 37.1% 62.9% 
Post Deliberation 4 (t4) 37.1% 62.9% 
 
 
The tabular form for game three is given by the following, with the individual in 
question denoted by individual i: 
 
 Individual  
 A B 
A 10 , 10 20 , 2 
 
Individual  
B  2 , 16 15 , 15 
 
Figure 4.8 restated: Game Theoretic Encounter Three 
 
 
The results for game three are as follows: 
 
Table 6.3: Experimental Results for Game Three 
Time Period Selfish Strategy  Team Reason Strategy  
Pre Deliberation (t0) 65.7% 34.3% 
Post Deliberation 1 (t1) 42.9% 57.1% 
Post Deliberation 2 (t2) 48.5% 51.5% 
Post Deliberation 3 (t3) 51.4% 48.6% 
Post Deliberation 4 (t4) 54.3% 45.7% 
 
Descriptive analysis of the results from games one to three indeed appears to show a 
change of strategy choices over the course of the four deliberative sessions.  It is clear 
that from t0 to t4 in all three games that there has been an overall increase in the 
percentage of individuals employing the team reason strategy choice.  In game one, for 
instance, there is an increase of 11.4%, game two sees a larger increase of 22.9%, and 
game three an increase of 11.4%.  On the surface, all three games appear to exhibit a 
relatively modest shift when the percentages are converted into actual players; 10% 
! 
j
! 
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represents only four individuals, for example.  More interesting though, is the shape of 
this increase.   
 
 
Figure 6.1: Team Reason Strategy Choices in Games One to Three 
 
When displayed on the same axis, it is clear that there is a strong similarity between 
games one and two.  They both start with the same percentage of individuals utilising 
team reasoning as a strategy; and they both see a dramatic increase at time period t2, 
which is then followed by either by a subsequent reduction or stabilising of this 
percentage.  And although not immediately so obvious, game three in fact follows an 
almost identical pattern, with the trigger for a large increase occurring at t1.  
Descriptively, then, it appears that all three games suggest an inverse ‘U’ shape 
relationship exists between time (deliberation) and the percentage of individuals 
choosing the team reason strategy.  The next step, then, is to investigate the extent of 
this relationship, and equally imperatively, the degree to which these changes are 
statistically significant. 
 
Running a logistic regression in SPSS for all three games, and treating time as a factor, 
the following results are obtained: 
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Table 6.5: Logistic Regression Parameter Estimates for Game Two 
95% Wald Confidence 
Interval Hypothesis Test 
Parameter B Std. Error Lower Upper 
Wald Chi-
Square df Sig. 
(Intercept) .526 .3498 -.160 1.212 2.262 1 .133 
[Time=1] -.932 .5421 -1.994 .131 2.953 1 .086 
[Time=2] -.814 .4719 -1.739 .111 2.973 1 .085 
[Time=3] -.095 .4227 -.924 .733 .051 1 .822 
[Time=4] -4.515E-16 .4579 -.897 .897 .000 1 1.000 
(Scale) 1       
Dependent Variable: Outcome for game 2 
Model: (Intercept), Time 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.4: Logistic Regression Parameter Estimates for Game One 
95% Wald Confidence 
Interval Hypothesis Test 
Parameter B 
Std. 
Error Lower Upper 
Wald Chi-
Square df Sig. 
(Intercept) .057 .3382 -.606 .720 .029 1 .866 
[Time=1] -.463 .4294 -1.304 .379 1.161 1 .281 
[Time=2] -.114 .4426 -.982 .753 .067 1 .796 
[Time=3] .248 .4332 -.601 1.097 .328 1 .567 
[Time=4] 5.315E-16 .2802 -.549 .549 .000 1 1.000 
(Scale) 1       
Dependent Variable: Outcome for game 1 
Model: (Intercept), Time 
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Table 6.6: Logistic Regression Parameter Estimates for Game Three 
95% Wald Confidence 
Interval Hypothesis Test 
Parameter B Std. Error Lower Upper 
Wald Chi-
Square df Sig. 
(Intercept) -.172 .3393 -.837 .493 .257 1 .613 
[Time=1] -.479 .4105 -1.283 .326 1.360 1 .244 
[Time=2] .577 .4725 -.349 1.503 1.493 1 .222 
[Time=3] .232 .3982 -.548 1.013 .341 1 .559 
[Time=4] .115 .2559 -.387 .616 .201 1 .654 
(Scale) 1       
Dependent Variable: Outcome for game 3 
Model: (Intercept), Time 
 
The β-values calculated for each time period indeed match up nicely to the picture 
outlined in the simple descriptive analysis, but the truly interesting result from the test is 
that the significance levels are all extremely low.  Statistically then, this can be 
interpreted in two significant ways.  Firstly, the sample size for the investigation, whilst 
large when considered against the typical number of individuals involved in two 
citizens’ juries, is in fact relatively small when trying to investigate shifts of this 
magnitude.  In essence, it might therefore be true that the pattern is reflective of reality, 
but the sample size is simply too small to make this claim generalisable. The second 
plausible interpretation, of course, is that the visible inverse ‘U’ shape relationship 
witnessed between time and the percentage of individuals choosing to team reason 
appears merely due to chance – there is no real pattern in the data.  Both these possible 
explanations will be considered and discussed in section 6.4 of this chapter. 
 
6.3.2 GAME FOUR 
 
The tabular form for game four is given by the following, with the individual in 
question denoted by individual i, and individual j as a randomly selected member of the 
general public: 
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 Individual  
 A B 
A 11 , 11 2 , 16 
 
Individual  
B  17 , 3 4 , 4 
 
Figure 4.9 restated: Game Theoretic Encounter Four 
 
The results for game four are as follows: 
 
Table 6.7: Experimental Results for Game Four 
Time Period Selfish Strategy  Team Reason Strategy  
Pre Deliberation (t0) 65.7% 34.3% 
Post Deliberation 1 (t1) 42.9% 57.1% 
Post Deliberation 2 (t2) 57.6% 42.4% 
Post Deliberation 3 (t3) 51.4% 48.6% 
Post Deliberation 4 (t4) 54.3% 45.7% 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Team Reason Strategy Choices in Game Four 
 
Running a logistic regression we get the following results: 
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Table 6.8: Logistic Regression Parameter Estimates for Game Four 
95% Wald Confidence 
Interval Hypothesis Test 
Parameter B Std. Error Lower Upper 
Wald Chi-
Square df Sig. 
(Intercept) .288 .3416 -.382 .957 .709 1 .400 
[Time=1] -.575 .4089 -1.377 .226 1.980 1 .159 
[Time=2] .118 .3904 -.647 .883 .091 1 .763 
[Time=3] -.105 .3459 -.783 .573 .093 1 .761 
[Time=4] 2.335E-16 2.4463E-8 -4.795E-8 4.795E-8 .000 1 1.000 
(Scale) 1       
Dependent Variable: Outcome for game 4 
Model: (Intercept), Time 
 
As with games one to three, we see an inverse ‘U’ shape relationship appearing between 
the two factors.  But again, whilst this claim is supported by the various odds ratios at 
each time point (except for t2 which appears as a slight anomaly), it is once more 
undermined by particularly low significance levels – leading to the same possible 
avenues to explore. 
 
6.3.3 GAME FIVE  
 
Finally then, the tabular form for game five is given by the following, with the 
individual in question denoted by individual i, and individual j as a randomly assigned 
member of the corresponding alternative deliberative forum: 
 
 Individual  
 A B 
A 4 , 4 20 , 2 
 
Individual  
B  3 , 20 13 , 13 
 
Figure 4.6: Game Theoretic Encounter Five 
 
The results for game five are as follows: 
 
! 
j
! 
i
 151 
Table 6.9: Experimental Results for Game Five 
Time Period Selfish Strategy  Team Reason Strategy  
Pre Deliberation (t0) 62.9% 37.1% 
Post Deliberation 1 (t1) 57.1% 42.9% 
Post Deliberation 2 (t2) 63.6% 36.4% 
Post Deliberation 3 (t3) 51.4% 48.6% 
Post Deliberation 4 (t4) 51.4% 48.6% 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Team Reason Strategy Choices in Game Five 
 
Running a logistic regression the following results are obtained: 
 
Table 6.10: Logistic Parameter Estimates for Game Five 
95% Wald Confidence 
Interval Hypothesis Test 
Parameter B Std. Error Lower Upper 
Wald Chi-
Square df Sig. 
(Intercept) -.057 .3382 -.720 .606 .029 1 .866 
[Time=1] -.469 .4354 -1.322 .384 1.160 1 .281 
[Time=2] -.231 .3632 -.942 .481 .403 1 .526 
[Time=3] -.502 .3304 -1.150 .145 2.313 1 .128 
[Time=4] 1.200E-16 . . . . 1 . 
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Dependent Variable: Outcome for game 5 
Model: (Intercept), Time 
 
 
This time, the results are slightly different.  Game five does not seem to exhibit the 
same inverse ‘U’ shape result that the preceding four games showed. Indeed, whilst 
there is an increase in the percentage of individuals choosing team reason as a strategy 
overall (again with a slight anomaly at t2), the familiar drop off at t3 or t4 does not occur.  
In other words, the amount of individuals displaying the agency shift appears to 
stabilise after the immediate increase. 
 
6.4 FURTHER ANALYSIS  
 
Now that the relevant patterns and statistical significances have been teased out from 
the data, the next stage is to compare these results with the theoretical approach offered 
earlier in the thesis.  More specifically, how can these results be explained by the 
rational choice and social psychological approaches discussed in chapters two and 
three? And from this, how does this then relate to the theory of deliberation outlined in 
the latter parts of chapter one. To do this, it is imperative to therefore separate this 
section into two distinct sub-sections.  The first assumes that the relationships identified 
in the data are meaningful, but statistically insignificant on the basis of sample size.  I 
will refer to this as the ‘robust’ interpretation of the data during the rest of the thesis.  
The second proceeds from the assumption that the relationships identified in the results, 
due to the low levels of statistical significance, are simply the result of chance.  This 
will be labelled the ‘non-robust’ interpretation of the data.   
 
6.4.1 THE ROBUST INTERPRETATION 
 
In chapter two then, by drawing on the rational choice approach to decision-making, I 
sketched a model of deliberative revision that identified three levels at which change 
might take place.  The third layer, that of agency, was then further discussed in chapter 
three, particularly with respect to the social psychological concepts of identity and 
social categorisation theory.  These arguments can be summarised more simply in the 
following schemata of propositions: 
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        Agency (or how people reason) is a clearly defined level at which 
deliberative revision can take place, and that ‘team reasoning’ is one 
possible manifestation of the effects of deliberation.  
       There are a number of possible reasons as to why this particular shift should 
be considered favourable, and moreover, that a number of models of 
deliberative democracy implicitly include this within their arguments. 
        That social psychology, in particular, offers a useful explanation of the 
mechanisms at work to cause this revision. 
 
And finally: 
 
        That deliberation, as a very particular form of discussion, has a number of 
features that suggest it likely to induce such a shift in how people reason. 
 
The results, however, do not seem to match up precisely with these hypotheses.  It is not 
the case that in all games we see all individuals converge on the team reason strategy.  
Indeed, whilst there is some shift between t0 and t4 during all five interactions in favour 
of team reasoning, the most we ever see is a 22.4% increase in game three – reflecting 
an actual change in only seven individuals.  Moreover, this increase is certainly not 
uniform across all the different types of game, where the participant is playing with an 
individual that represents a different ‘we’ for the basis of a social identity.  And further 
still, in games one to four the increase is not sustained throughout the course of the 
deliberation, where time seems to also trigger an opposing shift towards individual 
reasoning after a certain point is reached.  How, then, can these be explained?   
 
The answer, I suggest, is best elucidated via an argument that runs on a process of 
backwards induction.  Firstly, I have already outlined the results of the experiments that 
were premised upon the rational choice approach to decision-making.  This comprises 
the first (already completed) step.  Next, I want to return to social identity and self-
categorisation theories, in order to gain an understanding of the processes that were at 
work to generate these results.  This should provide a conceptual justification for what 
occurred during the deliberation, and is the second step of the overall explanation. 
Finally, the third stage involves an exploration of the potential empirical features that 
were present during the deliberation itself that reconcile with this justification.  Taken 
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together, these three different elements combine to provide a full explanation for the 
data. 
 
To start, I want to briefly restate the general argument behind social identity and self-
categorisation theories that I offered in chapter three. The premise is that identity is a 
multiple phenomena, and consists of both personal and social aspects that an individual 
will cognitively switch between, depending on which one is more salient at any given 
time.  The former, which relates largely to idiosyncratic elements of an individual is 
characterised by particular behaviour, as is the latter, team reasoning being one such 
manifestation.  A number of factors were then identified from the experimental 
literature as having a robust effect on raising the salience of social identity, thereby 
logically inducing individuals to team-reason. These included belonging to the same ad 
hoc/social group, the presence of an out-group, having common preferences, the use of 
common language, having shared experiences, participating in face-to-face discussion 
and the more technical concept of interdependence. These factors were then compared 
with the six key features identified in the behavioural account of deliberation, as well as 
with the four phases outlined in the structural account.   
 
For reasons of clarity I am going to structure my analysis on the basis of three key 
questions that arise from the data.  The first relates to all five games, the second to 
games one to four, and the third involves comparative analysis with game five.  
Mirroring the approach I took in chapter three, in each question I will consider the 
conceptual (social psychological) perspective first, followed by an attempt to develop 
the conclusion via re-engaging with deliberative principles. 
 
Q1. What accounts for the immediate increase in the proportion of individuals 
employing team reasoning in all five games? 
 
Two general hypotheses suggested in the conceptual stages of this investigation appear 
to be born out in the early stages of the results.  Firstly, that deliberation causes agency 
revision and triggers people to team reason.   And secondly, the suggestion made on the 
basis of the structural account of deliberation, that earlier phases of the deliberative 
process (particularly the education and information phase) are likely to have an 
especially pronounced impact on this revision.  From a social psychological perspective, 
this is represented by the salience of a social identity being raised in relation to that of 
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the salience of a personal identity in individuals that have shifted strategy choices.  In 
games one to three, this is equivalent to saying that more individuals involved in the 
process began to view the group as a single entity, and further still, that these 
individuals then began to exhibit behaviour that was reflective of this altered ‘we’ 
perspective.  What is interesting, however, is the degree to which this predicted revision 
was also apparent in relation to other levels of social identity.  In particular, deliberation 
also triggered the same self-categorisation process when individuals were paired up 
with both anonymous members of the general public (game four), as well as other 
anonymous members of another deliberating group (game five).  The interpretation of 
this result is that the deliberation’s impact, at least early on, seems to be at the higher 
end of the ‘scale’ discussed in chapter four.  It has raised the salience of all three social 
identities – as a member of the deliberating group, as a member of any deliberating 
group, and as a member of the public/society at large.  To provide a robust conceptual 
justification for this increase in games four and five on social-psychological grounds, I 
need to introduce two features of behaviour, other than team reasoning, that are 
triggered by social identity:  
 
i.       Stereotyping 
ii. Social Projection 
 
Let me take the issue of stereotyping first. It is roughly described as the process by 
which a complex entity is depicted merely in terms of its most prominent or salient 
features/properties. From this base, two further concepts can be derived. The first, self-
stereotyping, is defined as the process in which a specific individual begins to define 
him or herself in this manner.  A significant amount of empirical and experimental 
evidence exists to support this conceptual hypothesis then, especially in the presence of 
social identity where individuals begin to ‘take on’ the most salient properties of the 
group in which they are a member (Hogg and Turner 1987; James 1993; Levy 1996; 
McKillip et al 1977).   
 
In other words, a collection of individuals who perceive themselves to be 
members of the same social category or group should tend to stereotype 
themselves in terms of their common attributes.  For instance, when describing 
themselves, they should endorse attributes that are seen as typical of in-group 
members, and reject those that are seen as typical of out-group members.  
(Simon and Hamilton 1994; p. 699) 
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Some studies have found that self-stereotyping in favour of the group’s characteristics is 
more likely in cases where there is a significant difference in size between the relative 
in-group and out-group (Simon and Hamilton 1994).  In this example, more self-
stereotyping occurred in the smaller group.  Others have looked at the impact of 
expectations in relationships on the phenomenon (Sinclair et al 2006), whilst there is a 
significant body of work investigating the impact that it has on issues of gender and 
ethnicity (see Sesko and Biernat 2010). There is also considerable debate over both the 
speed at which this process happens, and whether individuals are aware of it (Banaji et 
al 1993).  The second derivation is the practice of stereotyping others (Hamilton and 
Trolier 1986, Hamilton and Sherman 1994).  This can occur both on a positive 
dimension, where individuals view others in terms of favourable categorical 
information, as well as on a more negative one – often referred to as prejudice (Jussim 
et al 1995). 
 
Linked to both these phenomena is the concept of social projection, which is defined as 
the process by which ‘people come to believe that others are similar to them’ (Krueger 
2007; p. 2).  In short, it is based on a combination of propositions that are strongly 
linked to social identity and self-categorisation theories, as well as that of stereotyping: 
 
i. In circumstances that prime social identity, individuals are likely to describe 
both themselves and others in terms of criteria that are common/most salient 
to a relevant group membership. 
ii. This process is easier in relation to out-groups, because it involves 
displacement of much less personal information that might run contrary to 
the stereotypical features (Ames 2004). 
iii. The perception of members of out-groups is therefore much less accurate as 
it is based on less information (Ryan and Bogart 2001). 
iv. Social projection occurs automatically in cases that require quick 
judgements, as well as in situations of high cognitive load and time pressure 
(Epley et al 2004; Krueger and Stanke 2001). 
 
So how do these concepts relate to agency revision in games four and five?  The answer 
lies in the fact that they are both triggered by a combination of the same factors 
(Crawford et al 2002; Rydell et al 2007; Spencer-Rodgers et al 2007), as well as the fact 
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that stereotyping and social-projection play reinforcing roles in the self-categorisation 
process.  What I argue has occurred, then, is the following.  The early stages of the 
deliberation saw discussion that performed well against the ideal maxims of being (i) 
interactive, being based on (ii) equality and (iii) mutual respect and reciprocity, and was 
(iv) reason-based according to the (v) public principle.  This, as I suggested in chapter 
three, prompted more individuals to cognitively entify the group, and because of this, 
self-define in terms of the relevant social identity.  Having done so, when presented 
with non-decomposable games in which they were partnered with members of the same 
group, the team reason strategy was employed.   
 
A further result of this categorisation, though, was that these factors also triggered a 
process of self-stereotyping, as the individuals began to think of themselves in terms of 
the normatively favourable criteria that higher quality deliberation involves. Recall that 
in games four and five the individuals were partnered with co-players with whom none 
of them had ever had any contact.  The only source of information as to who they were 
playing with was a single line statement informing them they were a member of a 
particular group: the general public, or the other deliberative forum. On one level then, 
each individual was therefore playing each game with a member of a very carefully 
specified ‘out-group’.   But interestingly, it is also the case that each ‘out-group’ can 
simultaneously be labelled as a potential ‘in-group’, since on a slightly higher level of 
abstraction they are both potential social identities available to the participants.  This 
duality, combined with the relative lack of information actually known about the other 
person, had the affect to trigger the processes of stereotyping and social projection in 
each player’s mind.  Each co-player was cognitively pictured as having some/all the 
stereotypical features of each group (for example preferences), which in turn were 
features the individual in question could also self-identify with.  This in turn led to a 
raised salience of the relevant social identities, and resulted in the team reason strategy 
choice in these two games.  In short, the very fact that the participants had never 
actually met their co-player in both these games meant they relied on stereotyping and 
social projection to bridge the cognitive gap.   
 
Q2. What accounts for the subsequent decrease in the proportion of individuals 
employing team reasoning in games one to three, and game four? 
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Over the course of the entire deliberation, the increase that is apparent in the early 
stages is not sustained.  In games one to three, a significant drop off is witnessed in the 
second half of the process.  This, quite easily, is conceptually justified via a simple 
turnaround of the answer to question one.  Once the individuals participating in the 
deliberation had been doing so for a specific amount of time, it seems that the raised 
salience levels of a social identity in relation to both the deliberating group and the 
public/society were reduced.  At the point where personal identity became more 
prominent than social identity for these individuals, then, their choice of strategy 
reverted back to individual rather than team reasoning.   
 
Explaining this via a deliberative justification is slightly more complex, and requires re-
engaging with some of the issues I identified in chapters one and three.  In particular, I 
need to return to the two approaches that I used to define deliberation: the structural 
account, which concerns itself with the relevant phases of deliberation; and the 
behavioural account, which is concerned with the features that typify deliberative 
communication.  As I demonstrated in chapter five, the case study that was used for the 
experimentation was broadly structured according to the normative framework I 
developed in chapter one.  The early phases of the deliberation were more heavily 
weighted towards education and information, the middle phases towards debate and 
discussion of current issues and potential solutions, and the latter phases directed 
towards the group making an ultimate decision and set of recommendations.    In games 
one to four, the initial increase in agency revision occurred after the first session, with 
the reduction then taking place during sessions two, three and four.   
 
The first element of the deliberative justification, then, concerns the nature of the 
deliberative phase that triggered the reversal in strategy choices back to individual 
reasoning in these games.  As I suggested in chapters one and three, the latter stages of 
any democratic deliberation should focus the discussion on arriving at a decision – and 
indeed this is exactly what occurred during the case study.  From the second session 
onwards, the group members were encouraged to participate in the deliberation more 
actively, and indeed towards session three, they were presented with a number of 
decision-making tasks in preparation for the final stage.  The consequence of this 
requirement (the difference between deliberation and democratic deliberation) is a 
change in the nature of the behaviour/discussion between individuals.  In particular, as I 
suggested in chapters one and three, the decision-making stage in deliberation might 
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uncover, and make more salient, the true nature of the disagreement amongst the 
participants.  By this, I mean that once a group is required to make a collective choice 
that publicly represents the ‘will’ of all members, then it can become more important for 
individuals to ensure that the final decision is as close to their desired ends as possible.  
Whilst this clearly involves a relaxation of the public principle, it need not necessarily 
go as far as inducing individuals to make statements based on self-interest (Mansbridge 
2010).  The identification of greater than expected difference between deliberating 
individuals is also a manifestation of the much weaker relaxation of the principle.  
Recalling once again the definition of ‘public spirited’, where claims are made on the 
basis of that which ‘the public at large could accept’ (Chambers 2004; p. 390), there is 
the possibility then, that some members in the group might represent the minority 
section of the population that simply cannot accept the proposal or reasons behind it.  In 
this instance, whilst the discussion still performs well against deliberative criteria, the 
gulf between the preferences of members of the group is enough to raise the salience of 
personal identity in some individuals.   
 
To make this point a little clearer, let me return to the archetypal example of this in the 
deliberative literature: that of Rawls’ and Gutmann and Thompson’s discussion of the 
abortion debate.  Imagine two individuals partaking in a deliberation.  One individual 
takes the reasonable moral stance that life begins at conception and opposes the 
legalisation of abortion.  The other acknowledges that some individuals will reasonably 
reject this belief regarding the starting point of human life, and therefore favours the 
legalisation.  In this example, ideal deliberative behaviour, i.e. the existence of a single 
conception of the common good articulated through public reason, is impossible.   
Public-spirited reasoning, then, would consist of individuals making claims that large 
sections of the public might accept.  In this example, both positions are indeed 
indicative of this, and yet they remain diametrically opposed to each other.  Deliberation 
on the topic of abortion, then, might very well lead to the destruction of any social 
identity between the individuals when a collective decision is required.  Relating this to 
the case study of Private and Personal Information (Bradwell 2010), this was especially 
relevant when the topics of online information and personal health data were 
considered.  Typically, individuals split into two camps during the discussion of these 
topics.  There were those who trusted government, and therefore had no problem with 
health authorities storing private date in order to improve the NHS.  There were also 
those who took a much more sceptical, but equally reasonable perspective, and pointed 
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out a number of recent data scandals as reasons to support their opposition to such data 
collection and storage.  When asked to come to a conclusion on such an issue, then, 
even reasons that were based on the relaxed notion of ‘public spirited’ heightened this 
policy/preference difference, and worked to reduce the salience of any social identity 
that had been built up amongst the individuals in the earlier deliberative phases.54 
 
Extending this analysis onto game four then.  It also appears that once the deliberation 
had progressed to a point where personal identity was made more salient than that of a 
social identity, (with respect to the actual deliberating group amongst some individuals); 
it then had a significant impact on the related processes of stereotyping and social 
projection.  By exposing the increased level of difference that existed, the cognitive 
image of the co-player in game four that had been constructed in the early stages of the 
process became subject to challenge and revision. Instead of playing the game with an 
individual stereotyped as possessing the idealised features of the deliberative principles 
outlined in chapter one, co-players were again then cognitively pictured to be much 
more similar to the individuals actually involved in the deliberation.  In turn, these 
individuals had of course begun to exhibit behaviour that was reflective of some of the 
relaxations of the principles, including the use of ‘public spirited’ arguments rather than 
‘public reason’. Just as a drop in the salience of social identity occurred for some 
individuals in the actual group, the very same effect (largely due to the recognition of 
difference) was then translated to game four.  In other words, in the same way that 
stereotyping and social projection caused individuals to team reason in game four 
during the early stages of the process, the reverse was then true as the deliberation got 
closer to the decision-making phase. 
 
Q3. Why does game five not exhibit the same decrease? 
 
Assuming a robust interpretation of the data, I now arrive at possibly the most 
interesting result. Whilst it is evidently true that game four exhibited a decrease in the 
number of individuals employing team reasoning towards the end of the deliberation, 
this ‘drop off’ was not evident in game five. Yet if both of the interactions rely on 
stereotyping and social projection to cause team reasoning, the question becomes: why 
                                                 
54 As I suggested in chapter three, this is a particular result of the topic under consideration, 
rather than the deliberative process per se. In cases where less disagreement exists, the decision-
making phase in deliberation might in fact help promote social identity.  This highlights one 
area for further investigation. 
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does it occur in one game and not the other?  To answer this, as I mentioned briefly in 
question one, I need to discuss two important distinctions.  The first, and most 
significant, looks at the apparent malleability of stereotypes, and questions whether they 
are in fact always easily revised.  The second builds on this debate, and introduces a 
number of different aspects of stereotyping (and social projection) that have been found 
to impact on this level of malleability.  These include the debate between an approach 
founded on automaticity versus one that prioritises ‘thoughtfulness’ (Bodenhausen 
1990; Devine 1989; Doosje et al 1995; Kunda and Oleson 1995; Macrae et al 1994) and 
a debate between descriptive and prescriptive articulations (Gill 2004).  Once these 
issues have been considered, I will then draw on them to suggest a probable explanation 
for the results of game five. 
 
A popular way of conceptualising the process of stereotyping then, both theoretically 
and experimentally, has been the claim that it is simply a shortcut for individuals to take 
in making comprehensive judgements (Fiske 1998).  For example, Bodenhausen et al 
(1994; p. 49) argue that ‘stereotypes can be viewed as judgemental heuristics that are 
relied upon by social perceivers whenever they lack the ability or the inclination to think 
more extensively about the unique personal qualities of out-group members’.   Whilst 
Macrae et al (1994; p. 37) take it one step further, and make the normative claim that 
the process relies only on ‘the execution of rudimentary skills’.  In this sense, 
stereotyping is suggested to occur most often under cases of extreme time pressure 
(Freund et al 1985, Dijker and Koomen 1996), under conditions of high cognitive load 
(Gilbert and Hixon 1991), or when individuals are subject to information overloads 
(Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein 1987).  On the basis of this interpretation, it is therefore 
logical that once an individual does have the time or cognitive ability (etc), then such 
judgements will be made on more accurate information, and the stereotype will be 
revised or rejected quite easily.  Indeed, taken in conjunction with the mechanism of 
social projection, this is a core conceptual assumption of the explanation offered for 
game four. 
 
However, there is also a substantial body of literature that has challenged this 
presumption of malleability in stereotyping. For example, Kruglanski and Freund 
(1983) have investigated the notion of ‘epistemic freezing’, when stereotypes become 
fixed irrespective of new evidence. They demonstrate that additional information, in 
contradiction to the established image of an individual, can be ignored, and that original 
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stereotypes can remain robust under certain conditions.   Nelson et al (1996), and Blair 
et al (2001), on this very line of inquiry, have found particular evidence for this under 
conditions where stereotyping was considered undesirable.  In their studies, they looked 
specifically at the manifestation of prejudice, and whether individuals presented with 
contradictory individuating information would revise the negative stereotypes they held 
of other individuals.  They both found considerable evidence for an element of 
resistance, claiming that categorical evidence (stereotyping) can at times be left 
unchanged in the face of contestation. In other words then, whilst some types of 
stereotypes can indeed be undercut by more accurate behavioural information (Kunda 
and Thagard 1996, Fiske 1998), some might be described as being more ‘sticky’.  The 
question this generates, of course, is what determines whether a particular stereotype 
fits in the former, or latter category. 
 
Often then, the argument of malleability has been used in conjunction with that of 
automaticity.  But as a number of theorists and empiricists have demonstrated, the 
dynamic process of stereotyping is two-fold (Brewer 1988).  On this supposition, 
Wegener and Clark (2006) have integrated these ideas into a model that distinguishes 
between ‘non-thoughtful’ (automatic) and ‘thoughtful’ approaches.  The latter, they 
argue, is indicative of stereotyping which influences ‘judgements when social 
perceivers are engaged in effortful thinking about target-relevant information’ (2006; p. 
43).  Or put more simply still, stereotyping that occurs when individuals do have both 
the cognitive ability and time to make comprehensive judgements, yet still rely on 
categorical, rather than individuating information.  Arguing that both processes lead to 
slightly different outcomes, they point to a number of studies in the literature on attitude 
formation to suggest a more considered approach leads ultimately, to more resilient 
judgements being made (Darley and Gross 1983; Nolan et al 1999).   In particular, they 
base their empirical investigation on the related results that ‘more thinking’ leads to 
stronger attitudes, that remain over time (Petty et al 1995), that are more resistant to 
challenge (Haugtvedt and Petty 1992), and that more powerfully determine future 
behaviour (Petty and Krosnick 1995).  Their experiments provide quite compelling 
evidence that the very same result translates to the question of stereotyping.  Related to 
this, Smith et al (2005) have found that increased levels of experience can actually have 
the effect to enhance stereotyping, because familiar objects are often subject to less 
critical analysis.  In this sense, repeated interaction with an individual may not 
necessarily lead to the revision of a stereotypical judgement held about them by another 
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person.  And in turn, underlying this result Sherman (1996) demonstrated that whilst 
during low levels of experience stereotypic knowledge was derived from the 
identification of group exemplars, as interactions increased this changed to a more 
abstract image stored and retrieved independently of those it was originally based upon.  
In short then, stereotypes that are more considered, are more likely to remain stable in 
the face of new information. 
 
The second issue I want to discuss concerns a differential feature of stereotyping that is 
present most clearly in the work looking at prejudice, especially on the basis of sexual 
discrimination (Heilman 2001; Rudman and Glick 2001).   When a given individual 
makes a cognitive judgement on another according to categorical, rather than individual 
information, stereotyping is occurring.  But this, on its own, does not tell us whether the 
process is purely positive, in that it is concerned merely with how things are, or whether 
some form of normative element is in play.  Heilman (2001), for instance, discusses the 
impact of normative expectations regarding the behaviour of women on their chances of 
promotion, concluding that stereotyping which involves some form of value judgement 
is one of the most significant causes preventing women from moving up the 
‘organisational ladder’.  Broadening this division into a wider context, Gill (2004) 
argues it is best encapsulated by the respective labels of descriptive and prescriptive 
accounts of stereotyping: 
 
[…] descriptive stereotypes, which purport to describe what group members are 
typically like (“women are gentle”), and prescriptive stereotypes, which describe 
the behavioural standards group members must uphold to avoid derision by the 
perceiver (“women should be gentle”).  
(Gill 2004; p. 619) 
 
After initially discussing the rather more anecdotal evidence provided in the sexual 
discrimination literature, the results of three different studies are then reported that 
provide support for three important claims.  These can be summarised as the following: 
 
i.       Descriptive stereotypes can be undercut by more accurate and sustained 
behavioural information.  
ii. Prescriptive stereotypes, on the other hand, can remain in place even in the 
presence of contradictory behavioural information. 
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iii. It is possible for individuating information to simultaneously reverse 
descriptive stereotypes whilst having no effect on prescriptive stereotypes. 
 
So, how do these issues relate to the fact that there was no inverse ‘U’ shape 
relationship for game five?  The answer, I suggest, emanates from a conceptual 
assertion that the dual processes of stereotyping and social projection are different in 
relation to game five than to game four.  Drawing upon the discussion above then, two 
differential features can be attributed to the type of stereotyping (and consequently 
social projection) at work when individuals were asked to play the non-decomposable 
games with members of an alternative deliberative forum.  The first relies on the 
prescriptive/descriptive distinction.  At the beginning of the deliberation, all individuals 
involved were briefed on both the topic and the structure of the process.  A crucial part 
of this involved establishing agreement amongst the participants over a set of discursive 
norms directly related to the principles of ideal deliberative behaviour.  Moreover, this 
was continually reinforced throughout the actual process by the relevant facilitators.  
The consequence of this, on one level, was the creation of a normative picture of how a 
‘good deliberator’ should act, or in other words, a prescriptive stereotype.  In the early 
stages where the behaviour of individuals more closely matched this regulative ideal, 
due to social projection, this manifested itself in an increased number of individuals 
self-defining in terms of the social identity.  And as Gill (2004) demonstrates, even in 
the face of contradictory individuating information (such as experience in an actual 
deliberation), prescriptive stereotypes can persist.  In other words then, even once the 
process had reached the point where ‘lower quality’ deliberative behaviour dominated, 
individuals presented with game five were still cognitively picturing the ideal stereotype 
of a ‘good deliberator’ as their co-player.   
 
Further to this, the early stages of the deliberation are also important in relation to the 
debate on automaticity.  As Wegener and Clark (2006) argued, when stereotypes are 
formed on the basis of a more thoughtful or considered approach, they are more likely 
to remain stable in the face of contestation.   After the prescriptive account was outlined 
at the start of the discussion then, the early phases/sessions of the process were then 
likely to affirm the prescriptive stereotype in the minds of the individuals.  Because this 
practice of affirmation involved a much more thoughtful process rather than a simple 
heuristic, it therefore took on the properties more associated with Wegener and Clark’s 
model.  Taking both these arguments together, it is then possible to explain the more 
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robust nature of the stereotyping and social projection processes involved in game five.  
Moreover, because the stereotype remained in place, it then explains why social 
identity, in turn, stayed more salient - and thus why the percentage of team reasoners 
remained stable.  
 
6.4.2 THE NON-ROBUST INTERPRETATION  
 
I now arrive at the second possible interpretation of the data, where the low values of 
statistical significance are now assumed to be central to the results.  In this sense, it is 
no longer simply the small sample size involved in the experimentation that is the main 
driver behind the low levels of significance, but rather, the process itself that was being 
examined.  From this starting point, I would therefore suggest that the effect of 
deliberation has been multi-directional, raising the salience of social identity in some 
individuals at some points, and personal identity in other individuals at other points.  
Because of this, agency revision might indeed have occurred at points in the process, 
but the levels of magnitude and consistency that are required to generate a robust 
relationship are not witnessed. 
 
Explaining this conceptually simply requires a reiteration of the arguments presented in 
answer to Q2, but extended to all five games across the course of the entire deliberation.  
Briefly, the suggestion was that the process actually served to heighten the recognition 
of difference between individuals, with this in turn leading to lower quality deliberative 
behaviour, and lower salience levels of social identity for some individuals.  The only 
difference, under a non-robust interpretation of the data, is the assertion that this must 
have occurred immediately, beginning in the very first deliberative phase.  Whilst some 
aspects of the deliberation might indeed have had the effect to raise the salience of 
social identity then, this was merely ‘counteracted’ by the difference argument.  
Consequently, no real pattern emerges from the data. 
 
6.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
In this chapter, then, I have attempted to outline the results of the experiment that tested 
the impact of deliberation on the issue of agency revision.  In doing so, I have 
performed both basic descriptive analysis, as well as then subjecting each set of results 
to a more robust statistical test (logistic regression).  I have then offered two possible 
explanations of the data on the basis of two different interpretations of the reasons for 
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low statistical significance.  From these various elements of the analysis, three different 
results can be drawn out.  The first is supported by both the robust and non-robust 
interpretation, and is therefore considered more substantial.  This will be referred to in 
the next chapter as micro result one: 
 
Micro Result One: Deliberation does not necessarily lead to agency 
revision amongst the individuals involved in the process, particularly in 
cases where deep disagreement amongst individuals is present. 
 
Relating this back to second-generation deliberation, this potential result raises some 
specific concerns regarding the claims made by deliberative theorists.  One of the main 
thrusts towards deliberative decision-making, as a distinct method compared with 
wholly aggregate accounts, is the argument that the revisionary process leads to better 
outcomes.  As I suggested in chapter two, one of these possibilities is supposed to be an 
increase in the number of individuals employing team reasoning (with the associated 
benefits this in turn provides).  This interpretation and result, then, directly contradicts 
this assertion.   If micro result one is indeed corroborated by larger scale empirical 
investigation, then deliberative theory must respond accordingly and take this into 
account.  Agency revision, or at least in the direction this thesis has investigated, can no 
longer be used as an argument for the prioritisation of deliberation as a precursor to 
collective decision-making.  If it does not create team-reasoners, then the three 
suggestions made in chapter two (that it helps to ‘solve’ social dilemmas, that it 
increases trust between individuals and ultimately promotes community generation) 
cannot be upheld.  To put it quite simply, second generation deliberative democrats 
must look for other reasons to normatively justify their approach.55 
 
The second and third results that I want to highlight make a slightly different argument, 
although they are supported only by the robust interpretation of the data and therefore 
considered slightly less substantial. Respectively, these are: 
 
Micro Result Two: Deliberation can trigger a small degree of agency 
revision, although the effect matches an inverse ‘U’ shape relationship 
                                                 
55 It should be pointed out that this does, of course, raise some empirical questions for further 
investigation – particularly whether topics characterised by less disagreement deliver the same result.  I 
will discuss this briefly in the final section of the final chapter. 
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with respect to members of the same deliberative forum and the general 
public. 
 
Micro Result Three: Even under conditions assumed in micro result two, 
deliberation can cause sustained agency revision in reference to other 
members of another deliberating group. 
 
Again, I now want to relate these two possible results very briefly back to the account of 
second-generation deliberation I outlined in chapter one.  On this interpretation of the 
data a limited amount of agency revision is triggered by the process, and accordingly, 
the argument for deliberative models of decision-making on the basis of the three 
reasons I put forward in chapter two remains.  However this is not the entire story, as 
the ‘shape’ of the results also suggests two possible implications for second-generation 
accounts of deliberation.  The first relates to the results from games one to four.  The 
inverse ‘U’ shape relationship that emanates from the data means that deliberation has a 
more powerful effect much earlier on in the process.  It therefore raises the argument 
that deliberation should be limited to the point where the agency revision effect is 
largest.  
 
The second implication I want to highlight relates to the fact that game five (where 
individuals were partnered with a member of another deliberating group) saw a 
sustained increase with no drop off after a certain time point was reached.  In this case, 
it raises the related question of whether physically deliberating with all members of the 
group is both necessary and favourable on the agency revision dimension.  If, for 
example, more team reasoners can be created by restricting the group size and by 
ensuring as many individuals as possible take part in other deliberations, then the 
unitary conception of deliberative democracy is called into question. 
 
These three results, and the implications they have for deliberative theory, now form the 
central substantive points in the final concluding chapter of this thesis.  The last stage in 
the project is to apply these results back to the theory of deliberative democracy, and 
explore any lessons that empirical political science has regarding the recasting of theory 
in terms of third generation principles.  This completes the overall objective that I 
outlined in the introduction. 
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  CHAPTER 7   
CONCLUSION: RECASTING DELIBERATION AND 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
In the introduction to this thesis I discussed the importance of the application of 
empirical political science to political theory, specifically in relation to deliberative 
democracy.  After citing a now famous article by James Bohman (1998), I put the case 
that deliberative models of democracy, having moved beyond the ‘working theory 
stage’ (Chambers 2003), were now experiencing what Dryzek (2008) has since labelled 
the ‘empirical turn’.   
 
Situated in this research agenda, in chapter one I then discussed a useful taxonomy for 
the way deliberative democracy has developed over the past twenty years, before 
outlining a clear definition of the central feature of these models: that of deliberation.  
Having established the parameters of the investigation, chapters two and three then 
deployed the rational choice and social-psychological approaches to decision-making to 
deconstruct the normative claim regarding one of the transformative powers of 
deliberation.  In doing so, I identified three levels at which revision was possible.  The 
third level, agency, represented a much overlooked and almost entirely ignored line of 
inquiry. In chapters four and five, I then set out to provide the details of an experimental 
approach to test whether deliberation did indeed cause this shift, before discussing the 
results in chapter six. In this final chapter, I now consider how these results interact with 
the most recent shift in the theory of deliberative democracy.  My concerns, then, are as 
follows: 
 
i.       To provide a discussion of the recent drive towards recasting both 
deliberation and deliberative democracy in terms of macro, or ‘third-
generation’ principles (Elstub 2010). 
ii. To provide an analysis of third-generation models of deliberation, and 
demonstrate the most significant problem with them in comparison to 
second-generation, unitary accounts.   
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iii. To explore the implications of the experimental results regarding 
deliberation and agency revision on this transformation in democratic 
theory.  
 
In fulfilling these three objectives, I will demonstrate that whilst the shift to a macro 
conception of deliberation (crucial in third-generation deliberative democracy) might 
rely on an argument of ‘second best’ in terms of solving the scale problem, this is not 
the case on all dimensions.  Because of this, I conclude the thesis with two assertions.  
Firstly that deliberative democrats should continue to engage with empirical political 
science to inform theory, and secondly, that they need not be so resistant to the more 
recent attempts to recast deliberative democratic theory in systemic terms. 
 
7.2 THIRD-GENERATION DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY  
 
In the first chapter of the thesis, I proceeded on an approach to deliberative models of 
democracy that was premised upon a distinction between first, second and third 
generation principles.  After outlining the key assumptions that were categorical of 
primary incarnations (Cohen 1997; Habermas 1987, 1990, 1996a; Rawls 1993, 1997a, 
1997b), I then discussed a number of ways in which second-generation accounts 
(Dryzek 2000; Goodin 2003; and Gutmann and Thompson 2004) have responded to 
some quite potent challenges.  The most crucial of which has been the question of 
legitimacy (Parkinson 2006a), and in particular, how deliberation can be made feasible 
and institutionalised within democratic decision-making.  It is this question, more than 
any other, that has framed what Elstub (2010) refers to as third-generation recasting.  
How can a deliberative democracy be realised in a large, complex society? 
 
Let me briefly restate the problem of scale put forward in Dahl’s ‘back of the envelope’ 
calculation that I offered earlier then: 
 
If an association were to make one decision a day, allow ten hours a day for 
discussion, and permit each member just ten minutes – rather extreme 
assumptions […] – then the association could not have more than sixty members. 
(Dahl 1970; pp. 67-68) 
 
In an attempt to solve this, I discussed a number of different possible solutions.  One, 
mirroring Rawls, looked at restricting the number of decisions over which full 
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deliberation was suitable (Dryzek 2001). This was dismissed on the grounds that even 
one decision would be unfeasible on the basis of Dahl’s logic. Another discussed the 
possibility of deliberation ‘within’, shifting the burden from external discussion to 
‘internal reflection’ (Goodin 2000, 2003, with Niemeyer 2003).   Again though, this was 
then demonstrated as only a partial solution: face-to-face deliberation is still required at 
some point in the process.  A third possibility suggested representation as the answer, 
with deliberation either only playing a role in the selection process of candidates 
(Bessette 1994, Gastil 2000), or alternatively, amongst the elected representatives in 
‘ersatz deliberation’ (Goodin 2000; Parkinson 2007).  Both these potential solutions 
seemed to offer some useful possibilities, although did so by partitioning off sections of 
the democratic system into separate elements.  Largely on this basis, I then suggested 
briefly that a ‘third-generation’ attempt to recast deliberative democracy in terms of 
more ‘macro’ level arguments could also be used to circumvent the issue.  It is this 
more recent reformulation that I now discuss, a shift that Dryzek (2008; p. 1) labels the 
‘systemic turn’ in deliberative democracy.56   
 
7.2.1 MACRO ACCOUNTS OF DELIBERATION 
 
The most crucial point that macro models of deliberative democracy must confront is 
the definition of deliberation they make central in their framework.   By this, I do not 
mean the debate regarding the criteria of ideal deliberative behaviour (the behavioural 
account), and nor do I mean the various stages that a deliberation must be constituted of 
(the structural account) – although these will become relevant shortly.  Rather, I refer to 
the assumption that deliberative decision-making requires the simultaneous input of all 
members affected by the relevant issues under consideration.  In micro deliberation, 
which relies on this unitary conceptualisation, this is made possible by an extremely 
small number of individuals being involved. Macro accounts, on the other hand, claim 
that the issue of scale is central, and that deliberation must be conceived in a different 
manner if it can be utilised on a societal level.  Four different (although related) 
theoretical ways of conceptualising deliberation have underpinned the third-generation 
literature as a mechanism to circumvent the problem of scale, which I now want to 
discuss.  The first two are based only on dividing up the larger deliberating group into 
smaller subsets, whilst the second two also introduce the idea of a division of 
                                                 
56  I have left the discussion of this reformulation until the final chapter for the very reason that my results 
speak directly to it.  By providing an outline of the approach first, the manner in which an agency revision 
argument can be deployed is much easier to construct and comprehend. 
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deliberative labour amongst the deliberators.  Once I have done this, I will then discuss 
how they interact more broadly in terms of deliberative democracy, before then 
considering how my results interact with this recasting. 
 
Parallel Deliberation 
The first conceptualisation, which I term parallel deliberation57, requires the 
participation of all individuals in society, but proceeds by splitting the larger group into 
smaller, more manageable subsets of the population.  In doing so, it allows the smaller 
groups to form their own distinct forums, where higher quality deliberation is therefore 
made possible.  Once individuals have been through a, rather than the discursive 
process, they are then required to take part in a common separate aggregation phase, 
such as voting.  The following diagram might thus represent parallel deliberation that 
involves splitting the population into three different subgroups: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Parallel Deliberation 
 
Whilst parallel deliberation therefore involves the full participation of all individuals 
affected by any decision, it does so by relaxing the requirement of simultaneous 
contributions in a unitary (or single) forum.  In doing so, one aspect of the legitimacy 
critique is therefore dealt with quite nicely.  If those affected by the issue are the source 
of legitimacy for any collective decision regarding it, then it stands to reason that the 
more individuals involved in the process, then the more legitimate the outcome.  
However, by solving this problem, parallel deliberation appears to generate a secondary, 
related epistemic concern, which I will term the ‘transmission problem’.  By 
constructing lots of different deliberative forums, each comprised of different 
individuals with different initial preferences and different personal experiences, the 
suggestion is that the transformative power of the process is likely to be different at 
                                                 
57 Goodin (2000; pp. 87-89) discusses this type of approach in his section on ‘ersatz’ deliberation, 
although does so from the perspective of using one forum to represent the entire population, rather than 
each forum doing so.  
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each site.  In turn, this poses a number of questions regarding the nature of the post 
deliberative outcomes.  Has deliberation at one site, because it has taken place without 
the participation of a particular individual, resulted in a different outcome compared 
with another?  If this is the case, then clearly some forums will be better or worse than 
others.  In particular, those that are attended by a more representative cross section of 
the population would logically seem to provide for higher quality deliberation.  Parallel 
deliberation thus seems weaker, or less preferred, than a unitary conception on this line 
of reasoning. 
 
But responding to this briefly, there are two possible counter points that help to mitigate 
this problem.  The first simply draws on the idea of representative selection that is 
found in the literature on mini publics that I discussed in chapter five.  Parallel 
deliberation could plausibly rely on a formal allocation process of membership, to 
ensure that every deliberating group involves a representative selection of individuals 
affected by the decision.  Secondly, it is also important not to conflate individuals, with 
preferences and reasons.  Whilst it is possible that every individual might possess a 
unique set of preferences, values and personal experiences, it is likely that some, if not 
all, will be duplicated by other members of the forum.58  Indeed, factor analyses of 
various real world deliberations has often only uncovered at most five to six possible 
clusters, with three or four being more common.  If this is the case, then whilst parallel 
deliberation might indeed create some new drawbacks through alleviating the scale 
problem, these issues do not seem to completely demand the dismissal of the 
conceptualisation as unworkable.   
 
Disjointed Deliberation 
The second approach I want to consider builds upon the idea of splitting large numbers 
of individuals into smaller sets of deliberating subgroups.  In parallel deliberation, the 
sites or forums are conceptualised as highly distinct and separate.   Members of one 
forum are not required, nor are they welcome, to attend any other.  But as I have 
suggested, this can generate a secondary concern when the quality of the substantive 
outcome is considered.  If a particular perspective is not represented in the discussion, 
for example, then the final post deliberative preferences arrived at by that particular 
subgroup may be ‘less’ deliberative on the basis that plurality of inputs is deemed 
favourable. A formal condition of representativeness is one way of partially 
                                                 
58 I owe this nice counter-point to John Parkinson. 
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circumventing this critique.  An alternative, however, relies on two slight amendments 
to the approach.  The first is an even greater relaxation of the unitary condition.  Parallel 
deliberation goes some way by not requiring individuals to contribute to the same 
forum, but it is still premised upon the fact that multiple deliberations are to take place 
at the same time.  A further weakening of this condition, allows for the possibility that 
different forums can take place over the course of a time period – allowing some to 
finish before others even begin.   
 
Built upon this, the second differentiation utilises the idea of a crossover, where 
membership of the various deliberating forums overlaps with each other.  Goodin 
(2000) labels this type of process as ‘disjointed’ deliberation, and cites Aristotle’s 
suggestion of deliberating ‘not all in one body, but in turns’ as the original formulation 
of the approach.  Recasting deliberation in these terms again clearly circumvents the 
scale problem, and does so in way that partially self-mitigates the transmission problem 
associated with the parallel articulation.  By linking deliberating groups with each other, 
the process allows for the transmission of any unique perspectives and preferences, and 
goes some way to ensure that each individual gets to deliberate with every other 
individual – albeit in a rather indirect manner.    The simplest representation, then, 
would be the following: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Serial Deliberation 
 
However, when disjointed deliberation takes this linear form, the serial nature of the 
process becomes highly susceptible to the problems of inequality and path 
dependency.59  If deliberation is undertaken in this way, those participating in group one 
will have a disproportionate amount of influence over the macro process in comparison 
to the members of group three, violating the maxim of equality.  This is because whilst 
individuals involved in deliberating groups towards the end of the time period are 
                                                 
59 This particular example of disjointed deliberation is better termed ‘serial deliberation’. 
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exposed to the post-deliberative preferences and opinions of individuals from earlier 
groups, the reverse is not true.  A solution to this problem is to allow individuals from 
different groups to interact with each other throughout the course of the entire process, 
thereby creating a host of different ‘starting points’ for the macro deliberation.  
Diagrammatically, this alternative could therefore be depicted by the following: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Disjointed Deliberation 
 
The most significant difference regarding this non-linear account of disjointed 
deliberation is that no single group forum represents the start, or finish, of the overall 
process.  There is no definite first or last sub-deliberation.  To facilitate this, two 
foundational assumptions of disjointed deliberation must be maintained.  The first is 
that the different subgroup deliberations must take place over a long enough time scale 
to allow sufficient overlapping between different forums.   And the second is that these 
respective forums must therefore last long enough themselves to allow individuals to 
move between the groups.  If both these conditions are met, then it possible to imagine 
something like a dynamic network of different deliberating groups, each enjoying input 
from, and input into, other forums.  As Goodin himself puts it, ‘there might be a “web 
of group affiliations” that links (indirectly: perhaps very indirectly) everyone with 
everyone else in a dialogue that effectively straddles the entire community’ (Goodin 
2000; p. 87). 
 
As with the parallel conception though, disjointed deliberation can be critiqued on a 
number of levels that result in the claim that it is less preferred than the unitary account 
relied upon in second-generation models of deliberative democracy.  Most obviously, 
the argument levelled at parallel models regarding the transmission of perspectives is 
only ever partially answered in the disjointed articulation.  It cannot, for instance, 
guarantee that all members hear all viewpoints.  An indirect transmission does not 
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function as efficiently as a direct one, and because of this, overlapping membership is 
clearly a case of the ‘second best’ alternative.  From this, the question of how cross 
membership of different groups actually works also raises some interesting related 
concerns.  Consider the area marked ‘x’ in figure 7.3 above.  This represents the 
collection of individuals who are involved in all three of the group deliberations, and is 
the basis of this partial solution to the transmission problem.  But in turn, this poses the 
question of which individuals should occupy this position?  Whilst it seems logical that 
any basis of membership of this subset should be related to ensuring the transmission of 
different perspectives, it becomes extremely difficult, impossible even, to formalise this 
operationally.  Any selection process that solves this must start from an impossible 
point of complete information in order to ‘know’ which perspectives are unique.  And to 
complete the circular nature of this issue; the only real way to guarantee the ‘correct’ or 
‘best’ people hold this position is to make the overlap large enough that the scale 
problem might become an issue once again.  In short, whilst disjointed deliberation 
mirrors the parallel conceptualisation in solving the scale problem, and performs 
slightly better on the self-generated issue of the transmission problem, it still represents 
a less preferred articulation than the (small scale) unitary account. 
 
Distributed Deliberation 
The third macro account of deliberation that has been utilised in third generation models 
of deliberative democracy draws upon both the previous two articulations, but takes a 
slightly different focus.  Parallel and disjointed deliberation work by splitting the 
population into smaller constitutive groups, in order to reduce the number of individuals 
in each deliberative forum.  Distributed deliberation (Goodin 2005) takes this one step 
further, and is rooted in the assumption that different elements of the deliberative 
process can be apportioned to these different sections of the population.  The simplest 
way this can be outlined, then, is by way of the structural account of deliberation that I 
offered in chapter one.60  Let me restate the four different stages that were identified as 
essential components in any democratic deliberation: 
 
 Education and information phase 
 Identification of solutions phase 
 Evaluative criteria phase 
                                                 
60 Parkinson (2006; p. 169) follows a similar logic in his table (the distinction between define, discuss, 
decide and implement) although with reference to deliberative democracy, and thus includes many other 
forms of political participation and political institutions in his discussion.  
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 Decision-making phase 
 
The first three of these elements are, if you like, the essential aspects of the ‘talk-
centric’ part of the process, which the scale problem so applies to.  Distributed 
deliberation therefore works by (a) splitting the population into smaller groups, and (b) 
by then assigning each group to a particular task.  In doing so, the deliberative work is 
therefore shared out amongst the entire population, with different individuals 
performing different parts of the macro deliberation.  Further to this, it is also possible 
to then unpack the distributed elements themselves.  If, for example, the number of 
individuals involved in a single phase is still too large, then disjointed deliberation 
might be employed within this stage.  Mirroring the previous two discussions, this might 
be represented by the following: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4 ‘Parallel’ Distributed Deliberation  
 
The dilemma for this ‘parallel’ distributed articulation, however, is that the various 
stages of a deliberation need to be linked together, and in a particular order.  For 
example, the evaluative criteria phase relies heavily on the identification of solutions 
phase. Without any possible courses of action identified, it is more difficult for 
individuals to come up with an agreed way of ranking them.  And similarly, it would 
make little sense to come up with the said criteria before a host of possibilities had been 
first generated.  There are two related possibilities that emanate from this.  A more 
structured perspective would argue for a formal transmission mechanism between the 
various deliberative moments.  As I will discuss in the following section regarding 
macro models of deliberative democracy, this is often the role that formal political 
institutions play in large complex societies. For example, it might be possible to 
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imagine the collection of individuals in groups four, five and six in figure 7.4 to simply 
take the input from groups one, two and three as fixed.  If phase one represents the 
identification of solutions phase, this would mean that only those possible courses of 
action that had been recommended by the earlier deliberating individuals would be 
considered in the subsequent stages of the macro deliberation.  
 
It turns out, though, that this formalisation merely creates a different version of the 
transmission problem applicable to parallel and disjointed articulations.  Whilst it might 
be practicably possible to split the stages of deliberation into distinct serial phases, this 
ignores the fact that many of them are intrinsically linked in both directions.   Take the 
relationship between the identification of solutions phase and the establishing of 
evaluative criteria.  It is conceivable that a situation where a particular discussion and 
decision on the latter might positively influence the outcome regarding the former.  
What happens say, if the individuals in phase two want to rank possibilities on a 
particular dimension, yet the deliberation in phase one has paid no attention to this 
criterion when coming up with different courses of action? The resultant output from 
the first phase is thus clearly sub optimal from a deliberative standpoint that values 
plurality of input into the process.  Again, a partial solution is to allow for an overlap 
between the various stages, resulting in an approach that might be labelled ‘disjointed 
distributed deliberation’.  For the third time though, this represents only a second-best 
solution to the transmission problem when compared with that of a unitary account. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5 ‘Disjointed’ Distributed Deliberation  
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Dividing deliberation up on the basis of the structural account to make it applicable on 
the macro level is though, only one way in which deliberation might be segmented on 
the basis of a division of labour.  A second starts from the ‘disjointed distributed’ 
articulation discussed above, but also introduces the behavioural account into 
consideration.  Mansbridge (1999, 2010a) and Goodin (2005) both suggest that the 
burden for all individuals to exhibit ideal deliberative behaviour for all phases of even a 
disjointed distributed deliberation is too great for implementation on a macro level.  
Instead, they construct a model which allows the ‘deliberative quality’ to vary at certain 
points during the overall process, with particular phases required to perform better 
according to certain maxims.  To make this a little clearer, let me restate the six key 
features of deliberative behaviour that I identified in chapter one: 
 
 Interactive Communicative Process 
 Equality 
 Mutual Respect and Reciprocity 
 Reason-based Discussion  
 The Public Principle  
 Decision-focussed 
 
Goodin’s argument is therefore quite simply that not all six criteria need to be 
completely satisfied by all individuals in all phases.  Consider, for example, the 
education and information phase in comparison with that of the identification of 
solutions.  It is quite logical to expect the latter to involve more interactive 
communication than the former, and similarly, for the former to involve discussion that 
is non-decision focussed.  What matters for sequenced deliberation then, is that the 
overall process exhibits instances of all six criteria, not that all the individual 
component phases do.  It is on the aggregate level that deliberative behaviour must 
reflect these six ideals.   As Mansbridge (1999; p. 224) puts it: ‘the criterion for good 
deliberation should be not that every interaction in the system exhibits [these ideal 
criteria], but that the larger system reflects these goals’.  
 
Out of all four macro interpretations, sequenced deliberation represents the format most 
removed from the unitary conception offered in second-generation accounts. It includes 
division by group, division by deliberative phase, and division by deliberative 
behaviour.  But as with the other three formulations, solving the scale issue comes at a 
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price.  Firstly, because sequenced deliberation draws on both distributed and disjointed 
articulations, it is equally susceptible to the suggestion that it only partially ensures full 
transmission of all perspectives to all individuals throughout the process.  Moreover, 
because both variants are applicable, the problem is made even more pervasive and 
entrenched in this approach.  For a final time then, overlapping between individuals and 
deliberative phases provides only a second-best solution in comparison to the unitary 
perspective.   
 
But secondly, there is also a salient issue regarding the argument for the transformative 
power of deliberation that must be tackled by proponents of sequenced models.  If a 
particular group of individuals are only required to participate in certain phases, and 
assuming the allocated phase for an individual is one that performs poorly on 
deliberative criteria, then clearly some of the positive effects which deliberation is 
expected to deliver will not obtain.  Indeed for those individuals who only participate in 
the decision-making phase, for instance voting, it is difficult to see how the process is 
any different from the aggregative model of decision-making which deliberative forms 
are proposed to replace. For the moment though, I want to put this issue to one side, as I 
will return to it in section 7.3 when I consider how the results of the agency revision 
experiments (one such transformative example) relate to these approaches to macro 
deliberation and deliberative democracy. 
 
Type of 
Deliberation 
Split into 
groups 
Overlap 
between groups 
Division by 
deliberative 
phase 
Division by 
deliberative 
behaviour  
Parallel + - - - 
Disjointed + + - - 
Distributed + + + - 
Sequenced + + + + 
Table 7.1 Features of different models of macro deliberation  
 
At this point, it might be useful to briefly summarise where my argument has reached.  
So far, I have discussed four different conceptualisations of macro deliberation, in 
particular highlighting the problem of ‘transmission’ that they generate in departing 
from the unitary account.  My next concerns are firstly a discussion of how deliberative 
models of democracy might be conceptualised using third-generation principles, and 
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secondly, how these different macro interpretations of deliberation have been 
incorporated into them. 
 
7.2.2 MACRO ACCOUNTS OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
 
As I have asserted numerous times already, the shift from focussing on micro to macro 
models of deliberative democracy represents the most recent development in the field of 
study.  As such, the relative paucity of literature in the third-generation tradition reflects 
both its short history, as well as the fact that it symbolises what some could consider a 
retreat from the ideal deliberative project.  Arguing for a recasting of deliberative 
democracy that draws on a macro interpretation of deliberation might appear as partially 
surrendering the significant body of work that has sought to establish and entrench the 
deliberative turn.  This is something that I will address much further in the following 
section (7.3), but for now, I want to provide a brief description of some of the more 
cogent third-generation accounts. 
 
Let me start by briefly restating the general claim(s) regarding macro models of 
deliberative democracy.  A deliberative democracy understood through a micro lens, 
might be envisaged as a unitary society of individuals who are required to discuss, and 
then vote on a particular issue. Citizens’ juries, consensus conferences, deliberative 
polls etc, are all direct manifestations of the guiding principles behind this approach. 
They aim to bring together all the individuals affected by an issue, and then use 
deliberation and aggregation as a way of securing a legitimate collective decision. 
Macro accounts, on the other hand, take the size and complexity of large societies as the 
starting point for their model, and construct a normative framework for political 
decision-making that draws on a host of different institutions.  In the same way that 
macro deliberation works by separating either the individuals involved or the 
deliberative process itself into smaller elements, third-generation models of deliberative 
democracy work by splitting the democratic system up into various smaller units.  In 
this sense, they aim to describe a system of governance and decision-making that is both 
more applicable, and similarly more closely reflects, contemporary democratic political 
systems. 
 
Discussions regarding macro models of deliberative democracy have largely centred 
around two related issues.  The first is which institutions should be included in any 
formulation, whilst the second asks how these various institutions should be linked with 
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each other.  But before I continue with this discussion, I want to draw upon a distinction 
made by Dryzek (2008), who examines how a deliberative democracy might be 
envisaged on the largest scale of all – that of a transnational level.  In it, he argues for a 
differentiation between three different planes of formality in describing a macro 
democratic process.   
 
The first, which relies heavily on an idea also presented in Hendriks’ (2009), is the idea 
of a deliberative democratic ‘soup’.  According to this interpretation, a macro model of 
deliberative democracy should include a host of different institutions that satisfy both 
deliberative and democratic functions, but do so in an entirely unstructured and non-
systematic manner.  For example then, a ‘soup’ might include the use of mini publics 
that perform well on deliberative criteria, and it might also include an election process 
for a legislature that involves all citizens in an equal manner.  What it does not include, 
however, is any normative, formalised link between these two institutions.  A 
deliberative democratic soup pays no attention to the order, or how the mini publics 
might be linked to the election process: all that matters is that both institutions merely 
exist. The second interpretation, which he terms a deliberative ‘society’, is slightly more 
structured than a soup, because it ‘has norms and discourses that regulate the activates 
of and interactions of all the relevant composite members’ (Dryzek 2008; p. 5).  In this 
sense, a deliberative society, whilst it does not suggest that institutions should be 
structured according to a formalised normative framework, does argue that the 
individuals involved possess certain values and norms.  These values and norms are 
expected to guide both the behaviour of individuals, as well as provide some basis for 
how the institutions are related with each other in the overall process.  The crucial point 
to draw out though, is that because the values and norms are socially constructed, they 
are free to change at any point. To put it more simply, a deliberative society relies on 
endogenously determined criteria to guide the deliberative democratic decision-making 
process. 
 
The final interpretation, and the one which has proven the single most popular in 
democratic theory, is the concept of a deliberative democratic ‘system’ (DDS).   The 
term, first utilised by Mansbridge (1999) in an article discussing the importance of 
‘everyday talk’, represents the most structured way of conceptualising a deliberative 
democracy on the macro scale.  A system, as with a ‘soup’, includes a number of 
different institutions that perform various different deliberative and democratic 
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functions alike.  It also relies on certain values and norms to help shape the process, 
mirroring the idea of a deliberative democratic society.  Where it differs, however, is the 
fact that some of these norms are now expected to provide the explicit structure, and 
required rationale, of the decision-making process.  More specifically, a deliberative 
democratic system should function in a manner as close as possible to the ideal 
requirements established in second-generation, unitary accounts.    Numerous 
deliberative democrats have since offered different accounts of deliberative democratic 
systems, including Mansbridge (1999), Ackerman and Fishkin (2002, 2005), Goodin 
(2005), Hendriks (2006) and Parkinson (2006a).61 Whilst differing in their respective 
focus and approach, all share five common characteristics built into their models.  These 
include a public space, an empowered space, a transmission mechanism between them, 
the accountability of the latter to the former, and the opportunity for individuals to 
deliberate over the make up of the system (Dryzek 2008; pp.8-9).  Very briefly, let me 
discuss the three most relevant to my overall argument.62 
 
Public Space 
The idea of public space, in which individuals are free to associate and communicate 
with each other, is akin to Habermas’ (1996b) articulation of the ‘informal public 
sphere’ in his two-track model of politics.  Although modelled as having no formal 
power to actually make collective decisions, public space is argued to discharge a 
number of other essential democratic functions.  As Habermas so succinctly puts it, 
then: 
 
[…] new problem situations can be perceived more sensitively, discourses aimed 
at achieving self-understanding can be conducted more widely and expressively, 
collective identities and need interpretations can be articulated with fewer 
compulsions than is the case in procedurally regulated public spheres. 
(Habermas 1996b; p. 308) 
 
Relating this to the literature on deliberative systems, Mansbridge (1999), for example, 
focuses on the role that ‘everyday talk’ plays in satisfying this criterion.  Goodin (2005), 
conversely, describes a deliberative system specifically in relation to a liberal 
representative democracy, and relies solely on the free election campaign to fulfil this 
                                                 
61 The phrase can also be found in Thompson (2008), Bohman (2009) and Mansbridge (2010b), which 
gives an indication of the general direction of the field of study. 
62 The first three represent the substantive features that allow me to then consider the ‘type of macro 
deliberation’ which they rely upon, in the following section. 
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element.  For Parkinson (2006a) and Hendriks (2006) on the other hand, who sketch a 
slightly more institution-based articulation, this might also include things like 
participation in activist networks, political protests, or the media.  Finally, Ackerman 
and Fishkin (2002) offer perhaps the most radical account, when they argue for all 
citizens to attend separate forums to participate in structured deliberations to guide 
subsequent political action. Different formulations might include different institutions 
then; but they all have at least one that performs this function.   Importantly, within a 
deliberative system the fact that this space is open and available to all citizens has 
significant impact on both the nature of participation found within it (which I will 
consider in the next section), and the role it plays in the wider process.  Habermas, 
Ackerman and Fishkin, Mansbridge, Goodin, Hendriks and Parkinson all suggest in 
various guises, for instance, that the institutions found within ‘public space’ are 
especially effective at securing the ‘democratic’ foundation for the deliberative 
democratic system.   
 
Empowered Space 
The notion of empowered space again draws upon Habermas’ work (1996b), but this 
time is representative of the arena he referred to as the ‘formal political process’.  This 
second element of the two-track model relates directly to more conventional political 
institutions that are required to make the binding collective decisions.  In Goodin 
(2005), Parkinson (2006a), and Hendriks (2006), this remains the prevue of an elected 
representative assembly. But it is possible to also consider other ‘less’ democratic 
institutions that might be asked to perform this function.  For example in constitutional 
democracies, it is often the role of the appointed judiciary to provide the final 
judgement as to whether a collective decision is legitimate.  Something like a Supreme 
Court, then, might fulfil this requirement.  Ackerman and Fishkin’s (2002, 2005) focus 
on the Presidential election is perhaps the least ‘democratic’ example in action, as it 
reflects a single individual who makes up the arena.   
 
The privileged nature of this forum, compared with that of public space, means it has 
subsequent different resultant obligations placed upon it.  For instance, the fact that it is 
composed of a much smaller number of individuals means it is much more likely to be 
able to secure higher quality (even unitary) deliberation.  Because of this, most accounts 
(notably not Ackerman and Fishkin’s, though) tend to suggest this institution as the 
element best (although not uniquely) equipped to provide the main ‘deliberative’ thrust 
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of the deliberative democratic system.  If public space is to provide most of the 
‘democraticness’ then, empowered space is argued to add the ‘deliberativeness’.   
 
Transmission Process 
In establishing two distinct elements of a larger deliberative democratic system, the 
obvious next issue to consider is how they are linked.  This is essential for the process 
to work as a ‘system’ rather than a ‘deliberative democratic soup’.  But more 
importantly, political legitimacy is dependent on the transmission process between these 
two respective segments of the larger process.  As Cohen (1999; p. 409) argues: ‘the 
two-track model indicates how (communicative power) might flow from citizens, 
reasoning in a dispersed network, through a deliberative legislature, to administration’.  
 
As I suggested in section 7.2.1 regarding sequenced deliberation, deliberative 
democratic systems rely on certain types of institutions to provide this service. 
Ackerman and Fishkins’s (2002 2005) model offers perhaps the simplest example of 
this in action, where preferences constructed in the public space are fed into the 
empowered space via the casting of electoral ballots.  Taking a slightly different (and 
more deliberative) approach, Hendriks (2006; p.500) refers to these as ‘mixed 
discursive spheres’, whilst Parkinson (2006a; p. 166) prefers the term ‘middle 
democracy’.  Both, however, appeal to rather similar instances of the process in action.  
They suggest examples including mini publics (citizens’ juries, consensus conferences 
etc), facilitated town hall meetings, public seminars and even the media.  The key point 
to take, however, is that Hendriks and Parkinson favour a mixed approach to this aspect 
of the system. 
 
7.2.3 DELIBERATION IN DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS 
 
Dryzek’s (2008) classification of the features that deliberative democratic systems 
incorporate offers a useful analytical framework for describing these models.  What it 
omits to consider, however, is the type(s) of deliberation they each rely upon.  In this 
section, I want to address this shortfall, and discuss which of the various conceptions of 
macro deliberation detailed above are present in deliberative democratic systems.   
 
The overall picture of the accounts offered by Mansbridge (1999), Ackerman and 
Fishkin (2002, 2005), Goodin (2005), Hendriks (2006) and Parkinson (2006a), then, is 
one of a sequenced deliberation.  But within this, it is also possible to identify the 
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presence of other formulations.  Consider how deliberative democratic systems work.  
They begin by segmenting the deliberative democratic process into different arenas, 
which in turn fulfil different phases of the structural account of deliberation.  From this, 
and because certain arenas/phases clearly lend themselves to performing better 
according to different ideal behavioural criteria, a subsequent division on this dimension 
is also undertaken.  Moreover, not all individuals are required to participate in all of the 
different institutions or arenas, although a degree of overlap is present. From a holistic 
perspective, a deliberative democratic system therefore ticks all four of the boxes that 
define a sequenced deliberation. 
 
But this is not the entire story.  Looking at the two distinct arenas as well as that of the 
transmission process, it is clear that different accounts of deliberation dominate in each 
of them.  In the formal empowered space, the relatively small number of individuals 
expected (or indeed allowed) to participate facilitates the use of the ‘gold standard’ – it 
is able to proceed on the basis of unitary deliberation.  Conversely, the public space, 
because of the requirement for it to act as the main democratic element in the system, 
involves far more individuals. As a consequence, it must rely on either disjointed or 
parallel deliberation to ensure all individuals are able to participate in a deliberative 
fashion.  And finally, within Parkinson (2006a) and Hendrik’s (2006) descriptions of 
‘middle democracy’ or ‘mixed discursive spheres’, it is a mixture of all types of 
deliberation that predominates.  In this element, the result of the large-scale disjointed 
process is taken into numerous different deliberative forums before it is finally fed into 
the unitary empowered space. 
 
Deliberative democratic systems, then, are examples of a sequenced deliberative 
process, which in turn is constituted by unitary, parallel and disjointed formulations of 
macro deliberation.  Most crucially, because of the associated ‘transmission problem’ 
generated by the parallel and disjointed articulations, the argument that a deliberative 
democratic system represents a less preferred account of deliberative democracy than 
that of a wholly unitary conception can of course be levelled. The problem, to put it 
quite simply, is that the only guaranteed way to ensure the contestation of all 
preferences and perspectives is to allow all individuals to deliberate with each other.  
Relaxing this maxim, as I argued in section 7.2.1, solves the scale problem at the cost of 
this requirement.  To sum up this argument in Parkinson’s (2006a) words then: 
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[…] while we can imagine a deliberative system that is more legitimate than 
current arrangements, no one event can ever be fully legitimate and at the same 
time strictly deliberative, because not all the elements of legitimacy, democracy 
and deliberation can be present in one process. 
(Parkinson 2006a; pp. 174-175) 
 
7.3 AGENCY REVISION AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS  
 
Again let me briefly summarise where my argument has reached. So far in this 
concluding chapter, I have presented an outline and analysis of the different accounts of 
macro deliberation and approaches to macro deliberative democracy.  I have then 
suggested that because the latter so relies upon the former, that the deliberative problem 
of ‘transmission’ (which is generated in an attempt to solve the issue of scale) can 
therefore be used to critique deliberative democratic systems on the same basis.  For this 
reason, the shift from second to third generation-accounts of deliberative democracy 
might be seen as one of compromise.  As Parkinson argues, ‘the ideal remains the full 
involvement of every citizen in every collective decision that affects them’ (Parkinson 
2006a; p. 151), or for Goodin: 
 
Let us concede from the start that the ‘ideal speech situation’ would be best. The 
very best deliberation, let us suppose, would indeed be a cooperative game 
among all players in which all the deliberative virtues would be simultaneously 
and continuously on display.  
(Goodin 2005; p. 193) 
 
In this final section, I want to tentatively suggest a different argument on the basis of the 
analysis and experimental results outlined in the preceding chapters.  By applying the 
topic of agency revision to macro accounts of deliberation, I will demonstrate that 
deliberative democratic systems might not be seen as ‘second-best’ on all dimensions.  
To do this, and following a distinction I made in chapter six, I want to differentiate my 
argument on the basis of two distinct levels of magnitude.  The first, based on the non-
robust interpretation of the data, is the (much) weaker of the two, although it is rooted in 
more reliable empirical foundations.  The second, which emanates from the robust 
interpretation of the data, involves a stronger conclusion, although does so from a 
weaker empirical standpoint.  But before I get to this, let me briefly summarise the 
argument I outlined in chapter two regarding the assumption, and normative 
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justification, of agency revision in deliberation.  Using the rational choice approach, I 
suggested three ‘reasons’ for the favourability of democratic decision-making that 
triggered agency revision and caused individuals to become ‘team-reasoners’.  
Respectively, these justifications were as follows: 
 
 ‘Solving’ social dilemma encounters 
 Creating increased levels of trust amongst individuals 
 Acting as an important element of community generation 
 
Taken together these arguments therefore turn agency revision into an alternative 
dimension, other than the issue of legitimacy, upon which deliberative models of 
democracy can be normatively ‘judged’.  As a consequence, the question that can be 
derived from this supposition is whether a deliberative democratic system, compared 
with that of unitary deliberative democracy, is likely to deliver the same positive effects.  
It is this final line of inquiry that I now consider. 
 
7.3.1 NON ROBUST INTERPRETATION OF THE EXPERIMENTAL DATA  
 
The first crucial point to make regarding the results from the experiments on agency 
revision is to look at the type of deliberation they were based upon.  The use of a mini 
public, although structured according to four different sessions, was designed to reflect 
the principles associated with second-generation models of deliberation.  This includes 
the requirement that a single group of individuals were involved in the entire process, 
and that all behavioural criteria were present in the single forum.  In this sense, the 
results clearly reflect an investigation of a unitary (often termed micro) account of 
deliberation.  Let me restate the result derived in chapter six that was based on a non-
robust interpretation of the data then: 
 
Micro Result One: Deliberation does not necessarily lead to agency 
revision amongst the individuals involved in the process, particularly in 
cases where deep disagreement amongst individuals is present. 
 
Appropriately, this statement can be directly linked to the question of systematising 
deliberative democracy.  In this case the experimental results relating specifically to a 
unitary conception of deliberation seem to suggest that the normative claim made in 
deliberative models of democracy does not always manifest itself. This result, crucially, 
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appeared to hold across all three definitions of a ‘we’ that were tested for.  Team 
reasoners were not created in relation to the deliberating group, to the general public, 
and nor in relation to being a member of any deliberating group.  Interpreting the data 
this way, it argues that no agency revision has occurred even under a unitary approach 
to deliberation.  So long as parallel, disjointed, distributed or sequenced articulations of 
deliberation do not work to reduce the number of team-reasoners, then they must be 
considered no ‘worse’ than a unitary articulation on this dimension.  Extending this 
analysis to deliberative democracy, the conclusion can be drawn that at the very least, 
the shift from a second to a third-generation formulation does not result automatically in 
a ‘second best’ alternative.  As a consequence, I would put forward the following claim 
regarding deliberative models of democracy on this basis: 
 
Conclusion One: on the dimension of agency revision, unitary conceptions 
of deliberative democracy do not necessarily perform better than systemic 
accounts of deliberative democracy. 
 
This conclusion, it should be noted, of course raises further empirical questions. Saying 
something does not necessarily perform worse, does not mean, of course, that it might 
not.  It simply states that without further investigation, the claim that a systematic 
approach to deliberative democracy is worse than a unitary approach cannot be made on 
the basis of agency revision.    
 
7.3.2 ROBUST INTERPRETATION OF THE EXPERIMENTAL DATA 
 
The second way of interpreting the data proceeds from the assumption that the low 
levels of significance were attributed to the small sample size, rather than a product of 
the effects of the deliberation itself.  On this understanding, the results suggest that 
unitary forms of deliberation can indeed deliver a small degree of agency 
transformation, but crucially, that it appears to diminish after an initial immediate 
increase during the process.  Indeed for games one to three (which partnered individuals 
with members of the same deliberative forum), the proportional increase of team-
reasoners at t4, although higher than at pre-test levels (t0), was significantly lower than 
at another time in the course of the process.  In short, it appears that there might be a 
point in the deliberation that eventually results in a reversal of the agency revision 
process. Or as Shapiro (2002; p. 196) might put it, it begs the question of ‘how much is 
too much deliberation?’ Recall the second result that I offered in chapter six: 
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Micro Result Two: Deliberation can trigger a small degree of agency 
revision, although the effect matches an inverse ‘U’ shape relationship 
with respect to members of the same deliberative forum and the general 
public. 
 
From this claim, it possible to draw some tentative conclusions regarding the sequenced 
nature of deliberation present in deliberative democratic systems.  As I demonstrated in 
chapter five, the structure of the mini public was designed to very roughly match that of 
the structural account of deliberation offered in chapter one.  The earlier phases, for 
example, were much more heavily weighted towards individuals participating in 
discussion focussing on education and information, whilst the latter sessions were 
designed to prompt more decision-focussed participation.  Matching these different 
sessions with the experimental results, it appears to support an element of the discussion 
in chapter three.  More specifically, in reconciling the structural account of deliberation 
with factors found to trigger social identity, I suggested that decision-focussed 
discussion, present particularly in the latter stages of a deliberation, could have the 
effect of priming personal identity.  By making individuals openly advocate for specific 
preferences in cases of deep disagreement (even if these competing preferences were 
believed to represent a common good), it was likely that agency revision might take 
place in the opposite direction. 
 
Second-generation accounts of deliberative democracy rely on a unitary conception of 
deliberation.  All individuals affected by a decision are required to participate in all 
various deliberative phases with everybody else. The modest overall increase in the 
number of team-reasoners can therefore be used to justify support for second-generation 
models over wholly aggregate accounts of democracy.  However, the inverse ‘U’ shape 
relationship within the data demonstrates that a stronger case can be made for 
democratic decision-making that requires individuals to only participate in an optimal 
amount of deliberation.  Deliberative democratic systems, because they proceed on a 
sequenced basis, do not require all individuals to participate in a full deliberation.  
Indeed in Fishkin and Ackerman (2002, 2005), Goodin (2005), Hendriks (2006) and 
Parkinson (2006a), the only arena that requires universal participation is that which 
represents the public space.  The formal decision-making aspect of the deliberation, 
including a discursive attempt at consensus, takes place in a highly restricted and small-
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scale assembly.  From the perspective that an approach is to be judged on the number of 
team-reasoners that it produces, then, it is possible to envisage a situation where 
deliberative democratic systems actually fare better than unitary accounts of deliberative 
democracy.  If the vast majority of individuals are required only to participate in the 
early deliberative phases, then the positive agency revision effects cannot then be 
reversed by the more decision-focussed phases of the process.  This leads to the second 
conclusion relating to deliberative models of democracy: 
 
Conclusion Two: sequenced deliberation may actually result in more team-
reasoners than a unitary approach.  In this case and on this dimension, 
deliberative democratic systems might be seen as more preferable than 
unitary deliberative democracy.  
 
An approach that assumes a robust interpretation of the experimental data also 
highlights the results of games four and five as conceptually interesting.  In these two 
interactions, individuals were respectively partnered with a member of the general 
public, and another deliberating group who they had never met.  In relation to the latter 
type of ‘we’, the number of individuals employing team reasoning increased (and 
stabilised) over the course of the deliberation.  It did not show an inverse ‘U’ shape 
relationship.  Recall result three that I outlined in chapter six then: 
 
Micro Result Three: Even under conditions assumed in result two, 
deliberation can cause sustained agency revision in reference to other 
members of another deliberating group. 
 
So what do these two results, taken together, say about different formulations of 
deliberation, and through that, about deliberative democratic systems more generally?  
Most simply, a comparison can be drawn with the notion of ‘another deliberating group’ 
and the parallel and disjointed articulations of deliberation discussed above.  These 
particular accounts rely on the fact that individuals, although participating in the same 
overall process, do not necessarily come into contact with all the other individuals also 
involved.  Even in disjointed deliberation, where there is some element of cross 
membership, the vast majority of participants do not take part in the physical action of 
deliberation with each other.  Game five, which explicitly identified the co player as 
being a member of a different, but related deliberative forum, can therefore be seen as 
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testing this approach.   Whilst the number of individuals employing team reasoning in 
reference to members of the same group declined towards the latter stages of the 
deliberation, this reduction was not seen in relation to members of another deliberating 
group. In other words, the fact that parallel and disjointed articulations of deliberation 
do not require everybody to deliberate with everybody else might actually be beneficial.  
To put it quite simply, they may in fact create more team-reasoners than a unitary 
articulation. 
 
Linking this to the notion of a deliberative democratic system, the argument is slightly 
more complex than a simple transposition of the claim that it might fare better than a 
unitary account on this dimension.  Parallel and disjointed formats of deliberation are 
indeed involved in the makeup of most if not all of the systematic accounts.  But they 
have different levels of importance and formality in them.  Consider the approach taken 
by Mansbridge (1999), Goodin (2005), Hendriks (2006) and Parkinson (2006a).  The 
public space present in their relative deliberative democratic systems are by design, 
highly unstructured.  Indeed, the dynamic and spontaneous nature of this arena is 
considered an essential feature in satisfying the democratic aspect of the decision-
making process.  In these types of model then, it is more likely that the individuals 
involved will see the other participants who they are not in contact with, as merely 
members of the general public.  The experimental results from game four, which tested 
the presence of agency revision to team reasoning in respect to this group, mimics that 
of games one to three – an inverse ‘U’ shape relationship.  On the other hand, where 
parallel and disjointed accounts are relied upon to deliver both deliberative and 
democratic elements of the system, for example in Ackerman and Fishkin’s (2002, 
2005) notion of a deliberation day, the outcome is slightly different.  By formalising the 
various forums or groups, individuals are likely to become much more aware that others 
are engaged in a similar deliberative process.  In turn, this changes the perception of the 
other individuals as a member of the general public to that of a member of another 
deliberating group, securing more agency revision.  The final tentative conclusion that I 
want to draw from the data then, is as follows: 
 
Conclusion Three: parallel and disjointed deliberation may actually result 
in more team-reasoners than a unitary approach.  In this case and on this 
dimension, deliberative democratic systems might be seen as more 
preferable than unitary deliberative democracy.  
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7.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FURTHER RESEARCH  
 
The various chapters of this thesis have had a number of different objectives.  They 
have drawn on a host of different literatures and approaches to conceptually and 
empirically investigate the twin concepts of deliberation and deliberative democracy.  
Focussing on the issue of deliberative revision, I have demonstrated the conceptual 
distinction between the three layers of issue, preference and agency.  I have then 
devised and undertaken empirical work in order to investigate the latter of these areas.  
The results, although representative of an extremely small sample size, offer some 
useful insights into the nature of deliberation, and in particular, the shift from a unitary 
to a systematic approach to deliberative democratic theory. 
 
It is also worth noting that my results also raise some important further research 
questions.  In relation to studying unitary deliberation at the micro level, a number of 
other variables can be identified as interesting for empirical investigation.  For example, 
one particular issue to look at is the degree to which the topic under consideration 
impacts upon agency revision. Does deliberation cause less agency revision for 
individuals involved in more controversial topics, and how do the initial preferences of 
the individuals involved relate to this?  This links specifically to the important question 
of whether deliberation is always appropriate for decision-making over all issues.  In 
short, is deliberation always better than a wholly aggregative methodology?   
 
Finally, and linked to the argument considered in this final chapter, I also want to 
highlight the possibility of more detailed investigation of the impact of specific phases 
in the deliberative process. My results suggest that earlier phases in the process appear 
to have a greater positive impact on triggering agency revision to team reasoning.  
Further investigation of this question, taken in conjunction with the macro articulation 
of a sequenced process, will have significant impact on how it is then applied in the 
third generation approaches discussed above.  In short, I conclude this thesis by pointing 
out that further empirical investigation and analysis is required in order to inform 
normative deliberative democratic theory.    
 
 
 193 
VI. APPENDIX ONE: THE EXPERIMENT  
 
Instructions – an Example 
You are playing a game against another person sat in this room.  This person will be 
randomly assigned, and neither you nor they will know whom each other are.  The 
outcome of the game is dependent on both yours, and your co-player’s choices. 
 
In front of you are two buttons.  One is labelled “A”, and the other “B”. 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
In the game, both you and your co-player are going to press one of the two buttons. 
 
If you both press button “A”, then you get £8, and they get £8. 
 
If you press “A”, but your co-player presses “B”, then you get £0, and they get £15. 
 
If you press “B”, and your co-player presses “A”, then you get £15 and they get £0. 
 
If you press “B”, and your co-player presses B, then you get £5, and they get £5. 
 
 
Game Choice: Please circle the button you wish to press: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A B 
A B 
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NB. Over the course of the following 5 games, you will be playing in order to collect 
points.  At the end of the 4 discussion sessions, these points will be converted into 
tickets in lottery to win one of two cash prizes of £100.   
 
Game 1 
You are playing a game against another person sat in this room.  This person will be 
randomly assigned, and neither you nor they will know whom each other are.   
 
In front of you are two buttons.  One is labelled “A”, and the other “B”. 
 
 
 
   
 
In the game, both you and your co-player are going to press one of the two buttons. 
 
You Press They Press You Get They Get 
A A 5 points 5 points 
A B 10 points 4 points 
B A 3 points 10 points 
B B 7 points 7 points 
 
Game Choice: Please circle the button you wish to press: 
 
 
 
 
Game 2 
You are playing a game against another person sat in this room.  This person will be 
randomly assigned, and neither you nor they will know whom each other are.   
 
In front of you are two buttons.  One is labelled “A”, and the other “B”. 
 
 
 
   
 
In the game, both you and your co-player are going to press one of the two buttons. 
 
You Press They Press You Get They Get 
A A 7 points 7 points 
A B 2 points 11 points 
B A 10 points 2 points 
B B 4 points 4 points 
 
Game Choice: Please circle the button you wish to press: 
 
 
 
A B 
A B 
A B 
A B 
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Game 3 
You are playing a game against another person sat in this room.  This person will be 
randomly assigned, and neither you nor they will know whom each other are.   
 
In front of you are two buttons.  One is labelled “A”, and the other “B”. 
 
 
 
   
 
In the game, both you and your co-player are going to press one of the two buttons. 
 
You Press They Press You Get They Get 
A A 10 points 10 points 
A B 20 points 2 points 
B A 2 points 16 points 
B B 15 points 15 points 
 
Game Choice: Please circle the button you wish to press: 
 
 
 
 
 
Game 4 (please note a slight difference) 
You are playing a game against a randomly selected student from the University of 
York.  This person will be randomly assigned. 
 
In front of you are two buttons.  One is labelled “A”, and the other “B”. 
 
 
 
   
 
In the game, both you and your co-player are going to press one of the two buttons. 
 
You Press They Press You Get They Get 
A A 11 points 11 points 
A B 2 points 16 points 
B A 17 points 3 points 
B B 4 points 4 points 
 
Game Choice: Please circle the button you wish to press: 
 
 
 
 
 
A B 
A B 
A B 
A B 
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Game 5 (again please note another difference) 
You are playing a game against another person in a similar deliberating group.   
This person will be randomly assigned. 
 
In front of you are two buttons.  One is labelled “A”, and the other “B”. 
 
 
 
   
 
In the game, both you and your co-player are going to press one of the two buttons. 
 
You Press They Press You Get They Get 
A A 4 points 4 points 
A B 20 points 2 points 
B A 3 points 20 points 
B B 13 points 13 points 
 
Game Choice: Please circle the button you wish to press: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I hereby give permission for Thomas Flynn to use the results of these games for 
academic research, and more specifically, as material for submission in a PhD thesis. 
 
 
Name: _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Signature: ______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Date: _________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A B 
A B 
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